Participation by banks in other branches of the economy. Studies: Competition - Approximation of Legislation Series 25, 1975 by Immenga, Ulrich
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Participation by banks 
in other branches 
of the economy 
COMPETITION - APPROXIMATION OF LEGISLATION SERIES - 1975 -25 
I The taking of participation - i.e. shareholdings which carry power to influence an-
other company, plays a big role in banking legislation: many states have forbidden 
their banks to acquire such holdings in the non-banking sectors of the economy; in 
other countries, where the banks are allowed to participate, the legal controls on this 
facility have become the subject of discussion. 
The present study describes the legal situation in the member states of the EEC, and 
puts in perspective the arguments used for and against participation in non-banking 
sectors by the banks: the risk as well as the position of power resulting from such par-
ticipation; the use of participation during the crisis of an enterprise, and many other 
aspects. The study concludes by recommending as a compromise solution, in view of 
eventual harmonization in this area, the facility of participatory holdings within cer-
tain fixed legal limits. Participation by banks 
in other branches of the economy 
An opinion on the economic, competitive and opera-
tional advantages and disadvantages of such participation 
on the basis of the statutory provisions of the Member 
States of the European Communities 
On behalf of the 
Commission of the European Communities 
Prepared by Professor 
Dr. Ulrich Immenga, Göttingen/Lausanne 
Göttingen, February 1975 
STUDIES 
Competition — Approximation of legislation Series No. 25 
Brussels, February 1975 SUMMARY 
Chapter one : Introduction 1 
ï) The concept of paxticipation 1 
II) Delimitation of the subject matter for 
investigation 3 
III) Implementation of the investigation 3 
Chapter two : The legal position and operating 
conditions in the Member States 
of the European Community 4 
ï) Belgium 4 
1) The separation system 4 
2) Exceptions to the prohibition on participation 6 
3) Problems of the separation system 8 
II) Federal Republic of Germany 9 
1) The legal position 9 
2) Participation in practice 11 
3) Proposals for reform 12 
III) Denmark 13 
1) Legal "bases 13 
2) Participation in practice 15 
IV) Prance 15 
1) The legal "bases of separate operation 15 
2) Participation in practice 18 
V) Great Britain 20 
1) Bases of the "banking system 20 
2) Participation in practice 24 
3) Trends 24 
VI) Ireland 25 
1) The legal bases 25 
2) Participation in practice 26 
VII) Italy 27 
1) The structure of the banking system 27 
2) Participation by the commercial banks 28 
3) Participation in the longer-term financial 
sector 29 Vili) Luxembourg 30 
IX) The Netherlands 32 
1) The legal bases 32 
2) Participation in practice 34 
3) Proposed reforms 34 
X) Results of the comparative survey 
of the legal position 35 
1) Control systems and criteria in 
Member States 35 
2) Participation practice in the 
European Community 37 
Chapter three : Reasons why banks participate 
in the non-banking sector 39 
ï) Introduction 39 
II) Participation as a consequence of bank's 
restricted freedom of action (unplanned 
investment) 40 
1) Participation resulting from unplaced 
new issues 40 
2) Participation as a consequence of 
price support operations 42 
3) Participation through recovery of bad debts 44 
4) Unplanned participation within the scope 
of commercial banking policy 46 
III) Planned participation 48 
1) General prerequisites for planned 
participation 48 
2) The special status of banks in investment 
business 48 
3) Planned participation within the scope 
of banking objectives 50 
4) Influence on the undertaking the object 
of planned participation ? 53 
5) Further motives for acquisition 57 
IV) Conclusions 58 
Chapter four : Non-banking areas affected by 
participation 6l 
ï) Procedure of the investigation 61 
II -Il) Banks' customers as depositors 63 
1) Liquidity problems caused by participation 64 
2) Security risks participation 66 
3) Unplanned participation and the protection 
of depositors 68 
4) The significance of depositor protection 68 
III) The banks' customers as investors 7° 
1) Investment advice with regard to participatory 
holdings 70 
2) Investment advice and inside information 7I 
3) Would competitive conditions produce 
objective investment advice ? 72 
IV) The stock market and capital market 73 
1) Trading in large parcels of shares by 
the banks 73 
2) Share price manipulation 75 
3) The secret building up of participatory 
holdings 76 
4) Advantages enjoyed by those with inside 
information 78 
5) The importance of participation for the 
capital market 79 
Digression : Companies' decision-making and the 
influence of the banks 82 
1) Voting rights from participatory 
holdings 82 
2) Bank-linked investment companies 83 
3) The right to vote on deposited shares 84 
4) Credit relationships 86 
5) Personal involvement 87 
6) Conclusions 87 
V) Market interests 88 
1) Market relationships of undertakings 88 
2) The market for undertakings 89 
3) Competition between banks 92 
III Vi) The undertakings affected by the 
participatory shareholding 94 
1) Possibilities of undertakings being 
put at a disadvantage in banking 
relationships 94 
2) Possibilities of undertakings being put 
at a disadvantage directly through the 
exercise by banks of powers under company 
law 96 
3) Conclusion 98 
Vil) The power aspect 99 
Chapter five : Conclusions from the analysis of the 
banking and non-banking effects of 
participation 103 
I) Positive effects 103 
1) Banking policy 103 
2) The capital market IO5 
II) Negative effects 106 
1) Solving the problems without controlling 
participatory share ownership IO6 
2) Participatory share ownership as a 
criterion for control IO8 
III) Assessment of the relative importance of 
the interests involved 112 
1) Assessment of the relative importance 
of the interests involved in the sphere 
of banking policy 113 
2) Assessment of the relative importance 
of the interests involved in the sphere 
of influence on business undertakings 114 
3) Taking capital market functions into 
account 115 
IV) Relevant interests in the "separation 
system" 116 
Chapter six : The effects of differences in 
Member States' regulations on the 
European Community's integration 
objectives 119 
ï) The present state of integration 119 
II) Legal differences and a common banking 
market 120 
l) Competitive advantages for banking ? 120 
IV 2) Competitive advantages as a result of 
influence based on company law 122 
III) Legal differences and integration of the 
capital market 123 
IV) The harmonization of legal differences 
from the supervisory law aspect 124 
Chapter seven : Development of a proposal for 
legislation 127 
ï) Possible methods of control and their 
relevance to present problems 127 
1) Prohibition of participation 127 
2) Limitation in proportion to own 
resources 127 
3) Limitation of the level of participation 
in individual undertakings
 ! 128 
4) Restriction on the exercise of voting 
rights 129 
II) Proposal for legislation 129 
1) Limits to participation 129 
2) Exceptional provisions 131 
3) Combatiig circumvention of the provisions 133 
Bibliography 137 
Notes 147 
Annex I 159 
Annex II ΐγγ 
V CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
I) The concept of participation 
The concept of participation must for the purposes of our investigation 
essentially be taken in its widest interpretation. Participatory 
investments form part of an undertaking's £long-termj financial assets 
which also include items held in portfolio (securities). No clear dividing 
line can be drawn between the two but a distinction may be made with the 
help of commercial criteria. Where the banks' concern in acquiring shares 
in companies is solely to employ surplus liquidity, the matter is generally 
one of "portfolio" interests. But "participation", on the other hand, is 
said to exist where there is an intention to participate C'. What is not 
very clear is to what end the intention to participate should be directed. 
As a purely negative limitation, reference is made to objectives that go 
beyond mere considerations of the investment of funds on profitability 
grounds (2), 
If an intention to participate is to be distinguished from a simple desire 
to invest, a minimum prerequisite for assuming that participation exists is 
the presence of a realizable relationship to the subject matter of 
participation. This relationship must extend beyond the desire to invest. 
Participation may always be said to exist if influence can in any way be 
exercised over the subject matter of participation. Influence is acquired 
in the case of a financial asset where the latter consists of company 
securities. These grant property and management rights; the latter include 
in particular the right to vote, the exercise of which allows genuine 
involvement in the company. On this interpretation, all shareholding rights 
in companies, such as shares in the partnership capital of partnerships and 
shares in joint-stock companies (public or private AG or GmbH) may be 
regarded as participation. The share as a form of participation is clearly 
predominant here. It is very easily interchangeable under all legal systems and consequently permits of rapid changes in ownership and anonymous 
acquisition. Moreover, the leading undertakings are constituted in the 
form of public limited liability companies. 
The opportunity to influence, as a criterion for the differentiation of 
portfolio and participation investment, must apply independently of the 
commercial interests that such investment creates. Participation may, 
therefore, not only be said to arise if it follows from business involvement 
in the company whose shares are acquired. It would otherwise be necessary 
to prove an objective of this kind in the banks' participatory investment 
policy which, in the case of investment in the non-banking sector, would be 
extremely difficult, to say the least. Nor can it be a matter of whether 
the shares are created or acquired directly in the banks' interests or at 
the instigation of the companies themselves, or indeed in the interests of 
outsiders. The only interpretation of the participation concept that can 
do justice to the banks' participation policy is one which, as we shall see, 
is characterized by the most varied of motives. 
It is not possible to generalize quantitatively as to when a potential for 
influence may be said to exist. It is certainly not enough to take as a 
criterion the existence of a majority holding or a holding capable of 
blocking resolutions requiring a special majority (blocking minority)(3). 
The threshold of influence may lie a good deal lower, depending on the 
distribution of shares. Moreover, significant rights (e.g. to apply to 
the courts) may in fact be granted to smaller minorities under the various 
company law systems of the Member States. Only where holdings are really 
minimal is it possible, therefore, to assume that the influence capable of 
being exerted is negligible. As soon as an opportunity for influence arises, 
shareholding interests can be pursued which are different from those of other 
investments in securities. However, the holding must be of a certain 
duration; no influence can effectively be wielded under only a short-term 
title to shareholders' rights. Il) Delimitation of the subject matter for investigation 
Participation by banks characterized in this way may be divided into two 
sectors: the banking and financial sector on the one hand and the rest 
of the economy on the other. Participation through the creation of 
subsidiaries and joint ventures in the banking and financial sector takes 
the form, in the first instance, of investment in other financial institutions. 
These are frequently banks specializing in a particular business (e.g. external 
trade, mortgages, instalment loan financing, etc.). With regard to the 
remainder of the financial sector, mention may be made in the first place 
of investment companies. Secondly, the banks frequently have interests in 
the capital of finance companies, including factoring and leasing business. 
In this connexion, account should also be taken to an increasing extent of 
their shareholdings in companies operating data-processing equipment and 
undertaking the rationalization of banking business. 
Such participation is characterized by specific objectives. It is a means 
of extending the range of banking services since it is related to the 
(banking) industry. A positive change in a bank's capabilities is sought^ . 
This aspect of participation does not arise where it relates to the non-banking 
sector. Other motives and interests that require further examination are 
concerned in this case. A differentiation of participation according to 
the banking and financial sector on the one hand and the rest of the economy 
on the other is therefore necessary. This will allow the investigation to 
be restricted and participation in the banking and financial sector to be 
ignored. 
Ill) Implementation of the investigation 
The investigation is introduced by a survey of the legal position and 
operating conditions in the Member States of the European Community. The 
banking system in the individual countries will not be described except 
where there is a direct connexion with the question of participation. Such 
a limitation is justified by the existence of recent accounts of the banking 
(5)  systems in the European Community
w/. The main part of the investigation is concerned with the question of the 
importance and effects of banks' participation in the non-banking sector. 
The interests affected are assessed and possible solutions are proposed. 
In this connexion, opinions can sometimes be given on a sound basis only 
where it is known to what extent the problems dealt with can arise in Member 
States as a result of the differences in legal background (e.g. the impact 
of the right to vote on deposited shares, the provisions of company law, etc). 
This entailed a comparative investigation in the most varied fields of law 
which in this case could only be undertaken in summary form. An attempt has 
been made to give some insight and advice in the relevant connexion. No 
claim to comprehensiveness is made. 
The problems affecting the subject matter for investigation are essentially 
determined by whether a separation exists within a Member State between 
deposit and investment banks (the separation system) or whether the banks' 
range of business is unlimited (universal banking system). These 
distinguishing conditions will have to be continually borne in mind when 
assessing the effective scope of participation and when developing proposed 
solutions. 
CHAPTER TWO 
The legal position and operating conditions in the Member States of the 
European Community 
I) Belgium 
1) The separation system 
a) The universal banking system applied in Belgium up to the reform of the 
banking sector of 193 V35, when it was eliminated. Since then, a strict 
distinction has been drawn between deposit banks (banques de depots) and 
holding banks (sociétés financières). 
Deposit banks are commercial banks particularly engaged in short-term 
deposit and credit business. Only they may now describe themselves as 
banques. They may commence business only after registering with the 
Commission Bancaire. Deposit banks are prohibited in principle from participating in 
joint-stock companies and from joining a partnership as a partner. 
This principle is embodied in Article 1*f of Royal Decree No. 185, of 
1935. 
This radical intervention in Belgian banking came as a reaction to the 
world economic crisis. The concept of protecting deposits was clearly 
predominant in the new legislation^'. Savers' confidence was to be 
maintained. The explanatory memorandum states that participation, 
which was claimed often not to have been clearly evident in the balance-
sheets, had disguised the true financial position of the banks and that, 
furthermore, the prohibition on participation would reduce the risk 
attaching to the banks' lending business. This business was not to 
extend to share placings where sudden and substantial"falls in value 
could occur. The aim of this legislation was, further, to make banking 
business independent from other financial transactions. 
b) The separation between banking and investment business applies to deposit 
banks when they are in the form of joint-stock companies (public or 
private limited liability companies and limited partnerships with share 
capital). Deposit banks in the legal form of partnerships are not 
subject to the prohibition on participation (Art. 8, Decree No. 185). 
The reason for this rule is the difficulty of separating the general 
partner's partnership and private assets. This exception has not, 
however, given rise to difficulties^), it should be noted in this 
connexion that even in the case of banks in the legal form of partnerships, 
participation may be acquired only with the banks' own resources. 
Nor does the prohibition on participation apply to public-sector banking 
institutions or private savings banks^·?. 
c) The holding banks occupy an important position in business life^ . 
The largest company, the Société Générale de Belgique, had a stock 
exchange value at the end of 1970 of about 5% of the value of all shares 
quoted in Brussels. These sociétés financières may be distinguished from holding companies in other Member States chiefly in that they 
frequently hold a large number of participatory interests in different 
branches of the economy. However, a 25$ holding is not often reached. 
The holding banks tend as a rule to operate with participation holdings 
between 5$ and 25$ and, consequently, within a range which in several 
Member States lies between the investment fund and the group company 
qualifying for group tax concessions. 
These banks therefore fulfil important functions in the national economy. 
They initiate cooperation between undertakings, facilitate groupings and 
obtain an insight into a range of economic sectors, which assists them in 
their important role of company adviser. 
2) Exceptions to the prohibition on participation 
Even at the outset, the prohibition on participation was not entirely 
(5)  comprehensive
N. Provision was made for four exceptions. See also 
notes page 157· 
a) In the first instance, it is possible for deposit banks to participate 
in other banks. There axe no maximum limits so that, in theory, shares 
might be acquired beyond the level of the bank's own resources. This 
provision takes account of the trend towards concentration which is taking 
place in the banking system. In principle, too, it allows participation 
in foreign banks insofar as these may be regarded as deposit banks within 
the meaning of the Belgian law. However, an important exception in this 
case applies to foreign banks which for their part are permitted to 
participate in the non-banking sector. It would otherwise be possible 
to circumvent the Belgian prohibition on participation by working through 
a foreign bank. 
The exception provisions concern not only participation in banks within 
the meaning of the Act. The Commission Bancaire has in fact recently 
stated^ ' that participation is also admissible in the case of companies 
exercising banking functions as a secondary activity. Mention should be 
made in this connexion of factoring and leasing, and of the data-processing 
field. In this way, recent developments in the banking sector are 
appropriately taken into account. b) The prohibition on participation, further, does not extend to shares 
secured by government guarantee. The reason behind this, too, is the 
security of the participation as a component of lending business. Even 
so, however, the liquidity risk is not always eliminated. 
c) The deposit banks may, further, acquire shares in the short-term for 
re-sale (Art. ík (2)), in order to fulfil a capital market function at 
least to a circumscribed extent. They were originally permitted in this 
connexion only to subscribe for shares in the context of a new issue and 
to accept them for public offer for a period strictly limited to six 
months. 
By an Act of 3 May 1967» however, Article 1^ has been substantially 
modified. In the first place, it is now possible to acquire shares 
otherwise than by subscription, though no direct approach may be made 
to the stock market. The intention underlying this is to deprive such 
business a priori of any speculative aspect. 
In addition, sale need no longer take place only through public offer 
and, finally, the permitted term for holding shares has been extended 
to one year. The Commission Bancaire may, moreover, extend this period 
twice for one year in each case. In this way, the bank can have three 
years at its disposal in order to facilitate the favourable placing of 
shares. 
The Commission Bancaire has additionally retained the right, by means of 
regulations, to demand information regarding shareholdings permitted 
within these limits and to limit their extent in particular cases. 
The liberalization of the prohibition on participation linked with the 
modification of Article 14 is based on proposals made by a Commission 
set up by the Government. The Commission's recommendations had gone 
(n) 
quite a way further
w. The amendment to the Act therefore demonstrates 
the desire to adhere to the principle of the prohibition on participation. This is emphasized by the fact that shares may only be held temporarily 
for the purpose of re-sale (en vue de leur offre en vente). The object 
is thereby pursued of reacting more flexibly to the requirements of the 
capital market without neglecting the protection of depositors. To 
particularize: firstly, the opportunities for placing new issues on the 
market are improved. Secondly, the creditworthiness of undertakings 
is protected ih that fairly large quantities of shares suddenly released 
on to the market are acquired by the deposit banks in the interim until 
a new buyer appears. In accordance with these aims of the new rules of 
1967, the acquisition and sale of shares singly or in small quantities 
( R1 
is not permitted. Stock exchange dealing is therefore excluded . 
There is some doubt, however, as to whether such a restricted modification 
(q) 
can indeed achieve its intended economic objectives
X7'. 
d) Finally, the prohibition on participation is breached under Article 14 (3) 
in order to provide deposit banks with security against defaulting 
borrowers by means of debt conversion. Participation in a company by 
subscription or share acquisition up to the amount of loan granted can 
protect the bank against losses through failure of the borrower to make 
repayment. To this extent, the exception is in line with the intention 
to protect depositors. It should be noted that in such cases the shares 
must be re-sold within two years. The total of the participation 
investments of all deposit banks at the end of 1972 was put at 9·1 
thousand million Belgian francs . The participation probably relc 
for the most part, however, to banks and other financial institutions. 
3) Problems of the separation system 
It has always been recognized that even the abandonment of the universal 
banking system did not lead to a clear separation between banking and 
investment business. The reason for this lies in the influence that 
holding companies have on deposit banks, which has never quite been 
removed. This influence was, and still is, exercised through the 
holdings of the sociétés financières in the deposit banks. Indeed, the formation of new banks in consequence of the reform of 
193V35 occurred through a dispersal of banking business to new companies 
(11)  whose capital was largely taken up by holding companies . This 
type of corporate link was not in fact prohibited by the Act. The 
Commission Bancaire feared lest, as a consequence of these opportunities 
for control, financial and industrial groups would be able to pursue 
their own interests in the deposit banks to the detriment of the depositor. 
This threat to the independence of banking business had been of concern 
to the Commission Bancaire right from the start of the reform. The 
incompatibility of a seat on the board of a deposit bank with an 
equivalent position in a holding company, introduced under Article 16 
of Decree No. 185, could not guarantee the necessary independence. 
In the absence of other statutory bases, the Commission Bancaire has been 
seeking to prevent possible abuse by agreement with those concerned. 
In this connexion, mention should be made in particular of the protocol 
concluded at the beginning of 197^ between the Commission Bancaire and 
three leading banks (the Société Generale de Banque, the Banque de 
Bruxelles and the Kreditbank). The protocol relates in the first instance 
to the management body (comité de direction), which is to be composed 
exclusively of bankers; it guarantees its independence, including its 
basic right to make decisions on matters of remuneration. On the 
supervisory board (conseil d'administration) a balanced composition is 
to be ensured, in order to enable various interests to be represented 
and counter-balanced. The major shareholders who were party to the 
protocol undertook in particular not to alter their holdings without 
(12)  consulting the banks and the Commission Bancaire 
II) Federal Republic of Germany 
1) The legal position 
Germany is rightly regarded as the classic case of a country with a 
universal banking system. The institutions held to fall within this 
category may be distinguished according to three kinds of economic 
objective, as follows: 1) Profit-orientated banking organizations: the commercial 
or credit banks; 
2) Community-orientated banking organizations: the savings banks 
and central giro institutions ; 
3) Public-utility-orientated banking organizations: the co-operative 
societies ("Raiffeisenkassen"). 
Shareholdings are taken up predominantly by the commercial banks, 
although it should not be overlooked that the public-sector banks are 
becoming increasingly interested in participation business. 
The question of participation by banks in the non-banking sector is not 
regulated by law in Germany. Banks' holdings are restricted only by 
Section 12 of the Kreditwesengesetz (K'.VG - Banking Act) togelher with 
other long-term investments. Under this law, a credit institution may 
hold assets in the form of land, buildings, ships and shareholdings only 
to a total amount not exceeding the book value of its own capital and 
reserves. The reason for this provision is to protect liquidity. 
The shareholdings of banks in industry and commerce cannot, however, be 
expressed in figures in this way, even approximately. In the first 
place, shareholdings are aggregated with the other assets mentioned above. 
Secondly, the concept of participation has not been defined. In practice, 
this means that the entries under the item "participatory holdings" in 
the German banking statistics are generally limited to such holdings in 
credit institutions,, property management companies, building societies, 
etc. Shares in the non-banking sector are as a rule entered on the 
balance sheet under "quoted dividend-bearing securities" or "other 
securities"'^3). 
This practice has been little altered by the new directives regarding the 
preparation of the annual accounts of credit institutions. These 
directives correspond to Section 152 (2) of the AktG (Shares Act). 
According to this provision, in cases of doubt, shares in a joint-stock 
company amounting to 25% of its capital will be deemed to be a 
10 "participation". Accordingly, the larger holdings at least must be 
shown as "participations". Here too, however, an intention to acquire 
a participation may be denied and the holding may thus be treated 
differently in the balance sheet'1^). It may be assumed that the 
practice adopted is also due to the desire to avoid infringing Section 
12 of the KWG^
15\ 
The separate disclosure of shareholdings as "quoted securities"^"' gives 
no adequate information as a large part of existing stockholdings are 
not covered by this designation and, in addition, investment trust 
certificates are included. 
2) Participation in practice 
The legal position set out above does not cover statistical data regarding 
stockholdings in the non-banking sector. Reference can only be made to 
the figures obtained by the Federal Government in their "enquiry into 
business concentration"'^). This covers a period up to the end of I960. 
The report indicates that the total holding in shares (share capital) and 
other stock amounted to DM 2,100 million in nominal value. The report 
considered all holdings of securities exceeding 5$ of a company's share 
capital or business capital as a "participation". This accounted for 
DM 1,500 million, participation in banks amounting to DM ^02 million and 
in the non-banking sector DM 1,100 million. The latter amount related 
almost entirely to shares. 
The banks therefore held a total of only some 3·2/ο of the share capital 
of all public limited liability companies in the non-banking sector. 
It should, however, be noted in this connexion that even with a wide 
distribution of participation over industry as a whole, concentrations 
of capital were evident in certain sectors and, within these, in leading 
undertakings. There was, therefore, a potential influence in a few, 
though important branches of the economy*· '°'. 
The position of the three leading banks (Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, 
Commerzbank) is significant in this context. 
11 In i960, they held two-thirds of the nominal value of all participatory 
interests. Amongst these, 69$ was concentrated on only ten undertakings. 
The enquiry into business concentration indicated that the volume of 
participation was rising rapidly between 1955 and i960. 
This situation has not changed. For 1970, the Bundesbank estimated that 
of the nominal capital of German public limited liability companies 
(excluding insurance companies but including bank shr.res) some 5 to 7% 
were held by the banks in their own possession ' . In 1973 the banks' 
holding was 7.8% according to the Bundesbank's Monthly Report (Report 
No. 8, 197^i P· 2k). The holding of quoted shares and investment trust 
certificates rose between I967 and 1972 from DM 3,600 million to DM 6,600 
million
(20). 
The capital influence of the German banks on the economy is confirmed by 
an estimation of participation at 23% or over as at 30.11.1973· The 
figures included as Annex II to this. Report show that substantial parcels 
of shares are held. Particularly informative, further, is the ratio of 
ascertained participation to net worth. The percentage in this case is 
relatively high if account is taken of the fact that only nominal values 
and participations of over 23% are included. 
The opportunity for influence over the non-banking sector acquired through 
shareholdings cannot be adequately quantified from the figures reproduced 
here. It should be regarded in conjunction with the German banks' 
voting rights in respect of shares deposited with them (Depotstimmrecht). 
To this should be added the link with investment companies, which are 
usually subsidiaries of banks. This will be dealt with below. 
3) Proposals for reform 
The financial ramifications of the German banks have led to radical and 
manifold proposals for reform. Criticism has been directed particularly 
12 against the credit institutions' ability to influence other sectors of 
the economy. Only a brief reference can be made here to the individual 
proposals : 
a) In connexion with the disclosure of the banks' stockholdings, 
consideration is being given, inter alia, to regarding all 
shareholdings exceeding the normal commercial amounts as a 
participation within the meaning of the Banking Act. This 
would include parcels of shares from 3% or 10/fc upwards. In 
this way greater "transparency" with regard to participation 
in practice would be obtained. 
b) A possible restriction on the extent of participation is being 
discussed from two aspects. Firstly, the possibility of laying 
down a fixed ratio between the shares held and the bank's own 
share capital and reserves - as under other legal systems - is 
being considered. Secondly, thought is being given to limiting 
the extent of participation in a company in order to eliminate 
influence on the management of or joint responsibility for the 
management of the company in question. Exceptions could always 
be provided for in the case of large-lot dealing by banks and of 
(21)  reorganization measures 
c) Further, the hiving off of shareholdings by major banks in 
particular is under discussion^ '. These holdings would be 
transferred to special companies whose shares would be offered 
to shareholders of the banks concerned and in this way would be 
widely distributed. 
Ill) Denmark 
1) Legal bases 
A distinction is drawn in the Danish banking system between deposit banks 
and savings banks. This grouping is of no significance to the question 
of participation, however. The banks are supervised on the basis of 
the Banking Act of 1930 by an Inspector of Deposit Banks and Savings 
Banks. The Banking Act will be superseded by a new Act on 1.1.1975 · 
References below will be to the latter Act. As regards participation, 
it introduces no changes to existing law. 
The holding of shares in other companies in the non-banking sector is 
restricted in two aspects, as follows : 
13 a) Under current law, which in this respect is confirmed by Section 1 (k) 
of the new Act, neither deposit banks nor savings banks are permitted 
to operate in sectors of the economy other than banking. This 
principle prevents any control being exercised over other companies 
as a result of shareholdings. Banks are as a rule prohibited from 
acquiring majority holdings in other undertakings. As the deciding 
factor is whether influence can be exercised over another undertaking, 
a shareholding may be inadmissible from this aspect even if it is 
below 50$. The distribution of the shareholding in each particular 
case is decisive. 
This rule is intended to prevent conflicts of interest and amounts to 
a restriction on the universal banking system. This is confirmed by 
the fact that not only interlocking capital relationships but also 
similar personal involvement is prohibited. Members of the management 
bodies of banks may not occupy influential positions in other sectors 
of the economy. Exceptions apply to the acceptance of administrative 
(?k)  posts with institutions of a banking nature^ . This also applies 
to interlocking capital relationships. Participation in finance 
companies carrying on leasing or factoring business, in particular, 
is therefore considered permissible, as are capital interests in 
undertakings carrying out data-processing work on behalf of banks. 
b) The second relevant provision (Section 2k (1)) is rather different 
from Section 1 (k). This is intended to prevent a bank from being 
(25)  heavily committed in an undertaking on liquidity grounds . Banks 
are therefore prohibited from acquiring shares in a single company or 
from accepting these as security for credit to an extent exceeding 
15/0 of the book value of the bank's net worth. 
Under the same provision, a bank's shareholdings may not total more 
than 5C$ of its net worth. In this way the risk element in this 
type of credit business is dealt with. 
14 The total commitment, i.e. including credit of all types, towards 
a bank customer may not exceed 35% of net worth. There is, however, 
one exception which allows indebtedness to be increased to 50% in 
certain circumstances (Section 23 (1)). A general exception to 
these rules is provided under Section 26. 
2) Participation in practice 
Shareholdings of deposit banks were said at the end of 1972 to amount to 
Kr 1,108 million without distinguishing between finance and non-banking 
investment . This sum equals 1.6% of the balance sheet total 
(70,720 million). 
As at 31·3·1973, savings banks had a holding amounting to Kr 169Λ million . 
This commitment amounted to 0.6% of the balance sheet total (26,11^ million). 
Shares held by Danish credit institutions accounted for 3% of quoted 
shares and 0.19% of unquoted shares, computed in each case by nominal 
, (28)  value 
IV) France 
1) The legal bases of separate operation 
a) The French banking industry may even today still be regarded as 
separate in operation. Traditional short-term deposit and credit 
business is transacted by the deposit banks (banques de depots). 
Long-term industrial financing is a matter for the investment banks 
(banques d'affaires). 
This separation of operations is of historical origin. It is a 
result in particular of the way the national economy developed when 
the banks were founded during the last century^-"'. It was not 
imposed by government but arose purely from the limits that the 
different types of banks that developed set themselves. 
It was not until the banking legislation of 19^5 that the existing 
separation of operations was given a legal basis and clearly defined 
15 Underlying this legislative intervention was the concept of a more 
Ml)  effective control of the supply of credit
w . The Act created 
three categories amongst registered banks (banques inscrites). 
Firstly, there are the deposit banks. Under Article 7 et seq. of 
the Act, the leading houses in this group were nationalized. Deposit 
banks* borrowing business was limited to sight deposits and time 
deposits at two years' maximum. Participation was permitted only 
if no more than 10$ of the capital of a company was acquired. 
Provision was made for an exception in the case of interests in 
banks and finance companies. 
On the other hand, investment banks were defined as institutions 
whose activities principally comprised the formation and administration 
of stockholdings in undertakings. These operations were therefore 
in no way restricted. This type of bank was in principle prohibited 
from accepting sight deposits and time deposits at less than two 
years' call. 
Under the 19^6 amendment to the Act, further, the category of medium 
and long-term credit banks (banques de credit à long et moyen terme) 
was created. Their participation business was subject to the same 
restrictions as had been introduced for deposit banks. 
b) The clear separation of functions of French banks as described above 
(32) 
was weakened in 1966/67 by regulations . As a result, the 
situation today is as follows: 
Participation in undertakings by the deposit banks is prohibited only 
if this exceeds a 20% holding in one company. This restriction does 
not apply to participation in other banks, finance companies and 
companies rendering services to banks (services d'etudes ou services 
techniques resortissant à la profession bancaire). Where 
participation is permitted under these regulations, it may not exceed 
16 the bank's own capital resources, including new issues subscribed 
for. 
The restriction on deposit banks to short-term deposit business was 
removed. Short-term deposit accounts (less than two years) may not, 
however, be used in participation business. 
The investment banks, too, were released by the reform from the 
restrictions existing hitherto on borrowing business. They may now 
accept sight and short-term time deposits in the same way as the 
deposit banks. However, they too are affected by the restriction 
that participation may not be financed from short-term funds. 
The new rules applying to deposit banks with regard to participation 
also apply to the medium and long-term credit banks. 
Various reasons have been given for this weakening in the separation 
of operations in the French banking system. Firstly, it has been 
pointed out that the original sharp outlines had already been obscured 
by large-scale exploitation of the available exception provisions. 
Thus it was quite easy, for example, for investment banks to engage 
intensively in credit business as well. It is true that the Act 
allowed them to grant credit for an unrestricted period only to 
undertakings in which they had, had had, or intended to have a 
participatory holding. Although according to the letter of the Act 
the granting of credit was therefore to be linked to participation 
business, the investment banks could in fact easily undertake any 
credit business they wished as it was very difficult to prove the 
absence of an intention to participate . 
Further, the penetration of investment banks into short and medium-term 
business has been blamed on scarcity in the capital market due to 
(34)  economic conditions ^ . In addition, considerations of credit policy 
have been put forward^-
7'. The request that the banks' opportunities 
for implementing long-term investment financing be improved can be 
traced back to the findings of the commission responsible for preparing 
the Vth Plan (1966 to 1970). The legislative extension of the 
deposit banks' ¡opportunities for participation may be regarded as 
being linked with this. This enlargement of the operational field of the deposit banks and 
their elevation to equal status with the investment banks as regards 
borrowing business was also intended to increase the degree of 
compebition within the French banking systenr3°J. 
c) It is obvious that in consequence of the reforms of 1966/67 there 
has been some drawing together in the activities of types of banks 
hitherto highly specialized, and consequently a trend towards 
(Ύ7ί  universalization
w' . It can be seen that this development gives 
a substantial competitive advantage to the deposit banks, on account 
of their already long-standing and well-developed branch network. 
At the same time a definite process of concentration has taken place. 
Thus a number of investment banks have been merged with deposit banks. 
Today both investment and deposit banks may be found within single 
groups of undertakings. In this way borderlines between 
specializations are being still further eroded^3°). 
The trend towards universal banking is welcomed in principle. It 
should be noted in this context, however, that clear distinctions 
continue to exist in the investment branch in particular. It is 
further recognized in French banking circles that the transition to 
"banques à tout faire" is not without its problems. It has been 
commented that limits must be set to universalization. It has been 
stated in the first place in this connexion that specialization is 
an important factor in the productivity of banking services. 
Furthermore, the well-known conflicts of interest in the universal 
banking system have been stressed, particularly, for example, where 
a bank is both majority shareholder and lender. Such conflicts are 





2) Participation in practice 
a) As at the end of 1973 the number of deposit banks has been given as 
24-7 and of investment banks as 2k. The medium and long-term credit 
banking sector comprised 50 houses^ . 
18 As at 4.1.1973» the following figures have been given in respect of 
(4l) 
participation by the three groups of registered banks 
As regards deposit banks, participation amounted to Fr. 3»974 million, 
compared with a balance sheet total of Fr 480,267 million. These 
investments therefore equalled only 0.8% of the balance sheet total. 
On the other hand, participation by the investment banks amounted to 
7.4% of the balance sheet total. Their value has been given as 
Fr 2,225 million, the balance sheet total running to Fr 30,233 million. 
The corresponding figures for the medium and long-term credit banks 
are Fr 146 million in participation, with a balance sheet total of 
Fr 19,417 million. Participation, therefore, as in the case of the 
deposit banks, equals 0.8% of the balance sheet total. 
b) For the purposes of the investigation being made here, however, these 
figures are not very informative. No distinction is in fact made 
under the "participation" item on the balance sheet between shares 
in banks or other financial institutions and those in the non-banking 
sector (Titres de Filiales et Participations). In order to obtain a 
more precise picture of participation practice, recourse must be had 
to assumptions and trends. 
It has been stated that, even in the mid-sixties, the deposit banks' 
participation in securities portfolios only rarely involved industrial 
firms, in line with traditional policy. Predominantly, shares were 
held in other credit institutions or in undertakings active in the 
finance field. It was also found that a substantial proportion was 
(42) 
attributable to subsidiaries at home and abroad 
It must be assumed that the nature Of the deposit banks' participation 
has changed since the 1966/67 reform and that industrial shares, too, 
are now readily acquired. 
19 No essential change in the composition of participatory holdings is 
to be found in later literature, however. It has been revealed in 
connexion with an investigation of the balance sheets of a number of 
banks at the end of the sixties that even after the reforms the 
earlier separation of operations had been upheld to a large extent. 
In view of their balance sheet structure, states the author, it would 
hardly have been possible for the deposit banks to extend their 
(43)  participation business . 
(44)  It has further been stressed that the deposit banks have made 
little use of their improved opportunities for participation consequent 
upon the reforms. In individual cases, the first step was to 
incorporate new undertakings. The reason given for this caution is 
not only the relative lack of long-term funds but also the need to 
avoid the detrimental consequences of possible participation in 
competing undertakings. 
These statements indicate that the major part of the deposit banks' 
participatory holdings is in the financial sector and is not therefore 
of direct interest to this investigation. Participation in the 
non-banking sector must even today still be attributed to the 
investment banks mainly specializing in this type of activity. 
V) Great Britain 
1) Bases of the banking system 
For present purposes a distinction must be drawn between the clearing 
banks and the merchant banks in Britain. 
a) The clearing banks may be regarded as deposit banks. Their chief 
function is to accept deposits. Differentiation is made between 
non-interest-bearing sight deposits, interest-bearing deposits at 
7 days' call, and savings deposits. These last are regarded as 
of little consequence by the clearing banks though their importance 
is increasing in connexion with the expansion in longer-term 
... f . Ί s(45)  credit (see below) 
20 On the lending side, this corresponds to the emphasis placed on 
short-term credit. This is granted to trade, agriculture, private 
enterprise and, to a limited extent, also to industry. Credit on 
current account (the "overdraft") predominates. Generally speaking, 
therefore, the clearing banks see their function not as financing 
trade and industry in the long term but as making liquid funds 
continuously available for the money market. They make an effort 
to meet their customers' wishes in the matter of repayment. The 
correspondence between their borrowings and lendings accords with 
this objective. 
A further typical feature is the clearing banks' extensive branch 
network. This reflects the desire to attract deposits from a wide 
range of home customers. 
The clearing banks are represented for the most part by the "Big 
Four" London banks (National Westminster, Barclays, Midland and 
Lloyds), by four Scottish houses, and by eight Northern Ireland banks. 
The clearing banks' concentration on short-term deposits and advances 
precludes intensive activity in the industrial field. Long-term 
commitments with major customers are almost entirely ruled out. 
For this reason participation in the non-banking sector does not form 
part of the banks' lending business. The latter, in fact, serves 
only three purposes - maintenance of liquidity, investment in 
securities and the provision of credit. Almost the only securities 
invested in are British Government securities 
This specialization and, more particularly, the principle of not 
acquiring parcels of shares, are based on an unwritten code of 
conduct. However, a tendency towards liberalization is clearly 
evident. The Bank of England announced a change of policy at the 
(47) 
end of 1972 . According to this, clearing banks would not be 
prevented from participating in merchant banks or in other undertakings. 
Although already existing in law, the opportunity for participation 
has only just been effectively created by the present positive 
attitude of the Bank of England. 
21 b) Industrial financing is undertaken by the merchant banks. These 
are a group which mostly originated as family businesses and in 
many cases still remain so today. They may be compared with the 
normal type of private bank found on the Continent. Their activities 
were originally restricted to the provision of finance by means of 
acceptance credits. This was the origin of the "accepting houses", 
the merchant banks in the stricter sense . New issue business, 
initially for foreign companies and later for home companies as well, 
was chiefly the preserve of the "issuing houses". A number of 
merchant banks belong to the "Issuing Houses Association". 
The activities of both groups as merchant banks may be defined as 
(49)  follows : most merchant bankers are engaged in the broad field 
of industrial finance, linked with export and import credit business, 
dealings on all leading money markets, and the management of share 
and investment portfolios. Their operations are not limited to the 
private sector and they also manage the financial interests of 
governments and other public institutions. 
An important aspect of this work is their function as financial 
advisers to industrial undertakings. This covers consultancy on 
capital and financial problems and on participation and.mergers. 
An essential factor continues to be the holding of shares in industrial 
undertakings , which, together with long-term investment loans, 
serves to finance industrial projects. Participation can also, 
however, result from issuing operations. It is considered, however, 
that in contrast to the French banques d'affaires, the merchant banks 
have a relatively low level of share investment since their deposit 
(51)  base is too narrow . In order to supply long-term capital, the 
(52)  merchant banks have, further, increasingly set up investment trusts
w . 
22 c) The separation of functions as between the clearing banks and the 
merchant banks and the associated restriction of share investment 
to one type of bank are of historical origin. The clearing banks 
for the most part developed from the many private banks that dealt 
with general banking business. The large London banks originate 
from the joint-stock banks introduced at a later date. The 
restriction on business policy that still exists has been attributed 
in part to an excessively conservative attitude . By contrast, 
the merchant banks at first had an extremely restricted field of 
activity the nature of which made such banks increasingly important 
to the larger industrial enterprises as industrialization progressed. 
The result was a specialization in industrial financing. 
This development shows that there is no separation system in Great 
Britain analogous to the system of separate deposit banks and finance 
companies in Belgium, for example. The present structure has been 
little affected by Government intervention in banking. It may 
therefore be said that the existing separation of banking functions 
is not based on considerations of public policy or banking supervision. 
This does not mean, however, that the principles of separation of 
operations have not also.been considered from these aspects. Thus 
when a new issue was independently handled by a clearing bank for the 
(54)  first time in 1965> it provoked a great deal of criticism 
Reference was made, amongst other things, to the conflict of interests 
arising under the universal banking system. Caution was advised lest 
the dubious practices of the German joint-stock banks be adopted. 
It may be assumed that the separation of operations, based on unwritten 
rules in accordance with British tradition, derives from the advantages 
to be gained from separating commercial from investment banking. 
23 2) Participation in practice 
No statistics appear to be available on the actual extent of participation. 
Some insight may,however, be obtained from general investigations into 
(55)  the distribution of shareholdings . According to these, without any 
break-down into types, the banks in 1963 held 1.25% and in 1969 2% of 
quoted shares, by market value. The value of this information, however, 
is prejudiced by the fact that only securities quoted on the London Stock 
Exchange were taken into account. Furthermore, securities dealt in 
only unofficially, which are frequently taken up by merchant banks, were 
excluded. 
A more recent investigation into the shareholders of a leading company 
showed participation by banks amounting to 3% · If» with all due 
reservation, this percentage is applied to the market value of all shares 
quoted in Great Britain as at June 1974, amounting to £27,750 million 
(Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin), some clue is given as to actual 
participation in practice. An estimate must, however, be directed 
towards a lower figure since, according to the Bank of England's records, 
securities owned by all banks in June 1974, including certain types of 
debentures, amounted to £991 million. 
3) Trends 
It is evident that the system of separation of operations, which even 
before was by no means clear-cut, has noticeably changed recently. Both 
clearing banks and merchant banks are now penetrating sectors hitherto 
(57)  reserved to the other type of bank . 
The clearing banks are taking on industrial business, particularly through 
subsidiaries. New issues, as stated above, and associated services are 
becoming more and more frequent. Even long-term credit business is now 
being carried on by them. On the other hand, the merchant banks have 
come to recognize the advantages of traditional banking business. They 
24 have increasingly been opening branches, even in sectors of lesser 
commercial interest, and are seeking to attract deposits from a wider 
clientele. The previous strong emphasis on either home or foreign 
business has also lessened. 
Keen competition by foreign banks, amongst other things, is said to be 
responsible for this trend towards a comprehensive range of services. 
The visible tendency towards universalization is expected to increase 
in the seventies. It is not accepted, however, that the British clearing 
banks would be likely, in the course of this process of independent 
conversion, to change into investment banks of the type of the French 
banques d'affaires or the large German banks . So far, only a 
Í59) 
hesitant approach towards investment business has been noted 
VI) Ireland 
1) The legal bases 
The Irish banks similarly cannot be simply categorized under either the 
separation or the universal system. Under the Central Bank Act of 1971, 
they are subject to uniform supervision. The Central Bank grants the 
necessary licences for taking up banking business and supervises banks' 
activities. 
The aim of the granting of licences is to maintain the "orderly and proper 
regulation of banking" (Section 9 (2).Central Bank Act). The same 
criterion, furthermore, justifies the licence being made subject to 
provisos and conditions (Section 10 (ï)). 
The question of participation in the non-banking sector is not specifically 
regulated by statute and comes into play only within the framework of the 
above measure for the exercise of banking supervision. 
25 In 1971 the Central Bank had already laid down the criteria, after 
consultation with the Ministry of Finance and a number of leading banks, 
that it would apply in exercising its judgement within the framework of 
its supervisory function . These criteria are intended in particular 
to clarify the attitude of the Central Bank. In the absence of a 
statutory basis, they are not directly binding and may be varied in the 
light of subsequent experience by normal decision-making methods. 
In these guidelines, participation is one of a number of points touched 
upon in the chapter regarding supervision of banks already licensed. 
It is stated that no bank may hold more than 20% of the capital of 
another company without the Central Bank's prior approval
1· ^'. There 
are two exceptions, however: the approval requirement is dispensed with 
in the first place if the shares to be acquired are those of another bank 
or of companies carrying on banking-type activities or other financing 
business; in addition, any licensed bank shall be free to acquire shares 
if its lending commitment (credit, bill acceptances, stockholding rights, 
etc) in the case of any one undertaking does not exceed 2% of the sum of 
such items in the balance sheet. 
These exceptions indicate that the Central Bank approaches the question 
of participation from the aspect of investment security and consequently 
in the context of the protection of depositors. This is confirmed by 
the criteria mentioned in the same connexion which are directed generally, 
inter alia, against an undue concentration of risk investment in any one 
branch of the economy or against too high (i.e. 10% of potential credit) 
a grant of credit to individual customers. 
2) Participation in practice 
There is nothing to be said regarding the Central Bank's practice within 
the framework of the approval requirements that it makes. According to 
Central Bank information, there have been no cases of participation that 
required approval under the above criteria. The Central Bank Act has 
not therefore come up against any extensive practice of participation. 
No statistics are available as to participation resulting from share 
acquisitions which banks were free to make without prior approval. 
26 It may be assumed that participation plays no significant role in the 
lending business of Irish banks. This conclusion is reached from a 
study of the balance sheets (as at 31.3.1973) of the two leading banks 
in Ireland, whose share in Irish banking business is about 50%. It 
appears from this that the Allied Irish Bank Ltd., out of assets of 
£ 748.9 million, invested only £ 6.2 million in securities (excluding 
Government securities). The corresponding figures for the Bank of 
Ireland are £ 906.9 million and £ 10.6 million. As regards these items, 
it should be remembered that they also include the stock of the statutory 
authorities. Actual participation may therefore be considered to be 
small in extent. 
Irish company law requires the above banks to disclose cases of 
participation where these exceed 20%. The only relevant stockholding 
is the 3ank of Ireland's 26% investment in Celtic Oil Ltd. The nature 
(6? )  of the Irish banks as deposit banks, and less so as universal banks^ , 
is also clearly reflected in the fact that stockholdings of the leading 
credit institutions described as "associated banks" have been calculated 
(excluding Government and public authorities' stock) at £ 9·8 million out 
of a balance sheet total of £ 1,828.5 million ^ . 
VII) Italy 
1) The structure of the banking system 
The legal position and operating conditions in Italy are to a considerable 
extent determined by the structure of the banking and financial sector. 
The sharp division between short-term business on the one hand and medium 
and long-term business on the other, introduced under the Banking Act of 
1963' » predominates. This is the result of experience following the 
27 First World War when the banks had become deeply enmeshed in the long-term 
financing of undertakings, which led to crises of liquidity. A further 
structural feature of the Italian banking industry is strong Government 
participation which, related to deposit business, is said to be 8θ%
(·°-". 
Short-term business may not exceed a term of 18 months. In this way 
separation is created between normal credit business and longer-term 
financing credit. This differentiation leads to distinct grouping 
within the banking system. Short-term business is carried on by the 
commercial banks (aziende di credito). These include .the public-sector 
credit institutions (istituti di credito di diritto publico), the national 
banks (banche d'interesse nazionale), characterized by their supra-regional 
operations, the other commercial banks (banche di credito ordinario), the 
savings banks (casse di risparmio) and the co-operative banks (banche 
populari cooperativo). As these commercial banks restricted themselves 
to short-term business, this led to the necessary machinery being set up 
to take on longer-term business, through what in actual practice was 
merely the formal constitution of special departments as separate entities 
and through the formation of new financing organizations. 
2) Participation by the commercial banks 
The commercial banks' lending business is subject to supervision by the 
Banca d'Italia, which at the same time exercises central bank functions. 
Article 35 (2a) of the Banking Act empowers the Banca d'Italia to exert 
influence on the ratio of a commercial bank's share capital to its 
investments in property or shares. Under an enabling order to Article 
35 of the Banking Act^ ', commercial banks are obliged to give prior 
notification of participatory stockholdings that they wish to acquire 
for exceptional and justified reasons. Such an application must be 
accompanied by the balance sheets for the last three financial years. 
Furthermore, all changes in the shareholding must be notified to the 
Banca d'Italia as the supervisory authority. Exceptions are made, with 
the approval of the Banca d'Italia, particularly where the participation 
28 is either one by an azienda di credito in an istituto di credito or 
a temporary acquisition for re-sale to the public - e.g. as in the case 
of new issues ' . 
The objective of these regulations is clearly of a supervisory nature. 
Effective protection to depositors is considered to lie in the restriction 
of investment in shares. Unrestricted participation in undertakings by 
the commercial banks would not, moreover, be compatible with their 
limitation to short-term credit business. 
The level of such participation in the non-banking sector is extremely 
small. For all types of commercial bank at 30·9·1973 it amounted in 
total to 113 thousand million lire as against total assets of 103 million 
million lire. The exceptional nature of such stockholdings becomes even 
clearer when one considers the many times greater participation in banks 
and in the rest of the financial field^ 
3) Participation in the longer-term financial sector 
True industrial business is carried on by special financial institutions 
concentrating on medium and long-term credit business (istituti di credito 
a medio e lungo termine). Investment of assets in shares is not 
controlled in this case. A feature of these institutions is their 
orientation towards particular branches of the economy and, in particular, 
their direct or indirect dependence on the State. They often take the 
form of public-law corporations^
 y . They are consequently instruments 
of Government economic policy. In addition to the long-term financing 
of industrial investment, substantial direct participation may also~be 
met with here. Industrial participatory investment by the Istituto 
Mobiliare Italiano (IMI), whose capital is indirectly held by the State, 
was said in 1968 to be 35 thousand million lire, which is one-third of 
its share capital*·' '. 
29 The field of operation of these financial institutions extends to the function 
of administering Government investments. The Istituto per la Ricostruzione 
Industriale (IRI), in particular, may be regarded as one such holding company. 
It is seen as the Government's right hand in industry. Amongst other things, 
it holds the capital of three national banks and their subsidiaries. While 
it cannot be regarded as a credit institution, its activities nevertheless 
include the financing of undertakings controlled by it. Industrial interests 
are handled by five financing companies. Its shareholdings are said to total 
800 thousand million lire™. The IRI's funds derive directly from the 
State or are raised by the issue of bonds. The IRI may further be 
distinguished from industrial banks in the traditional sense in that its 
participatory holdings seldom change hands and it always exercises majority 
control. 
These forms of long-term industrial financing show that Italy has developed 
a system characterized to a large measure by strong State influence on the 
economy on the one hand but also by an attempt to achieve equilibrium with 
the private sector on the other. The question of participation in the 
non-bauiking sector must consequently in this case be viewed in different terms. 
VIII) Luxembourg 
The banking system in Luxembourg must within our present terms of reference 
be described as atypical. Its international character places it in a special 
position on the European banking scene. Barely one-third of deposits are made 
in Luxembourg currency. A majority of the banks have been formed by or are 
(72) 
branches of foreign companies . A distinction must therefore be drawn 
between banking business at the national level and banking business on the 
level of international finance. 
30 It is characteristic of the liberal basis of the Luxembourg banking system 
that participation in the non-banking sector is in no way controlled. Even 
the banking control commission (Commissariat au Contrôle des Banques) has 
avoided any intervention in this field. There is merely an obligation to 
show participatory holdings separately in the balance sheet. 
This universality of the Luxembourg banks may particularly be explained by 
the fact that this country is a small one. The relatively modest extent 
of the demand for banking services hardly allows of specialization. 
(74) 
Operations are said to be concentrated in short-term business . This, 
too, explains why participation in industrial or commercial undertakings is 
(75)  very low . Long-term investment of current funds is incompatible with 
sound banking practice. 
At the present time, consequently, longer-term financing is carried out with 
State assistance. The Government invests funds in the banks in order to 
provide the necessary corporate finance . To eliminate the defects that 
nevertheless still persist in the Luxembourg capital market, a bill providing 
for the creation of special banks, rather in the form of a national investment 
(77)  bank, has been submitted to Parliament . Furthermore, there are plans 
for assisting banks when they run into liquidity difficulties. For this 
purpose, in the first place, a multi-lateral support system would be developed. 
In the long term, consideration is being given to setting up a liquidity bank 
(78) 
with the role of a central bank as the lender of last resort 
Only brief mention can be made here of the Luxembourg holding company 
legislation of 1929, which is so important to the international investment 
sector. It grants substantial tax advantages to companies incorporated under 
Luxembourg law provided that they restrict themselves to the administration of 
participatory holdings. A particular feature is the absence of double 
(79)  taxation on joint-stock companies 
31 The holding companies essentially have no banking function. In principle, 
financing tasks may only be carried out by companies belonging to a group. 
Financial holding companies, with bank participation, were not permitted 
until 1967; the object in permitting their existence was to obtain capital 
for investment through the issue of bonds. The utilization of the funds 
for this purpose is supervised. The holding companies cannot therefore be 
(80) 
regarded as banks engaged in participation business 
IX) The Netherlands 
1) The legal bases 
There are three main types of bank in Holland. First of all, there are the 
ordinary commercial banks which in terms of volume of business clearly 
predominate. At the present time there are some 70 commercial banks of 
this kind, but their number is being reduced by the trend towards larger 
units .. The two leading commercial banks, in particular, are the result 
of mergers. These are the Amsterdam-Rotterdam Bank N.V. (AMRO) and the 
Algemene Bank Nederland (ABN). 
In addition to the commercial banks, there is a group of agricultural 
cooperative banks and savings banks. The Nederlandsche Bank carries out 
central bank functions and is responsible for bank supervision by virtue of 
the Supervision Act of 1948. 
The Dutch banks are essentially universal banks. Participation may be 
undertaken by all types of bank. At the present time, statutory control 
of participation of this kind exists on two points only, as follows: 
As regards savings banks, depositors are protected in that the bank's 
portfolio of quoted shares may not exceed 50% of its net worth (capital 
plus reserves)*· '. 
32 Banks' participatory holdings are indirectly affected by the supervision of 
the Nederlandsche Bank as the supervisory authority for mergers in the 
banking industry. Mergers between banks, in particular, are permissible, 
under Article 13 (1) of the Banking Supervisory Act, only if the Nederlandsche 
Bank issues a declaration of non-objection thereto. These powers of approval 
are normally exercised liberally, i-re. declarations of non-objection are 
granted as a matter of principle. What is significant for the purposes of 
our investigation, however, is that the question of participation is subject 
to the approval procedure. The Nederlandsche Bank examines whether a merger 
might lead to undesirable developments within the credit system or could 
conflict with sound banking practice. Under this aspect, the declaration of 
non-objection to certain amalgamations has been linked to the proviso that 
after the merger direct or indirect participatory holdings may be acquired 
only with the Nederlandsche Bank's prior consent. A participatory holding 
within the meaning of this proviso is a shareholding of more than 5% in 
another undertaking. This approval requirement is based on the consideration 
that merged banks, with their greater capital power, should not be completely 
free to pursue interests in other sectors of the economy. A trend of this 
( 8Ό 
kind is regarded äs detrimental to the credit system 
In this way an opportunity of controlling the participation policy of merged 
banks has been created. This factor should not be underestimated: an 
appreciable move towards concentration in banking has taken place in the 
Netherlands during the past few years. Twenty-four non-objection declarations 
are listed for 1964. It should be stressed in this connexion that the two 
leading commercial banks, the AMRO Bank and ABN, are also the result of 
amalgamât ions. 
33 2) Participation in practice 
No clear statement can be made regarding the extent of participation in 
practice. The balance sheets of the commercial banks^ ' for 1966 showed 
a sum of 458 million florins attributable to participatory holdings. This 
figure may be compared with the balance sheet total of all commercial banks, 
indicated at 23.2 thousand million florins (of which it forms barely 2%). 
The participation item on the AMRO Bank balance sheet was 85.9 million florins 
(balance sheet total 7.5 thousand million) and the corresponding figures for 
the ABN were 7.1 million (balance sheet total 7.6 thousand million). 
It has been commented in this connexion that the participatory holdings are 
mainly in subsidiaries or other institutions in the financial sector, that 
interests in other undertakings are rare and that the Dutch commercial banks 
(85) 
are not investment banks 
3) Proposed reforms 
Proposals for reform put forward in Holland have taken shape in a bill to 
( 86i  bring in a new supervisory law on the credit systenr . Article 17 O) 
of the bill contains amongst other things a prohibition - with a proviso 
that the prohibition may be set aside if the appropriate general approval 
is obtained - on direct or indirect participation by credit institutions in 
other undertakings. This provision is intended to cover participatory 
interests exceeding 5% of the capital of the companies concerned. In 
addition, the provision is intended to cover the enlargement of existing 
participatory interests. 
If this provision passes into law in the Netherlands, participation will not 
be entirely eliminated, because of the existence of the "approval" proviso. 
Powers for control, however, are comprehensive. The approval requirement 
already applying now in respect of the acquisition of participatory holdings 
by merged banks would be extended to the whole of the credit system. 
34 Χ) Results of the comparative survey of the legal position 
1) Control systems and criteria in Member States 
a) The survey of the control on.participâtion in the non-banking sector 
by banks within the European Community indicates substantial differences 
between Member States. 
In two countries (Germany and Luxembourg) there are practically no 
limitations. Within the framework of a universal banking system, all 
that is required is disclosure which is ineffective, however, due to the 
absence of a statutory definition of the concept of participation, at 
least in Germany. 
Other countries approach such liberalization in the investment sector of 
banking activities with greater caution and for this purpose have 
introduced restrictions. 
In particular cases, the scope of participation can be controlled on 
the basis of statutory powers in Holland and Ireland. Denmark has made 
general provision on this point. Something similar is also projected 
for Holland in the future. 
Contrasting with these countries are Member States where the question of 
participation in industrial and commercial undertakings is dealt with 
within the scope of a more or less clear separation of functions within 
the banking system. Specialization, particularly between short-term 
credit business and long-term industrial financing, which has either grown 
up or been statutorily imposed, has led to the traditional deposit banks 
being prohibited from, or having to accept restrictions on, the holding 
of shares. In this connexion, Belgium, Italy, France and Great Britain 
may be mentioned. While in Belgium and Italy, shareholding is denied in 
principle to a specific category of banks, France has in this respect 
introduced only a quantitative limitation. Great Britain proceeds 
flexibly on unwritten principles. 
35 A distinction must therefore be drawn between Member States without 
controls on participation, those with general controls on all banks, 
and those with a separation of functions in the credit system. 
b) The criteria of control, where no full prohibition exists, are illuminating. 
Two aspects are especially important: 
Firstly, provision is made for a specific relationship between the bank's 
own funds and its investments in securities. It is possible to determine, 
in this connexion, to what percentage point a particular commitment in a 
single undertaking is permitted. Such provisions exist in Denmark (15%)· 
A ratio may also be laid down between net worth and total shareholdings. 
This approach has been adopted by France (100%), Holland (50% as regards 
quoted shares) and Denmark (50%). An equivalent regulation applying in 
Germany (Section 12, KWG) is practically meaningless in view of its broad 
drafting. 
Secondly, the extent of participation in one undertaking is restricted 
in a number of Member States. In this case, France - for deposit banks -
and Ireland (subject to approval) fix a limit of 20%. Denmark prohibits 
a bank from undertaking any other business activity but at least relates 
this to a majority holding. According to the spread of shares, the limit 
may in fact lie lower. Holland wishes to introduce an approval procedure 
for 5% participation. 
Nothing further will be said at this point on the possible justification 
of such control criteria. Insofar as they are clearly defined in the 
individual countries they will be dealt with in connexion with the 
discussion of problems of participation. 
c) Where banks are prohibited from or subject to restrictions in holding 
shares, specific situations exist in respect of which exceptions are 
provided for. 
36 In this connexion, mention may be made in the first instance of interests 
in the banking industry (Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy and Denmark). 
The banking industry is in this case taken in a wide sense. Included 
are all kinds of finance companies (particularly factoring and leasing) 
and undertakings rendering services to banks. Firms involved in data 
processing come to mind particularly in this context and are often joint 
subsidiaries formed by banks on rationalization grounds. 
The acquisition of shares is, furthermore, considered permissible where 
it is only a temporary measure, for example in the placing of new issues 
offered to the public (Belgium and Italy). This meets the requirements 
of the capital market. 
In Belgium, furthermore, participation has been declared permissible as 
a reorganization measure to save endangered credit provided this does not 
lead to a permanent investment. 
The most disparate system of exceptions applies in Belgium as a result of 
the strict prohibition on participation imposed on deposit banks there. 
2) Participation practice in the European Community 
The practice of banks in the EEC Member States of holding portfolios of 
shares may be assumed to be substantial. 
In those countries where there is a recognizable separation of operations 
within the banking system this comment requires no further explanation. 
Specialization can, in fact, be put down to participation as the subject 
matter of lending business. It can consequently be assumed that houses 
particularly active in industrial finance will have appreciable shareholdings. 
This tendency has been proved as regards the countries concerned. 
It follows from this that, under such systems, participation by the deposit 
banks is slight and is frequently confined to other banks or financial 
institutions.. 
37 Share investment by the Irish, Dutch and Luxembourg banks is relatively 
insignificant. The reason for this could lie in the volume of foreign 
capital in these countries. 
Participation by banks in industrial and commercial undertakings is, 
substantial, however, in Denmark and Germany. 
The practical relevance of the subject matter under investigation is 
confirmed by these findings. It is further confirmed by the fact that 
the problems of participatory investment by banks in the Member States 
has in some cases led to comprehensive regulations due to considerations 
of banking or public policy. The only exceptions to this are Luxembourg 
and Germany. In the latter country, however, this question has been the 
subject of fierce controversy for a number of years. Moreover, the banks 
have already considered the possibility of self-imposed restrictive 
measures . Legislative action may be expected in the not-too-distant 
future. 
38 CHAPTER THREE 
Reasons why banks participate in the non-banking sector. 
I) Introduction 
It is not entirely clear - at least at first sight - why banks should 
frequently participate in large measure in the non-banking sector in the 
form of shareholdings in undertakings. The prime purpose in banking 
activity is in fact the provision of services affecting the investment 
of money and capital, and also the procurement of capital and the transfer 
(1)  of money . This conclusion leads one to ask what motives have led the 
banks to invest their funds in other undertakings outside their own 
industry. 
Reference may be made at this point to the fact that the holding of shares 
in companies is not always due to the exercise of corporate freedom of 
action, and reference could be made here to involuntary investment. Banks 
(2)  themselves, in particular, constantly refer to this fact . If this is 
the case, one may wonder what links therefore exist with actual banking 
business. The same question arises as regards voluntary planned investment 
in company securities. Is it possible to prove some relationship to the 
principles of profitability, liquidity and security which are central to 
private enterprise banking policy? 
A definition of the reasons why banks participate in industrial and 
commercial undertakings is synonymous with the banking industry's interests 
in such investment. We consequently arrive at our first point of reference 
for assessing the interests arising within the scope of the subject matter 
under investigation: the purpose and significance to the credit institutions 
of participatory investment. 
39 In order to determine this criterion of assessment, discussion in this 
connexion must be restricted. All that need be ascertained is what 
effects the possession of stockholdings amounting to participation in 
undertakings has on private enterprise banking objectives. Only in 
this context can an assessment be considered. Other interests, possibly 
'conflicting, beyond the confines of the credit system, are for the most 
part not dealt with in this chapter. 
II) Participation as a consequence of banks' restricted freedom of action 
(unplanned investment) 
1) Participation resulting from unplaced new issues 
Where a bank undertakes to issue other companies' shares on the basis 
that there will be a firm acquisition of the shares by the bank by 
subscription, followed by independent placing on the capital market, the 
bank itself bears the full marketing risk. This situation arises in 
most Member States of the European Community^·'. This risk is frequently 
not borne by one house alone, however. As a rule, it is distributed over 
several banks in a consortium. 
New issue business, and the marketing risk accepted with it, essentially 
(4)  serves profit purposes . The bank receives remuneration for its 
services, based on the extent of its work and the gravity of the risks 
accepted. The services rendered include in particular the technical 
processing of the issue and access to the facilities of its own sales 
organization. 
A further interest in an issue may be the aim to consolidate a medium to 
long-term preliminary credit through the capital market. This is the 
case where the bank has had contact with a commercial undertaking for 
some time and does not wish to carry a whole investment scheme right 
through to the end . 
40 One aspect of the share-placing risk is that the bank may be obliged to 
retain for its own account shares for which it has subscribed. This may 
be due to a slump in the share price of the issuing company or general 
lack of enthusiasm on the stock market. The bank is then bound in the 
interests of its trading partner and in view of the commitments it has 
entered into to make use of the excess shares for its own account. 
It may be assumed, however, that shareholdings acquired as a result of 
failed new issues will in practice rarely reach the level of actual 
participation . The following reasons may be adduced for this: 
The seller's risk is at its greatest in the case of first issues, as in 
this case the lack of knowledge as to the worth of new undertakings can 
reduce the market's willingness to take them up. The banks' first issue 
business has in fact declined substantially. Issues are made today 
chiefly to strengthen a firm's financial resources by means of a capital 
increase. This means that the issuing company is already known on the 
capital market. In addition, the amounts to be placed in such cases 
are smaller. 
It should be added that subscription for shares being issued is in practice 
undertaken mainly not by a single house but by a consortium of banks 
formed to launch the issue. If shares cannot be sold, the participants 
take them up only in due proportion. 
Participation as the (infrequent) consequence of an unsuccessful issue 
must be seen within the framework of general banking objectives. It is 
a by-product, consciously accepted - and remunerative - of banking activities 
which are directed towards achieving maximum profit. It is not really 
possible, therefore, to draw a clear line between investment achieved in 




41 2) Participation as a consequence of price support operations 
The fact that the banks' commercial success may depend on the movement of 
the price of certain shares means that they have not only to keep a 
careful watch on prices but to intervene actively on the stock exchange 
/ON 
and attempt to a certain extent to influence prices . Interest in 
price trends may, in particular, be dealt with from two aspects, which 
follow from the bank's activities as an issuing house and as an investor 
on its own account. 
a) The participating bank may, in connexion with new issues, consider it 
necessary to intervene during a transitional period if a wide market, 
with an equilibrium of public supply and demand, has not emerged. 
Especially if a new issue cannot be permanently placed and selling 
pressure mounts, it may have to purchase shares on the market itself 
in order to safeguard the interests of the issuing principal. 
In this case, too, however, it is unlikely that true participatory 
investment can result in this way. Such a situation can arise only 
on first issues which, as already stated, are relatively infrequent on 
the share market. In the case of capital increases, a price emerges 
based on the latest quotation of the subscription rights for the new 
(9) 
shares, a price which is geared to the price of the old shares
w. No 
intervention is necessary. Moreover, the bank may in certain circumstances 
leave any necessary price support operations to the issuing principal. 
b) Price support operations are of more practical importance to a bank where 
it intervenes on the market in order to counteract a drop in value in 
the stock it has taken up on its own account. It should be noted, 
however, in this case that all price support «has its limits. It can 
balance out chance price fluctuations in tight markets or check or mitigate 
42 seasonal falls. But a bank, with its limited funds, cannot possibly 
reverse a general downward trend of the market. 
The position may be different if a bank has a substantial stake in another 
company. If, due to special circumstances, the company's shares are in 
danger of falling, e.g. as a result of rumours about substantial capital 
losses, the participating bank may intervene. By taking up shares 
offered on the market, pressure on the shares can be relieved. In this 
way, the value of the bank's own investment is maintained often with 
relatively small funds. 
If a stabilization in the price is achieved in this way, the shares -
which in such cases may achieve the status of a participation - must be 
retained at least temporarily, as any re-sale might endanger their price 
on the stock exchange. Where an active effort to sell the shares is 
made and sale is ultimately accomplished, any additional shareholdings 
acquired through stock exchange price support operations represent onl·
1
 
a temporary measure of banking security policy*·'■'. 
c) Banks' price support is an-attempt to influence the market for certait 
shares. This is not direct involvement, intervention in fact being 
achieved through utilization of the market machinery. The operation 
of altering price trends in this way acquires an importance beyond that 
of the bank's interest since the whole of the market influenced reacts. 
This effect is the basis for the distinction made between public and 
(11)  private objects of intervention . The banks are consequently assumed 
to act in the general interest. This is questionable, however, since 
public and private interests may coincide, e.g. in containing excessive 
price movements, since price support is carried on within the framework 
of commercial banking policy. Price support directed against a fall in 
prices directly or indirectly serves to maximize profit in the long-term*·"¿', 
43 National economie considerations by themselves as the sole effective 
motivation would be in conflict with the interests of banks' shareholders 
and customers. 
3) Participation through recovery of bad debts 
Within the context of discussions on banks' participation in industry, 
reference is continually made to the need for the financial rehabilitation 
(13)  of economically weak undertakings by redeeming "frozen" credit 
Unlike the reasons for participation referred to above, there could be 
a substantial factor here leading to investment in shares. This is 
proved, indeed, by the exception provided for from the general prohibition 
(14)  on participatory investment by deposit banks in such cases in Belgium*· '. 
Jhe circumstances applying in this case are easy to define*·''^''. In the 
industrial financing field, in particular, the banks do not always succeed 
in recovering credit granted in the way that was originally intended. 
Even strict security requirements when checking the creditworthiness of 
borrowers cannot prevent such difficulties in credit business. 
In the case of investment credit, the bank is as a rule neither able nor 
willing to extend finance beyond a specific period. The redemption of 
the loan by the issue of debentures or, more frequently, of shares is 
intended to effect a change in the creditor relationship. This object 
is jeopardized, however, or proved ineffective if circumstances on the 
capital market do not permit this. Apart from relatively external factors 
of this kind, failure to convert the debt may also lie with the debtor 
himself if his economic situation is not such as to create the necessary 
basis of confidence for an investment of capital. 
44 In such cases it is directly in the creditor bank's own interests to act 
as a "new" creditor itself, if the credit commitment is to be redeemed. 
This is all the more true if the usual credit sureties cannot be realized 
or if to realize them would bring the debtor to the verge of bankruptcy. 
Even where credit does not serve the purpose of providing preliminary 
finance, it may be necessary to recover it through participation. Credit 
is said to "freeze" when the borrower is no longer able, whether for 
external or internal reasons, to fulfil his contractual commitments towards 
the bank and when the latter is unable or unwilling to agree to an extension. 
In this case it is in the lender's interest not to content himself any 
longer with a mere debt, but to achieve a solution through participation. 
Participation may in such cases take other forms than shares. A decisive 
factor is the debtor undertaking's legal form. Participation is frequently 
preceded by a change in the debtor's legal form. This is implemented by 
the bank in order to adjust the conditions of participation to its own 
benefit. 
The recovery of a debt through company securities may contribute towards 
the bank's protection against losses on credit business. This is obviously 
possible only if the company to be rehabilitated makes positive progress 
so that the participation does not lose its intrinsice value and so that 
the marketability of the shares is improved in the interests of subsequent 
re-sale. 
Besides securing the bank's claim by debt conversion, the assumption of 
shareholders' rights in the company gives the bank direct influence on 
the business decisions of the company to be rehabilitated. This influence 
45 is in practice frequently institutionalized by the bank being appointed 
to the supervisory board. The opportunity, in particular, of cooperating 
in the settlement of personnel and financial matters can be important to 
the creditworthiness of the undertaking and consequently to the bank's 
commitment. In addition, its influence can be used in order to combine 
the undertaking with a stronger partner. There is a clear link between 
participation based on the redemption of frozen credit and credit business 
as the chief element in a bank's lending operations. 
In the course of pursuing the aim of increasing profit, unavoidable credit 
risk may demand participatory take-over. The latter therefore serves in 
such cases to prevent or minimize loss and lies directly within the field 
of the objectives of banking business. 
4) Unplanned participation within the scope of commercial banking policy 
The investigation of the reasons for pursuing what is known as unplanned 
participation has confirmed a link with the general aims of banking policy. 
Investment always serves the interests of the business as a whole and, 
(15a) 
consequently, the aim of maximizing profit . This applies even where 
purely transitory items are concerned. 
Participation as a possible consequence of a share issue remaining unplaced 
or not fully placed, particularly in the course of a capital increase, may 
be attributed directly to the sales risk normally assumed with issuing 
business. It is one of the money-earning services within the framework 
of issuing activities. Participation is therefore an acknowledged possible 
by-product of banking business. 
The same applies in the case of participation resulting from the redemption 
of bad credit. In this case the profitability of credit business is 
secured by reducing the risk of loss. 
46 Price support on the stock exchange, with the possible effect of a growing 
share portfolio, is another component part of business policy. The value 
of a bank's own share portfolio must be maintained as far as possible, 
avoiding stock market losses. 
On the basis of considerations limited to the banking industry, such 
participation must therefore be regarded as a positive aspect of banking 
business. This also applies to this sector of the economy as a whole 
insofar as its economic strength is regarded as a prerequisite for the 
achievement of national economic tasks and for the maintenance of the 
necessary confidence on the part of the public. 
Although the involuntary nature of the investment is continually stressed, 
this does not mean that banks' participation is undertaken against their 
will, as it were. The participation is not of a kind for the content of 
which the banks would have had to assume no responsibility. As already 
explained, the participation always arises as a result of commercial 
interests, even if only indirectly in certain circumstances. Freedom 
of action within the framework of participation is restricted by other 
criteria of commercial policy considered operationally more important. 
All that is lacking is the force of planned investment policy. 
This does not mean, of course, that this cannot arise after a participation 
has come about. 
The concept of involuntariness easily leads to the impression that in the 
case of participation resulting under these terms banks are assuming 
extraneous or outside tasks forced upon them. The position is clearly 
otherwise, however. It therefore seems more proper to speak of unplanned 
participation as opposed to planned investment which will now be dealt with. 
Whether this differentiation of investment according to its reason of 
origin will yield conclusions for the subject matter of our investigation 
can be discussed only within a later context. 
47 III) Planned participation 
1) General prerequisites for planned participation 
The investment of shares on a planned business basis is dependent not 
only on internal considerations of the industry but on various external 
(16) 
factors. The literature on this subject stresses, firstly, the 
connexion between credit demand and investment in securities. If a 
bank's credit potential is not exhausted, it is permissible in order 
to stimulate credit business to diversify into the acquisition of 
participatory holdings. The reverse, however, is permissible only 
within limits, as even strong demand for credit should not mean that 
the bank must give up existing investment commitments in order to 
strengthen credit business. 
Secondly, trends on the stock exchange are important to shares. This 
is more so the case than with fixed-interest stock, as fluctuations of 
share prices are stronger and less predictable. Moreover, shares are 
always dependent on their market value on the day of sale as their life 
is of unlimited duration. 
Finally, reference may be made to the acquisition of participatory interests 
being influenced by the prevailing situation on the securities market. 
It is obvious that a highly developed market with alternative choices as 
to both quality and quantity favours share investment. Conditions are 
at their best when the capital market is buoyant, as this lightens the 
banks' path to the capital market and facilitates their withdrawal from 
it<17>. 
2) The special status of banks in investment business 
Compared with other investors, the banks have special institutional 
advantages, particularly if they are active in dealing in securities. 
In this connexion, the following considerations apply: 
a) In the first place, the banks that transact securities business for their 
customers as well as for themselves enjoy a cost advantage. In order to 
48 transact investment business on a commission basis, a specialist 
organizational framework is maintained through which transactions can 
also be undertaken on own account. This means that the banks do not 
have to pay the charges - i.e. commission - which other investors have 
to pay to make use of this framework. Moreover, the banks have a tax 
advantage in that, in Germany, they do not have to pay stock exchange 
turnover tax on their own purchases. 
These savings in ancillary charges secure higher profitability for the 
banks compared with other investors and facilitate the short-term exchange 
of stocks in portfolio. 
b) A further consideration is the banks' particular closeness to the market. 
Thus banks with a large volume of commission business can frequently 
deduce - from customers' instructions received before they reach the 
exchange - what market trends are developing. Fluctuations can therefore 
be instantly taken into account for buying and selling purposes. And 
during stock exchange hours, the optimum moment can be selected for dealing. 
c) What is more important, however, is the banks' opportunity to procure 
restricted company information and consequently choose suitable stock 
for investment. Non-banking investors, on the other hand, are directed 
to general economic intelligence, company reports, stock exchange 
comparisons, etc. in order to determine their investment policy. 
In Germany, at least, there are many and various long-standing links 
between the credit institutions, particularly the three leading banks, 
and industry. These links have been built up chiefly on the basis of 
credit and issuing business, which demand mutual confidence. The 
consequence is that the banks-almost without exception are represented 
on the governing bodies of major undertakings . In this way important 
49 sources of information are opened up, as the supervisory board has to 
keep watch over management. This means that its members have intimate 
access to all important data regarding the business results and development 
of the undertaking. Furthermore, the sura of such knowledge gives an 
otherwise inaccessible insight into important sectors of the economy. 
Even where information is not obtained through a seat on the governing 
bodies, banks often have better opportunity of apprising themselves on 
potential investments, since, as lenders and issuing houses, they always 
transact their business on a basis of intimate knowledge of the commercial 
situation of the undertakings concerned. 
In this way, the banks are able to realize to a substantial extent the 
objectives pursued through share investment, which will be discussed in 
detail below^
19^. 
However, it should be noted that the utilization of such inside knowledge 
is being increasingly confined within.limits. Countries with highly-
developed securities markets have come to recognize the growing dangers 
in this connexion, particularly to other investors. Circumscription of 
the range of insiders, restrictions on share dealing, and duties of 
disclosure are the subject of government regulations (e.g. in France) or 
voluntary self-imposed controls (Germany)' '9a;^ Reference should be made 
to the relevant literature for a full description of this particular 
problem^ '. It cannot be expected, however, that the regulation of 
"insider trading" will deprive banks of every opportunity of using 
undertakings' private information, which is to a special degree accessible 
to them, for the purposes of stock exchange trading. 
3) Planned participation within the scope of banking objectives 
The long-term achievement of maximum profit while maintaining liquidity 
at all times on the one hand and capital security on the other, may be 
50 regarded as the guiding light of the banking industry in a market economy*· ', 
This objective covers the creation or acquisition of participatory holdings. 
a) Commentators see the advantages to the banking industry of shareholding in 
the form of participation especially from the profitability aspect^2). 
This obviously applies where the acquisition of worthwhile stock, e.g. 
growth-orientated dividend-bearing securities, produces a more attractive 
return on the investment. To this may be added an appreciable increase 
in the intrinsic value of the shareholding, leading to the creation of 
hidden reserves for the bank. Profitability" is also favourably affected 
if superfluous liquid funds, that cannot perhaps be used profitably in 
credit business owing to lack of demand, are channelled into share purchase 
(23)  on own account ■" . 
This process, which might also be described as the achievement of a 
balanced spread of business, meets the requirement that the bank, as a 
service-rendering organization, should adapt its capability to the area 
(24)  of maximum demand 
The literature on this subject, however, goes beyond this point to stress, 
most forcibly, the aspect of securing profitability through a spread of 
(?5i  risk by means of the acquisition of participatory holdings
v -^'. Even 
in share investment of a semi-permanent nature, an opportunity is seen 
for stabilizing profit levels. The spread of the commercial risk over 
several branches of banking business allows of a balancing of risks. 
It is true that in certain circumstances, owing to a risk-conscious 
diversification of this kind, profit peaks may become fewer. What is 
more important, however, is the possibility of compensating for losses, 
e.g. in credit or issuing business, by the continuous receipt of dividends. 
Such an opportunity for balancing profit is considered an important factor 
with regard to the universal banking system as a whole and is described by 
Buscljgen^ as a "built-in stabilizer". 
51 As regards this aspect of participation, it should be noted that the 
distribution of risk may become effective in two ways. Firstly, risk 
resulting from the various types of bank business has less impact on 
profit levels. Secondly, participatory holdings may wherever possible 
be spread over the various industrial sectors in order to avoid, or at 
least to reduce, losses due to dissimilar developments in the various 
branches of the economy. 
Both factors serve the banking industry's requirements for security. 
(27) 
The dichotomy between profitTseeking and security is thereby restricted 
The principle of liquidity can be complied with in participation business 
through the marketability of the shares. In the case of share investment, 
however, this usually takes second place to the chief reasons underlying 
distribution. Liquidity requirements merely impose certain limits without 
being the primary influence on the bank's investment decisions 
b) Two further factors should be mentioned when defining the profitability 
of participation. 
When entering into actual participation permitting influence over the 
company, the tax aspect of group holding company concessions has a part 
to play in Germany. According to this, participation amounting to at 
least 25% of a company's nominal capital is exempt from the double taxation 
levied in the first instance on the company's profits and then on the 
distribution of those profits to shareholders that would otherwise apply. 
Under Section 9 of the Corporation Tax Act (Korperschaftssteuergesetz) a 
bank need pay no corporation tax on income in the form of dividends 
resulting from participation as a group holding company. Tax advantages 
also exist under the holding company legislation in Luxembourg referred 
to above. 
52 Mention should further be made of the value-enhancing effect of what is 
known as "large-lot" or "package" forming. Should a bank - or any other 
investor for that matter - succeed in accumulating shareholder's rights 
through share purchase, so that real influence over a company is possible, 
control of this kind over the undertaking as a result of the "package" 
(29)  holding is remunerated by a supplement on sale . The selling price 
is consequently appreciably above the prevailing quoted price. In this 
way, the effect of the gradual creation of a participatory holding can 
be profit-promoting if, upon sale, profit is made in the form of a 
"package supplement". 
4) Influence on the undertaking the object of planned participation? 
Banks frequently have participatory holdings that form a substantial 
part of companies' nominal capital. As regards Germany, this fact has 
been confirmed time and again*^
0'. it would appear that most such 
holdings lie between 25 and 50%. 
The profitability factors referred to above, tax benefits and "package-
forming", can only be marginal considerations in this context. The 
question as to the reason for such participation becomes more urgent 
when it is considered that substantial investment commitments militate 
to some extent at least, against the principle of distribution of risk 
and consequently against security as an objective of banking policy*-3 ' ). 
Are the banks concerned with influencing the undertakings in which they 
participate? The answer to this question is a definite "yes", not only 
in public ^ but also in the specialist literature^-
>-
>'. It is felt 
that considerations of investment policy alone are not an adequate 
explanation, as otherwise an undertaking whose shares were acquired by 
a bank with participation in mind would recognizably surpass all other 
(34)  public companies as regards its earning power and soundness
w . 
53 This view cannot of course be wholeheartedly supported, if only for the 
fact that quite a number of different criteria may underlie a participation. 
No quantitative analysis of participation is possible from this aspect. 
On the other hand, the matter is not one of speculation as any other motive 
is absent and, moreover, this might conflict with the principle of 
distribution of risk. What objectives can banks pursue through an 
influence on particular undertakings derived from company securities? 
What concerns us in this context is whether banking considerations are 
also to be found here. Other effects will for the most part be ignored. 
As a rule, it is in the banks' interests to stabilize commercial relations 
with their customers. This applies particularly in the case of major 
customers for whom private banking services are undertaken. It is 
therefore natural that existing opportunities for influence should be 
used in order to realize such interests. 
This means that a bank with a substantial participation in an undertaking 
can influence the latter's commercial decisions. Where the undertaking's 
relations with the banking sector are concerned, this capability can be 
made use of by the bank in order to promote itself as first choice as 
trading partner. In this way, credit demand is concentrated, securities 
transactions and issues are taken up, reinforcement of deposit business 
is pursued and foreign business is transacted. In short, the whole of 
the universal bank's spectrum of services is brought into play. Thus 
the influenced undertaking is put into the service of banking sales and 
procurement policy*· 35). 
It should be noted that the banks can also rely on higher growth rates 
in repeat business. In this context, there is the chance of opening 
salary accounts for the trading partner's employees and stimulating 
small-sum credit business. 
54 The securing of trading relations between the bank and a commercial 
undertaking is directly aimed at the optimum utilization of the bank's 
commercial machinery. The influence achieved through participation 
therefore serves the purpose of profit maximization. 
This fact is not synonymous with a general desire for power on the part 
of the banks, which is sometimes considered excessive. Nor, however, 
is it ruled out by the assertion, often heard but not examinable in this 
context, that the banks exercise no corporate functions in undertakings 
in which they participate*·3 ; i.e. that they essentially leave corporate 
freedom of decision unaffected, as the stabilization of business relations 
is directed only towards banking objectives. 
This influence cannot be denied or diminished by a reference to the 
increasing competition within the banking business (slogan: competition 
versus banking power*-37)). Livelier competition between and within 
banking groups may certainly be accepted as existing today, resulting 
particularly from freedom in interest rates, expansion of the branch 
(38)  network, and greater room for negotiation in public-sector institutions^-^. 
The effectiveness of competition in enhancing trading, relations, however, 
presupposes-mobility in demand for banking services, and it is precisely 
this condition that is absent in practice from the private banking relations 
with which we are concerned here. Even where the influenced undertaking 
attempts to "break out", it is often not in a position to do so immediately 
owing to existing ties. "A change in the banking connexion gives rise 
to charges for the transfer of securities, for the preparation of new 
balance sheets and financial plans, for alteration of the banking connexions 
listed on the company's letterhead, etc. The customer has to take further 
55 trouble in convincing the new bank of his soundness and comparing its 
charges for the service package required with the charges previously paid. 
The customer is further faced with some uncertainty in a change where it 
is not clear whether the new bank is trying to attract him with a special 
introductory price in order later to charge less favourable prices than 
(39 Ì  the previous bank for certain or all aspects of the business. "
w:7. 
Existing credit arrangements stand yet more clearly in the way of a change 
that may be desirable in itself. According to the degree of indebtedness, 
it will become more difficult for an undertaking to take up other offers. 
These opportunities for influence are not, moreover, necessarily dependent 
on extensive participation amounting to a majority holding. As a rule, 
even a minority holding of 25% can prevent a public company's General 
Meeting passing important resolutions as appropriate qualified majority 
requirements are frequently prescribed by law. Such majorities are 
required, for example, under various legal systems for capital increases, 
mergers or alterations of the Articles of Association. This dependence 
on a qualified minority may oblige the undertaking to consider this 
minority even in the case of other decisions. Moreover, where shares 
are suitably distributed, the desired influence can be obtained through 
a relatively modest participation. 
Finally, it should be stressed that participation is not the only 
instrument at the banks' disposal for extending and securing their 
trading relations. The right of consultation under company law based 
on participation is frequently strengthened by proxy voting powers in 
respect of shares deposited with the banks. Both opportunities for 
influence are as a rule institutionalized through the banks being 
represented on the governing body. To this should'be added that, in 
cases of heavy credit dependence on a bank, the latter achieves a status 
that may be described as de facto participation 
56 This undisputed fact obviates the need for particularly extensive and 
consequently costly capital participation as a prerequisite for the 
exercise of influence. 
5) Further motives for acquisition 
Parcels of shares in the form of participatory holdings, whether they 
result by design or otherwise, are frequently regarded by the banks as 
only transitory items. Participatory holdings which are the subject of 
dealings are therefore differentiated from genuine (long-term) financial 
assets. This means, with reference to conditions in Germany, that when 
production programmes are extended, when new groups are formed, when 
trading partners amalgamate or split up, when inheritances are passed 
on and on other such occasions, it proves necessary time and again to 
find, as a temporary measure, a financially strong purchaser who can 
cooperate in finding a constructive solution and, in particular, can 
(4l)  acquire a participation and also sell it again
v . 
In such cases, banks - in view of their activities in the corporate finance 
and consultancy field - may find themselves acting as a half-way house 
(42)  for major items
v . In other countries, these functions are by definition 
(43)  undertaken by the investment banks
v ^ . Several countries have created 
(44)  speciell institutions in order to facilitate industrial reorganization^ 
A proposal for a change in the ownership of parcels of shares often 
originates with third parties or with the companies themselves*· -", χη 
this connexion, particular reference may be made to those transactions 
serving to maintain specific conditions of ownership within a company or 
intended to prevent influence from being exercised in a particular way. 
Approaches are consequently made to banks, e.g. if family holdings in 
public companies are to be maintained. 
57 Banks are further recognized as suitable institutions to restrain the 
(47) 
influence of foreign capital interests . Such "anti-alienation 
defence" is, however, also undertaken by the banks of their own accord 
It may well be asked in this context for what reasons banks may be called 
upon to exercise certain controls over penetration by foreign capital. 
It must be assumed that not only national interests lie behind such 
"package patriotism" so often referred to. Customers' long-term interests 
(49)  are often an underlying motive in this case, too.
 y' 
Recent events have shown, however, that the safeguarding of national 
interests can be the wholly predominant factor in large-lot or "package" 
transactions. This is the case where the object pursued in an investment 
by foreigners is not evident and there is consequently a particular danger 
of political interference. Because of their financial opportunities and 
their relations with industry, banks enter into consideration here as sole 
partners to take up large parcels of shares and then frequently act in 
consultation with government. 
IV) Conclusions 
The investigation into the reasons why banks acquire shares or participatory 
holdings was opened with the question how such activities should be 
regarded in relation to the functions central to the banking industry, as 
at first sight there is no link in this case. 
It may, however, be confirmed that participation business, even where this 
concerns the non-banking sector, lies entirely within the framework of 
banks' commercial policy where the market-economy-based principle of 
achieving maximum profit while observing the requirements of liquidity 
and security is taken as a guideline. 
It has already been stressed in the case of unplanned participation that 
this is not indeed in origin the subject matter of selective investment 
policy but can always be explained by commercial interests in other branches 
of banking activity. 
58 There is no doubt that the same findings apply in the case of planned 
participation. This applies particularly in the case of (long-term) 
financial assets. Direct interest in profitability, full exploitation 
of lending business, and opportunities for earnings stabilization all 
come into account here. The special status of banks in investment 
business in general is a supporting factor. 
Nor can participation as the subject matter of trading be regarded 
separately from commercial objectives. There is direct interest in 
earnings where purchase and sale are linked to the expectation of a 
profit margin which certainly cannot always be realized. 
In the long term, banking objectives are pursued where parcels of shares 
are taken up as transitory items in the interests of present or potential 
customers in order that such shares may be used for corporate development 
purposes. It is conceivable for a bank in exceptional cases to take up 
a participation as a protective measure against foreign capital against 
its own profit-making interests. 
We therefore arrive at the certainly unsurprising finding that the 
acquisition of participatory holdings and their maintenance, whether 
planned or not, as a rule is clearly linked to banking objectives. While 
it cannot thereby be denied that national economic interests may also be 
served simultaneously (this will be dealt with later), this finding prevents 
the banking industry's participation in the non-banking sector for reasons 
of public welfare from being over-stressed^-
7 '. 
Whether - and to what extent - participation business constitutes a 
substantial factor in the capability of banks and, consequently, of the 
banking industry as a whole, from the profitability and risk stabilization 
aspect*·-
7-1', cannot be answered here. The small dividend yields and, in 
particular, the survey of the various banking systems within the EEC, 
whose efficiency cannot be disputed even where their participatory holdings 
59 are comparatively small, do not support the case for participation being 
given primary importance within lending business as a whole. It cannot 
be denied, however, that stock exchange profits can often be obtained from 
part icipat ion. 
It should be noted, in addition, that participation cannot be uniformly 
adjudged as advantageous, even from the banking point of view. We have 
seen that, particularly where investment in a company is extensive, the 
risk of this undertaking becomes a risk for the bank*·-
72'. 
While it may therefore be accepted that the advantages accruing to the 
banking industry from share investment business do not determine the 
question of participation, the further criteria necessary for such an 
assessment must be examined. 
60 CHAPTER FOUR 
Kon-banking areas affected by participation 
I) Procedure of the investigation 
Banks are the meeting-place of conflicting interests: of those involved, 
some group is usually dissatisfied with the bank's constitution or its 
policy and demands reforms for the removal of real or imagined grievances. 
This explains why the problem of the banks has remained unsolved throughout 
(1)  the world for more than 100 years 
This comment, made in 1933» is still valid today and applies especially 
to the banks' participation policies. A lively debate continues, covering 
the most widely divergent interests - which are nevertheless relevant to 
our investigation. This close connexion of the object of the investigation 
with various interest groups makes it understandable why it has been legal 
literature rather than economists' studies that has concerned itself with 
the problems arising. For what is involved is an aspect of the banks' 
constitutions which requires an evaluating and classifying appraisal. 
Meaningful conclusions are unlikely to be arrived at by means of empirical 
studies or model-based theoretical investigations. 
After discussing participatory investment under its specifically banking 
aspects, it is now time to ask what other interests beyond the banking 
sector are affected. As far as methods are concerned, an answer to this 
question can be developed in two ways. Firstly, the various reasons for 
acquiring participatory holdings can be taken as the starting-point in 
order to permit the examination of the different spheres of influence 
arising. Secondly, the possible areas affected may be placed in the 
centre of the investigation. 
The latter method enables the positions of the interested parties in 
relation to the participatory holdings to be determined more exactly, 
since the various influences can be judged together. This procedure 
is thus to be preferred. It extends in the same way to cover positive 
and negative influences within the individual areas affected. 
61 What non-bank interests can be affected by banks' participation in 
non-banking sectors of the economy? There are several levels to be 
considered here and further detailed differentiation is necessary. 
First we must consider the banks' customers. Here we must distinguish 
between depositors (savers) and securities customers. From here it is 
natural to enquire into the importance of participation for the stock 
market and the capital market, which in turn will involve another aspect: 
the public interest. On the same level are to be found the possible 
effects on other market interests. Among these is the competition 
between the banks, on the one hand, and the competitors of the undertaking 
in which the participatory interest is held, on the other. In addition, 
the market for "economic subjects", that is to say, the market for the 
undertakings themselves, will have to be included. 
On another, third, level is the undertaking which is the subject of the 
participatory holding. It is intended here to regard the undertaking 
as being equivalent to its shareholders or proprietors, although it should 
not be forgotten that other interests, such as those of the employees, of 
the preceding and following links in the chain of production and 
distribution or equivalent and of the public at large, normally make 
themselves felt as well. 
Where conflicts of interest are found when defining the "areas affected", 
it will be necessary to examine in detail whether these conflicts can arise 
only under the universal banking system (conflicts inherent in the system) 
or whether they are also conceivable under the "separation system" 
(conflicts not inherent in the system). 
The investigation that follows is based mainly on the technical and 
administrative debate which has been carried on in Germany. This may 
appear to be a limitation, but it should be pointed out that the Federal 
Republic is the most logical exponent of the universal banking system in 
the European Community. It has been in this country that the problems 
connected with the subject matter of our investigation have been most 
62 intensively discussed recently. Here the conflicts which are possible 
under this system arise undistorted by statutory regulation or organization. 
II) Banks' customers as depositors 
A bank pursuing its commercial goal of profit maximization and paying heed 
to the banking requirements of security and liquidity is acting in 
accordance with the best interests of its depositors. The latter are 
interested in the first place in a good rate of return on their deposited 
funds. A bank which allows itself to be guided by profitability 
principles cannot come into conflict with this requirement. In addition, 
the safety of the deposits must be guaranteed in two ways. 
It must be possible for the deposit customers to demand the return of 
their money, in a manner appropriate to the form of the deposit (sight 
deposits, short or long-term time deposits). In other words, the bank 
must ensure that its available funds are at all times sufficient to meet 
its payment obligations. Here we touch on the aspect of liquidity. 
At the same time the bank must make sure that the deposits which have been 
only temporarily entrusted to it are protected against loss. The risks 
inevitably accompanying lending business must be kept as low as possible. 
The bank must therefore, in all its commitments, have regard to the 
principle of security. 
The banking maxims of liquidity and security thus lie within the realm 
(21  of the most basic interests of the depositor^ '. Participation by the 
banks can result in the protection of depositors being disregarded under 
both aspects. 
63 1) Liquidity problems caused by participation 
Banking liquidity has been described as the ability to meet, without limit 
and at any time, all payment obligations falling due . Maintenance of 
this ability is one of the most important tasks of a bank's management. 
The object of liquidity planning is to supervise actions affecting the 
flow of payments both Into and out of the bank. Cash inflows are increased 
by the realization of assets, that is to say by their conversion into cash. 
The security of the necessary liquidity planning is therefore fundamentally 
influenced by whether or not this conversion can be effected continuously 
and not at a discount. 
In this connexion the "golden rule of banking", which is still valid, 
should be mentioned as an institutional precaution for the maintenance 
(L) 
of banking liquidity*· '. This rule states that short-term deposits should 
be used to finance only short-term lending and that long-term lending 
should be financed only by long-term deposits. The requirement, set by 
this rule, that there should be complete congruence between borrowings 
and leñdings as far as maturity dates are concerned, is of fundamental 
importance for liquidity planning, even though it is modified by the 
"sediment" theory. This is based on the experience that a certain 
proportion of funds will not be withdrawn on maturity and is thus 
permanently available to the bank. A "sediment" remains on individual 
accounts which is unaffected by day-to-day fluctuations. This means that, 
to the extent that such a sediment is expected, short-term funds placed 
with the bank can also be lent medium or long. The crucial point here 
is not the maturity of the liabilities but the extent to which the 
liquidation of the liabilities will actually be demanded. Moreover, less 
attention is now paid to the fact that debts are due. to the bank than to 
whether or not they are actually realizable . 
64 But this modification of the "golden rule of banking" may only be small, 
since the size of the "sediment" cannot be determined abstractly. It 
will tend to be nearly zero, if one takes into account exceptional payment 
requirements which may occur*· '. 
Banking liquidity is directly affected by participatory investment. When 
shares are acquired they cannot be regarded as having a maturity date in 
the future. The conversion of such an asset into liquid funds will be 
at the discretion of the bank on business criteria. But the decision 
will be influenced by many extraneous factors which restrict the 
possibilities of sale of the investment. 
Often there is no market for certain shares, which virtually rules out 
the possibility of disposing of a participatory holding. This is the 
case, for instance, when a company has few shareholders and does not 
contemplate introducing the shares on a stock exchange. Sale may be 
prevented by the conditions prevailing on the capital market if there is 
a temporary unwillingness to take up shares. 
Furthermore, even if there is a market for the shares, the conversion into 
liquid funds will depend on the value placed on the shares by the market. 
If, for political or business reasons, the economic situation is judged 
to be unfavourable, this usually has a depressing effect on the general 
level of share prices. Liquidation of the investment may then only be 
possible if a substantial loss is accepted, which, admittedly, may be 
covered by reserves undisclosed in the balance sheet. Finally, the sale 
of large parcels of shares can only be undertaken with extreme caution 
and in stages, if the market is not to react with a fall in the share price. 
65 The factors mentioned here illustrate the risk to liquidity connected 
with the acquisition of a participatory holding. Investments in shares 
are accordingly regarded as non-liquid^' . For this reason, the use of 
borrowed funds to provide a business undertaking with its ov/n capital 
resources is regarded with serious misgivings. Only funds with no 
repayment obligation, either immediate or after a given period, are 
considered suitable for participation purposes. Reference is therefore 
made to the banks' own capital resources as a yardstick for judging 
participation from the liquidity point of view. 
With regard to the restriction of participation business to a certain 
proportion of the banks' own capital resources, it should also be observed 
that the latter funds serve certain specific purposes, namely the provision 
of equipment, etc., and the covering of losses as guarantee capital 
Thus it is evident that the use of customers' money for investment business 
involves a risk for depositors in the transformation of maturities or the 
immobilization of funds that is implicit in the acquisition of participatory 
interests. 
2) Security risks in participation 
Besides profitability and liquidity, security is one of the maxims of 
(9)  commercial banking policy . This covers the granting of security in 
the concrete sense and the maintenance of security in the technical and 
organizational sphere . Beyond this, security in the sphere of the 
provision of finance is of importance here. Above all, as already 
mentioned, financial losses in lending business, which could prejudice 
the interests of depositors, have to be avoided. 
It is universally recognized that participation involves a considerable 
(11)  security risk . The risk lies in the danger that the shareholding 
will lose its value. This relates to the fact that the bank is linked 
(1?) 
to the business fate of the undertaking
v . The strength of this link 
increases with the extent of the holding in the undertaking. Incorrect 
business decisions by management and structural crises in the particular 
industrial sector both act directly on the value'of the holding. 
66 Capital losses arise when stock exchange prices fall. This affects the 
whole of a bank's holding. In the case of existing participatory 
investments, a bank can do little to influence this risk of loss. Where 
the holding in a company is substantial, joint business responsibility may 
be assumed through representation on the governing bodies. But management 
errors cannot be completely excluded in this way. In the case of losses 
of value for other reasons, control of the risk is impossible. 
Security considerations can, however, be taken into account on the 
acquisition of investments. The spreading of investments is a precaution 
(13)  against loss . Economic fluctuations linked to a particular branch 
of industry can be evened out in this way, as can losses arising from 
participation in a single undertaking. 
But the risk of loss of value cannot be removed by these means, even though 
it can be reduced. Limitation of the extent of the investment in any one 
company can also help to this end. Regulations of this kind are in force, 
for example, in France - in the case of deposit banks - Ireland and 
Denmark. 
The banks' participatory holdings often conceal undisclosed reserves. 
Losses in value are not therefore necessarily apparent from the balance 
sheet. Real losses of assets, however, cannot be ruled out by this. 
Another risk to security lies in the banks' opportunity to switch 
investments for speculative reasons. This applies both to stock exchange 
trading and to dealings in large parcels of shares. 
Reference is made in the literature on banking to another element of risk 
from'.the security point of view where there is a substantial holding in 
(14)  the shares of one company . In these circumstances the bank is linked 
to the business fate of the undertaking. This may lead to attempts to 
support the undertaking as much as possible even in an adverse business 
67 Situation in order to obviate losses in the share portfolio. In this 
way credit may be granted when, according to objective criteria of 
creditworthiness, it should be refused. Participation in the undertaking -
the interest in the subsidiary company - can thus give rise to highly 
risky transactions and endanger customers' deposits through losses in 
lending business. 
3) Unplanned participation and the protection of depositors 
Against the judgment expressed above, it must be borne in mind that in 
exceptional cases investment in shares may be advantageous for the 
protection of depositors. 
It has been indicated above that participation can arise without deliberate 
planning in the course of the rehabilitation of an undertaking*·'3·'. As 
soon as an advance made by a bank proves unrecoverable, the bank attempts 
to secure its position by converting the loan into a shareholding. To 
the extent that losses can be avoided in this way, the interests of the 
depositors are also served. 
This possible positive effect of participation from the point of view of 
the protection of depositors is insignificant compared with the risks 
outlined above. Except in times of economic crisis, participation with 
a view to company rehabilitation is comparatively rare. Although it may 
provide protection against credit losses, participation in this form 
nevertheless constitutes a risk from the selling and depreciation points 
of view described above as being typical. This is not sufficient, at 
least in general, to legitimize bank participation as being a protection 
for depositors. 
4) The significance of depositor protection 
A bank's commercial policy is directed towards the maximization of profit 
accompanied by the preservation of an adequate payment capability and 
the greatest possible security. These objectives are closely connected 
and indispensable. In particular, profitability cannot be achieved 
without regard for the liquidity and security principle. At first sight 
there might appear to be a conflict between the goal of profit maximization 
68 on the one hand and the requirements of liquidity and security on the 
(16) 
other . Raising earnings can, if pursued to its logical limits, 
endanger solvency and heighten the risk of loss on lending business. 
The effect would be to endanger the existence of the bank itself. At 
the same time the depositors' interests would be harmed because it would 
be impossible to repay them their money or would be possible only to 
make partial or late repayment. The bank would forfeit the necessary 
confidence. 
These factors show that the fulfilment of the requirements of liquidity 
and security is a prerequisite for safeguarding banking earnings. They 
must be continually borne in mind, whereas the earning of profits may be 
(17)  renounced under certain circumstances for a short period^ . Protection 
against the risk of lack of marketability and loss of value caused by 
participation is thus not only in the interests of the depositors but 
also safeguards the banking system's ability to function. 
Appraisal of a bank's participatory investment policy is, as these facts 
show, one of the fundamental tasks of those responsible for supervising 
the bank's operations. 
The rationality of this task is expressed in the supervisory laws of 
most Member States. The comparative legal survey showed us that it was 
precisely the necessity for adequate liquidity and security that led to 
the regulation of participation in the non-banking sector. During the 
economic crisis of 1930 the need for state intervention became especially 
clear. Italy and Belgium reacted by separating banking institutions 
handling medium and long-term business from those handling short-term 
business and prohibiting the latter from engaging in participation. 
Denmark, too, introduced banking supervision in 1930 and required the 
maintenance of a certain ratio between a bank's own capital resources and 
its share investments. In Germany Section 12 of the 3anking Act (KwG) 
is intended to restrict participation and other long-term investment by 
reference to the holder's own share capital and reserves. France, like 
69 England - a country with a tradition of separate functioning in banking -
has limited the acquisition of shareholding rights by deposit banks by 
reference to the extent of the participation in a company and to the bank's 
own capital funds. 
It is thus evident that the. European systems of banking supervision law 
have long since recognized their task of depositor protection in the case 
of banks' participatory investment in the non-banking sector and have 
implemented it in various different ways. 
Ill) The banks' customers as investors 
The banks, as intermediaries on the capital market, discharge an important 
advisory function vis-à-vis the investing public. The manner in which 
they exercise their function determines whether the necessary "transparency" 
for a rational decision by the investor can be achieved. 
1) Investment advice with regard to participatory holdings 
Doubts are often expressed about the objectivity of the banks in the matter 
of advice to their customers. Thus it is asked in the first place whether 
investors are really recommended the best form of investment. This 
should be considered in conjunction with the thesis, frequently advanced, 
that the universal banks neglect the securities market in favour of 
deposit-account saving*·'°'. Significant for the purposes of our 
investigation alone is the further reproach that even within a specific 
form of investment (shares) there is a danger of improper recommendation 
of individual investment outlets (joint-stock companies). The banks' own 
share portfolios are held responsible for this conceivable conflict of 
interests^ " . 
The following case is an example . A customer complained because in 
1953 his bank advised him to sell his Daimler shares and buy other shares. 
It was established that the bank had given 45 other securities customers 
the same advice and during that time had built up its own holding in 
Daimler. The complaint was rejected because it could not be proved that 
the bank had conducted its customer consultancy operations uniformly and 
that it intended thereby to favour itself. 
70 In fact it is obvious that stocks will be recommended by a bank for purchase 
or sale according to whether it wishes to create or build up its own 
holding or to reduce or dispose of it. If, for example, it is desired 
to increase participation in order to strengthen the degree of corporate 
influence or to qualify for the group-company tax concession, it will be 
natural for the investment adviser to encourage a willingness to sell the 
shares in question. Recommendations to buy may be made in order to push 
up the market value of the bank's own investment. 
Similarly, there is a real danger of lack of objectivity in investment 
advice if the bank holds unplanned participatory investments. These 
have not come into being as a result of planned investment policy and are 
usually intended to be sold again rapidly. An appropriate willingness 
to purchase on the part of the bank's customers will facilitate the sale. 
This practice is expressively described as "unloading" shares on to the 
public. 
2) Investment advice and inside information 
Securities customers' interests are not only endangered by a bank raaking 
recommendations in order to favour its own portfolio. The bank may also 
withhold adverse information about the business of certain companies, 
which it may have received as an "insider", from the advice-seeking 
(21)  public . It may be in the bank's interest to behave in this way if 
the undertaking's reputation would be harmed were the information to be 
passed on. Doubt might be cast on its creditworthiness and credits 
already advanced by the bank might be endangered. Further, the holding 
of a participatory investment by the bank in the undertaking may be the 
cause of such conduct. For to communicate the information might result 
in a fall in the undertaking's shares on the market and lead to substantial 
losses. 
71 We are dealing with a procedure similar to share price manipulation. 
It cannot be justified with the argument that defending investments 
against market losses is at the same time in the interests of the 
depositors. The conflict between depositors and securities customers 
is easily soluble. For the protection of depositors is only very 
indirectly affected. And a bank has a duty to investors to provide 
true information in order to prevent them suffering losses on their 
assets. 
3) Would competitive conditions produce objective investment advice? 
Against the argument of the conflict of interests arising in investment 
counselling it is held that the pressure of competition in the banking 
(22)  sector would ensure that the customers' interests were taken into account*· ', 
The wrongly advised customer, it is claimed, would not only withdraw his 
deposit but would also break off all his other business connexions with 
a bank which short-sightedly ga»re advice that was only in its own interest. 
It may be correct to say that this would impose a certain degree of 
restraint on a bank. But not even strong competitive pressure will 
guarantee objective investment counselling. Even where a market situation 
of this kind does exist, the "migration" of a customer is not the usual 
consequence of faulty investment advice. For the customer must first 
find out that the bank has failed to' have his interests at heart. But 
this is only conceivable in exceptional cases. How is the public supposed 
to detect the building up or disposal of participatory holdings on the 
market and establish that their own interests have been injured by this 
action? 
And even if the fact of damage to their interests is discovered, there 
still remain the factors restricting customers' mobility. Among these 
must be counted the customer's existing regular connexion with his bank, 
particularly when he has committed himself to heavy borrowing. Moreover, 
the customer transferring his custom to a competing bank would run a 
similar risk there, unless it was a house that did not engage in 
participation business. 
72 The possibility of conflict between a bank's own portfolio interests and 
the provision of proper advice and information to its securities customers 
is not the result of the connexion between credit business and securities 
business within the bank: it can also occur with investment banks in 
the "separation" system of banking. The conflicts of interest are not 
inherent in the system. They could only be countered by prohibiting 
specialized investment banks either from carrying on securities business 
on a commission basis or from investing on their own account. A solution 
of this kind is inconceivable. The only remedy here would be to tighten 
up the disclosure requirements thereby diminishing the banks' key position 
as advisers of securities customers. 
IV) The stock market and capital market 
Investment counselling of its securities customers by a bank is an 
important function in the process of acting as an intermediary between 
savings and investment, the supply of capital and the demand for capital. 
Previously we have examined the importance of the banks' participatory 
holdings in relation to this function. Beyond this it must be ascertained 
what influence share investment by the banks has in general on the stock 
market as part of the capital market. Here the investor also comes under 
consideration, independently of his characteristic as a bank customer. 
1) Trading in large parcels of shares by the banks 
Dealing in large parcels of shares is a normal form of activity on the 
capital market in Member States of the European Community where specialized 
investment banks or universal banks with substantial participation business 
(23)  are active. The French banques d'affaires^ ^ , the British merchant 
banks and the large German private banks may be mentioned in this connexion. 
Naturally, large-lot dealing is not the exclusive preserve of the banks. 
Other undertaliings, too, are in a position to carry on such business. 
However, the banks in special measure, particularly when they specialize 
in investment business, have the funds necessary to create or to acquire 
large parcels of shares. 
73 Large-lot dealing leads to greater flexibility on the capital market. 
The interests of finance are well served by the speedy balancing of supply 
and demand. Particularly in times of rapid industrial expansion large-lot 
trading can be a necessity for the capital market. 
The exchange of large parcels of shares takes place outside the stock 
exchange. This is true even of quoted shares. When this happens, it 
is to the benefit of the stock exchanges, although this is not a deliberate 
(24)  intention . Violent price fluctuations in a company's shares are 
prevented. If a major shareholder wishes to dispose of his holdings, 
this could cause a sharp fall in the share price which would lead to 
further selling. Such events could unjustifiably injure the market 
standing of an undertaking. 
On the other hand, the exclusion of the stock exchange from such transactions 
(25)  means a loss of market "transparency"
v ■". In particular, the turnover 
in the shares of a company remains unknown. This makes it more difficult 
to judge the trend of the share price because it is the quantitative 
(?61  components that make a market quotation more reliable . 
A single verdict cannot therefore be passed on the opportunity for 
large-lot trading which is opened up by participation, since positive 
and negative effects for the stock market are inseparably joined. 
In order to judge what importance should be attached to the negative effects 
in relation to the question of participation, it should be remembered that 
large-lot trading, as mentioned above, is not confined exclusively to the 
banks. Regulation of the banks' shareholdings therefore might well 
reduce the problems of extra-bourse trading in large parcels but it would 
not remove them. Moreover, this trading even has a positive effect for 
the stock exchange. In addition, it fulfils an important function on 
the capital market. Reference may be made here to what was said earlier 
on the subject of participatory investments as transitory items held by 
(•37 ι 
the banks^". And finally it should be noted that the problems arising 
in connexion with large-lot trading also occur with specialized investment 
banks, that is to say, they are not inhere:
-1 in the system. 
74 2) Share price manipulation 
Share participation enables banks to manipulate the quoted price of shares 
by buying and selling. The price of certain shares is deliberately 
(?° )  altered in the interest of the banks or of major customers of the banks^ ', 
The price then no longer reflects the conditions of the economy as a whole 
or of a particular industry but presents a falsified picture of an 
undertaking. 
The prerequisites for effective price manipulation are a rather narrow 
market for the shares chosen for the operation and, according to the aim 
in view, a falling or rising market, sufficient liquid funds and a 
(29)  substantial holding of the shares
 J . 
In principle, these prerequisites could also be valid for investment banks 
and even for non-banking undertakings. It can be assumed, however, for 
practical reasons that these prerequisites tend to be more relevant for 
universal banks
 J . 
Share price manipulation affects the reliability of the stock market as 
an indicator /Its "transparency'^. Manipulated prices cease to reflect 
the general assessment of a company's worth under given economic and 
political conditions. 
iVhen there are artificial rises in a share price the investor is tempted 
to follow suit by buying, in order to benefit from a possible gain in 
value. Conversely, a fall in the price may lead to anxious selling which 
is not justified by the financial position of the company in question
 J 
In certain circumstances a manipulated fall in the share price can lead to 
the calling in of a loan against securities because the share cover, in 
view of the falling price, is no longer adequate. 
75 Deliberate influencing of the prices of certain shares can, however, also 
be to the advantage of the investor. This has already been seen in the 
concept of price support operations by banks. 
We have seen that the banks take this course in order to protect their 
own portfolio interests or to prevent a collapse in a share price following 
an issue. Support from both these motives can serve the interests of 
other shareholders. This is particularly true when the market operations 
(3?)  combat short-term technical price fluctuations
w . The opportunity to 
influence certain share prices conferred by a bank's participation can 
thus be appraised in two ways. On one side there is the fact that the 
stock exchange picture is distorted and investors' interests harmed; 
on the other side, investors' interests are safeguarded by the balancing 
out of price fluctuations. Which effect has the greater weight cannot 
be answered for lack of empirical documentary evidence. For this reason, 
in the first place, it can be stated that the banks' opportunity for share 
price manipulation is not of crucial importance in the question of the 
control of participation. In addition, this opportunity is not inherent 
in the banking system but is available to other firms or persons provided 
they have the necessary funds. This means that even specialized investment 
banks can be subject to the same problems. A solution would have to be 
sought in the realm of an official supervisory authority with wide powers 
of obtaining information and carrying out audits. Only in this way could 
share price manipulation, with its negative effects, be separated from 
price support, with its positive effects. 
3) The secret building up of participatory holdings 
The bank engaged in securities business has, in principle, an opportunity 
to carry out "offsetting" with regard to customers* orders. Incoming 
buying and selling orders received by the bank are set off against each 
other without use being made of the stock exchange. In Germany this 
opportunity is given by the law on commissions which allows a bank itself 
(33)  to deal under certain specified conditions
w-" . 
76 The offsetting of buying and selling orders for securities received by a 
bank as agent can be used in the interests of the bank itself or of a 
customer to build up large holdings of shares with a view to participation 
without the members of the public thereby affected being able to find out 
about it. Other investors do not have an opportunity to react to 
occurrences of this kind. In principle it can be assumed that the 
creation of a large holding of shares through the medium of the stock 
exchange leads to higher prices because of the increase in demand. The 
shareholders of a company in which a party is. attempting to secure a 
participatory interest can escape the future influence of an emergent 
major shareholder by selling their shares at a higher price. In addition, 
it can happen in the course of participatory purchase operations that 
sales are made simply for profit-taking motives. Investors who do not 
discover that an attempt to secure a participatory stake in their company 
or to take it over is being made are precluded from the possibility of 
(341  having recourse to such lines of action
w '. 
This secret building up of large shareholdings entails a further danger 
for the shareholders of the company affected. They are suddenly, perhaps 
at the General Meeting, confronted with a majority shareholder. Insofar 
as the latter is in a position to control the company on the basis of his 
holding, the other shareholders' opportunities for influence, which were 
at least available if they acted collectively, lose their force in proportion 
to the extent of the controlling shareholding. This exclusion from the 
right to take part in exercising control is usually expressed in a falling 
share price. There is a loss of value. Anyone wishing to withdraw from" 
the controlled company will receive a lower price on sale*-33J. 
The situation as described with regard to the secret building up of 
participatory holdings, which in certain circumstances can be effected 
not only by "offset" business but also in other ways, shows that it cannot 
be of great importance for the problem of the control of participation. 
For what is involved here are the procedures of securities business, which 
are not necessarily connected with the problem of participation by banks. 
77 Secret building up of large shareholdings may also be undertaken by banks 
on behalf of third parties. 
Participatory holdings may also be acquired by other firms or persons 
outside the stock exchange through the purchase of various holdings. 
The question of the protection of shareholders, which certainly requires 
a solution, therefore demands a different answer. It is to be sought 
in company law, as the problem mainly affects the rights of the shareholders 
of the company affected by the participatory share build-up. This will 
principally involve the provision of information to the shareholders, 
information which will have to include notification of the intention to 
participate. The notification requirements as laid down by the German 
Shares Act (Section 20) in respect of holdings of 25 and 50% are not 
sufficient. These relate to actions that have already taken place. 
More appropriate are the rules on participatory acquisition in force in 
various other Member States of the European Community. One should mention 
the rules relating to "take-over bids" in Britain and offres publiques 
d'achats in France and 3elgium. These rules give a higher priority to 
the principle of the provision of information. The details cannot be 
discussed here ^ , but it should be noted that the Commission is currently 
preparing a proposal for a directive on the settlement of this question. 
4) Advantages enjoyed by those with inside information 
The problem of "insider trading" has frequently been alluded to in our 
present discussion. It cannot, however, be used as a criterion for the 
assessment of participation by banks or, following from this, for a 
decision in the context of the subject of our investigation. What is 
involved here is the exploitation of information about matters relating 
to an undertaking, which, if accessible to the general public, would 
influence the share price of the undertaking in question. Such information 
can be gained at an early stage by persons close to the undertaking's 
management and can be used for stock exchange transactions. In this way 
it is possible to make profits or avoid losses without risk, ahead of the 
(371  general investing public
w . 
78 Banks are, it is true, particularly well placed to acquire inside 
information and to use it for their own interests. Lending commitments, 
supervisory board posts, preparatory work on share issues and the influence 
gained through participation give access to useful facts about companies. 
But it is evident from this that participation is not the decisive factor 
in access to inside information. Moreover, it should be noted that the 
circle of insiders extends beyond the banks. Company officers occupying 
responsible positions must be included, in particular. The acquisition 
of information which can be used on the stock exchange prematurely is not 
therefore inherent in the banking system. 
The banks, by virtue of their capital strength combined with a participatory 
holding in the undertaking involved, are in an especially good position 
to exploit inside information. But other firms or persons also have 
these opportunities. 
The protection of investors can only be achieved permanently, therefore, 
if a general regulation is implemented which goes beyond the banks and 
their participation. Various Member States have already taken such 
is a 
for the creation of a European company*^·) 
steps^ '. An appropriate provision is also contained in the proposal 
5) The importance of participation for the capital market 
Although negative influences may result from banks' participation as far 
as the stock market and its sound functioning are concerned, these must 
be seen in connexion with the importance of the opportunity to participate 
for the capital market as a whole. This can only be dealt with briefly 
(40) 
for our purposes . We are concerned purely with the role of 
participatory shareholding in the financing (especially the provision of 
equity capital) of the undertaltings which go to make up the demand for 
capital. 
79 In connexion with the issue of new shares, the banks' ability to hold 
shares iß significant for two reasons. Firstly, the placing of the 
shares taken over is assisted. The risk on the issue for the issuing 
company is removed since the bank or consortium can itself initially take 
up the non-placeable shares, in order to dispose of them on a more 
(41) 
favourable occasion . Secondly, it is possible for the bank handling 
the issue to intervene with price support operations in connexion with 
the share issue until a stable market has established itself and a regular 
price trend has been achieved. The disposal of shares to the public, 
which is' often necessary in the absence of institutional investors, is 
thus facilitated. 
The points outlined here accord with the demand made in the EEC study 
on the creation of a European capital market (the Segre Report) that the 
regulations on the banking institutions' holdings of securities should 
make it possible for them to discharge their duties with regard to the 
(42) 
placing of shares with the necessary flexibility 
These capabilities also have an effect, indirectly, on the supply of 
medium and long-term credit to industry. The banks exercise a mobilization 
function in that tiiey take over the issue of shares to replace investment 
credits. Making this function more difficult by limiting the extent to 
which banks can take part.in the placing of shares could lead to gaps in 
the supply of medium and long-term credit to industry because full use 
would not be made of the banks' transformation function for credit supply*· ^', 
In the circumstances described, the shareholdings already discussed as 
"unplanned participation" have a role to play. But the banks also render 
planned assistance to the ihternal financing of undertakings by acquiring 
participatory interests. Large-lot trading should be mentioned in this 
connexion in the first instance: reference has already been made to the 
(441  importance of this form of activity for an elastic capital market . 
80 Further, the banks' investment activities bring about an enlargement of 
the capital market so far as the financing of undertaltings by participation 
is concerned. The banks, more than any other institutional investors, 
are in a position to act as intermediary between savers and share investment 
in an appropriate manner. 
These capital market functions of the banks are proved better than by 
theoretical deductions by legislative measures reflecting government 
banking and capital market policies in two Member States of the European 
Community. In France the deposit banks were given permission to increase 
their investment business in 1966/67. They were allowed to participate 
in undertakings to the extent of 20% and also to accept medium and 
long-term deposits. This liberalization was quite clearly aimed at 
improving the efficiency of the capital market. It involved a 
"transformation" intended to facilitate the conversion of surplus liquid 
(45)  savings into long-term risk capital . The new rules governing share 
ownership by the deposit banks were part of a comprehensive programme to 
give a new direction to the financing of capital investment projects*· . 
The considerations influencing the Belgian legislators in 1967 were little 
(4"1  different from this
v ''. The concern here was simply to permit temporary 
share ownership to a greater extent. The reform was mainly.directed 
towards large-lot dealing, since it is still not permissible to make use 
of a stock exchange for the purposes of making a participatory investment, 
and the prohibition, which required that sales should only be effected by 
means of public offers, was lifted. Behind this lay the idea that more 
use should be made of the banks for the provision of long-term finance 
to industry, even though the liberalization was not carried as far as it 
• τ, (48)  was in .trance 
The banks thus make a definite contribution to the enlargement of the 
capital market in the equity financing sector through their investment 
activities. This contribution arises in conjunction with the simultaneous 
pursuit of banking objectives,which are directed towards the maximization 
of profit. 
81 The extent to which this function of the banks is necessary for the 
capital market cannot be determined in isolation from the actual conditions 
prevailing with regard to that market. The answer to this question is 
also, and particularly, dependent on the extent to which other 
institutional investors, such as insurance companies and pension funds, 
take on the role of intermediary on the market. 
Digression: 
Companies' decision-making and the influence of the banks 
In Chapter Three it was stated that the ability to influence companies 
in which a participatory interest was held Was one of the reasons behind 
the formation of such shareholdings by banks. Before the effect of this 
influence on the company itself and on various markets with which it is 
associated can be investigated, it must be shown that this influence does 
exist - at least as a possibility. It is hardly possible to quantify 
such influence, since several ways are open to the banks for impinging on 
the decision-making of companies. Among them are: 
1. Participation (capital involvement) 
2. Bank-linked investment companies 
3. The right to vote on deposited shares 
4. Credit relationships 
5. Representation on governing bodies 
(personal involvement) 
1).Voting rights from participatory holdings 
Participation confers membership rights under company law which in turn 
give the right to vote on the appropriate bodies, in the case of joint-stock 
companies the general meeting. The size of the participatory holding 
determines the extent of the voting influence. 
Here two clarifications are necessary. The exercise of the right to vote 
in joint-stock companies relates in most legal systems mainly to the 
constitutional bases of the company and then to the balance sheet and 
82 distribution of profit and to the appointment and discharge of the 
governing bodies. Despite the small ambit of the subject matter on 
which the vote can be cast, the possible influence extends to the company's 
business policy. A decisive factor here is the appointment of management. 
Even the relatively small influence of the voting right, which can only 
impede certain specific resolutions requiring a qualified majority 
(blocking minority) has an effect on general decision-making by the 
company. The approval of a given resolution (e.g. for a capital increase) 
may sometimes have to be "bought" with concessions in other areas. 
It follows that even a relatively small degree of participation can confer 
opportunities for influence. This prerequisite is present in the case 
of the Belgian financial holding companies, the French participation banks, 
the Italian financial institutions and the German "Grossbanken' in numerous 
• . (49)  instances . 
2) Bank-linked investment companies 
This voting influence can be strengthened if the banks participate heavily 
in investment companies and can thus influence the votes of the latter in 
the companies. The German securities funds are largely controlled by the 
banks(30). V;ith few exceptions they are shareholders in the funds. 
Often a large commercial bank is at the centre while the remaining 
shareholdings are distributed over smaller financial institutions. 
Similar relationships also exist to a certain extent in other Member 
States of the European Community. This is suggested by the exceptions 
to the prohibition on participation by the banks enjoyed by the investment 
funds. In France most companies are set up by banks. Often it is a 
(51 )  question of joint subsidiaries of deposit and participation banks
w '. 
In Britain there are countless personal links and group-company connexions 
between the funds and the merchant banks'·-"-'. 
83 The danger of interference by banking interests is in this way increased, 
even though the influence is only exercisable indirectly. Voting by 
the funds at the general meetings of the companies represented in their 
portfolios is largely determined by the bank-shareholders*·-
7^-'. It should 
be realized, of course, that not every bank has the necessary weight to 
impose its views on other shareholders. The possibility nevertheless 
remains of strengthening the voting influence given by participation 
through associated investment companies. 
3) The right to vote on deposited shares 
Voting influence is decisively enhanced - and without the necessity for 
the investment of any of their own capital - by the banks' right to vote 
on deposited shares (Depotstimmrecht). This refers to the voting power 
exercisable by a bank in respect of the shares of its security-depositing 
customers. Banks' influence in general meetings arises from the fact 
that decision-making is not effected by the votes of the security-depositing 
customers themselves as shareholders but by the banks standing in their 
shoes. 
In Germany the Depotstimmrecht was developed into a proxy voting right 
by the company law reform of 1965· This voting power has given way to 
(=¡41  a proxy voting power
v-" '. If the bank wishes to vote on behalf of the 
security-depositing customers it has to ask for instructions,stating its 
own suggestions at the same time. In practice this rule has not prevented 
the banks from pursuing their own interests . The opportunity of 
giving instructions is only made use of by a very snail percentage of 
depositing shareholders ^ . Frovided no instructions have been received, 
a bank may vote according to its own proposals. It can even deviate 
frorii these if it can assume that the shareholders would have agreed had 
they known the facts of the case. 
84 In Germany in 1973 50.7% of all shares of domestic issuers (excluding 
insurance shares) were deposited with banks. Together with the banks' 
own holdings· of 7.8%, the credit institutions have, in certain circumstances, 
(57) 
almost 60% of the votes . There is thus a considerable voting influence, 
when it is considered that the average attendance at a general meeting is 
70 to 80%. The banks' influence thus rests in large part - in Germany 
at least - on the Depotstimmrecht. One should not conclude from this, 
however, that participatory share ownership can be disregarded. It 
retains its character as an influencing factor where the shareholding is 
considerable. whether this is the case or not depends on the distribution 
of the shares. 
For the other Member States the significance of the voting representation 
found in each country can be outlined as follows . The banks clearly 
have influence in Italy, where they are represented in their own name as 
empowered shareholders with a lawful title, analogously to the situation 
in Germany before the reform of 1965· In the remaining countries, on the 
other hand, the votes of the small shareholders are predominantly transferred 
to the management bodies. In France the blank proxy form serves this 
purpose. The same applies to Belgium, where the banks are already excluded 
from representation by the prohibition on holding shares, because most 
joint stock companies specify shareholder characteristics in their Articles 
of Association even for those holding a right to vote by proxy. The 
practice of "management voting" is also found in Luxembourg. 
An independent solution of the problem has been developed in the Netherlands. 
Undertakings with widely distributed share ownership and banks have set up 
joint stock companies for the sole purpose of safekeeping and administering 
the shares of the small shareholders on a trust basis. These companies 
are called administratiekantoore. For each share a certificate is made 
out and issued to the shareholder. The shareholders, as certificate-holders, 
receive the dividends on the shares and the proceeds of liquidation if the 
85 company is wound up. The owner of the shares, and thus the possessor 
of the voting rights, is the administratiekantoor. The voting influence 
therefore lies with the shareholders of the administratiekantoor, among 
whom are the banks. An attempt to prevent circumvention of the prohibition 
on "management voting" (Art. 44a (4), Wetboek van Koophandel) has been 
made in that certificates may only be dealt in on a stock exchange if the 
administratiekantoor is independent of the undertaking's management. 
In Britain the same system applies as in the USA, namely the proxy system, 
which in this case results in voting rights for management. The board 
sends to the shareholders, at the company's expense, proxy forms made out 
(50) 
in favour of itself
w-
/. 
The Commission's proposal for a 5th directive on the harmonization of 
company law has not tackled the institutional side of voting representation. 
Article 28 only introduces regulations for the implementation of voting 
representation insofar as a public offer has been made. This applies to 
banks, to the companies themselves, to shareholders' associations, etc. 
4) Credit relationships 
The banks' credit business may lead the borrowing undertakings into a state 
of dependency. If the borrowing undertaking is heavily indebted to the 
bank, a termination of credit can threaten its further existence. "The 
critical degree of indebtedness at which an undertaking begins to lose its 
independence to a bank is naturally reached sooner with small and medium-sized 
businesses than with large companies which have many different sources of 
finance and a greater number of banking connexions. As a bank usually has 
a good insight into the business progress of its customers, particularly 
through its knowledge of current customer movements, it can measure out its 
influence in such a way that it is effective at the time when the negotiating 
position of the other party in relation to the bank is at its weakest."^ . 
86 5) Personal involvement 
The occupation of seats on the supervisory board is an expression of 
(6? 1 
banking interests and potential influence in an undertaking
v
 ;. Of 
course, this may also be the consequence of a desire for expert advice 
and a strengthening of credit relations on the part of the undertaking. 
But frequently the banks' representation on supervisory boards is simply 
the outward sign of the voting influence which has been described. 
Whether representation on the governing bodies on its own can be considered 
an autonomous influencing factor may be doubted . In the first place 
the bank is only one mandate-bearer among several and will usually find 
itself in the minority. Often there are representatives from several 
other banks. The occupation of positions on the governing bodies should 
be seen more as the institutionalization of an already existing influence 
(voting right, credit relationship). However, it should be noted that 
the opportunities for obtaining information about the economic position 
and the business policies of an undertaking are considerably increased in 
this way. In addition, a bank's representative on the decision-making 
bodies can indicate the limits which must be set for business decisions 
on the basis of its influence elsewhere. 
6) Conclusions 
The influencing factors outlined here may affect undertakings' decision-
making to the benefit of the banks. The opportunities for influence 
have not been quantified in detail. These lie, as already mentioned, 
in the cumulative force of the factors. This clear power of influence 
must be included in the investigation. The Enquiry into Business 
Concentration in Germany also stresses the cumulative aspect. On what 
interests the influence can be effective will be shown in the sections 
that follow. 
87 From the description of the individual sources of influence it is evident 
that typically they only have effect on certain types of undertaking. 
Dependence arising from credit relationships occurs principally in the 
case of small and medium-sized businesses. Influence through the right 
to vote on deposited securities primarily has impact on large public 
companies with a wide distribution of share ownership. Participatory 
holdings may enter the picture here, but can also be found in companies 
with a small number of shareholders. 
Banking influence on undertakings is not, in principle, linked to the 
universal banking system. This would only be the case if one regarded 
an accumulation of all factors as a prerequisite for influence, so that 
even the credit relationships would necessarily have to be included. 
But the factors can be sufficiently effective en their own. Therefore, 
the separation system can also lead to dependence of undertakings on banks. 
V) Market interests 
1) Market relationships of undertakings 
The question whether the banks' influence can have effects on the market 
relationships of undertakings in which they hold a participatory stake is 
little discussed. A negative answer appears to be obvious if one proceeds 
from the generally accepted premise that the banks, in particular through 
their participatory holdings, do not pursue business goals . A 
self-restriction of this kind is not, however, institutionally ensured. 
It is conceivable that it could be abandoned if the banks' interests 
demanded it. That might be the case in the following set of circumstances. 
A bank, which through its financing is involved in the production sector, 
begins to bear business risks. This applies both to long-term investment 
credit and to participation. The fate of the undertaking gains in 
importance for the bank. i.'ith this, its market relationships inevitably 
also come within the sphere of interest. Usually one will be able to 
assume that even here self-limitation on the part of the banks is sure to 
be advised. The banks are basically not in a position to replace the 
business decisions of the companies in question in order to improve the 
88 companies' position on the market. A different situation with regard 
to interests can arise, however, when the same bank can also exert influence 
on other firms in the market, whether at the same stage in the economy or 
in preceding or subsequent stages. It is conceivable that there could 
be influence to reduce the pressure of competition or to secure an outlet 
(65)  for production . In either case, other competitors or consumers 
would be put at a disadvantage because of interference with the market 
mechanism. 
In the literature'·
wV- ' another possibility of influencing the market 
relationships between undertaltings as a consequence of participation has 
been indicated. A bank has, as already demonstrated, an interest in 
economic advantages for the undertakings in which it has a participatory 
stake. This interest could cause more favourable conditions to be given 
for credit or services than other, competing, undertakings could obtain 
from the same bank or from other banks. This would be an appreciable 
competitive advantage for the undertakings in which the participatory 
stakes were held. 
These possibilities for interference by the banks with the market 
relationships of undertakings in which, owing to joint assumption of the 
business risk they are particularly interested, cannot however provide a 
criterion for rules to govern participation. The problems are not 
inherent in the banking system. Conduct of this kind can always be 
found in company group relationships. Intervention affects competitive 
relationships and should be judged principally from the point of view of 
cartel law. Action to control concentration and a prohibition on 
discrimination could be considered here. A deeper examination of these 
questions is not required for the purposes of our enquiry. 
2) The market for undertakings 
Undertakings appear on the market as trading entities ("subjects"). In 
addition, they are themselves the "objects" of market relationships on 
the market for undertakings. Supply and demand are not only effected 
89 here by the sale of an undertaking as a whole entity, but by acquisitions 
under group-company law, mergers, and transfers of control through the 
sale of large parcels of shares. In these cases the power of disposal 
over the corporate resources changes. 
The price of this power of disposal and hence of the undertaking is 
calculated in different ways according to the nature of the transfer of 
control. In mergers it is expressed in the exchange relationship of 
the shares of the participating companies. The price of group-formation 
lies in the - at least - partial acquisition of the shares of the company 
being incorporated in the group, if the most important case for practical 
purposes, the participation group, is involved. In the case of the sale 
of a majority block of shares, the price will be determined in the 
(67) 
negotiations between buyer and seller 
The basis of this price formation on the market is the participants' 
(681 
valuation of the resources connected with the undertaking . In this 
way there tends to be an alignment of the transfer of power according to 
business objectives. The power of disposal is only sought when economic 
advantages, through rationalization for example, seem attainable. The 
market mechanism, forming a price by balancing the interests of the 
participants, ensures in this way, as it does on all other markets, that 
the resources of the undertakings are put to optimum use in the interests 
of the national economy as a whole. 
The prerequisite for the functioning of the market for undertakings in the 
manner just outlined is an independent balancing of interests between those 
involved. This prerequisite is not present, however, if a bank exerts 
decisive influence on both sides and is solely responsible for the uniting 
or transfer of resources linked to undertakings. The market mechanism is 
set aside to the extent that independent price formation in the pursuance 
of opposing interests no longer takes place . In Germany the transactions 
90 carried out by the banks in the brewing industry provide a vivid example 
of this. The reference to national interests in this connexion^'^' is 
evidence that economic goals of the participating undertakings are not 
motivating factors. 
If a non-banking undertaking is behind a change of corporate power of 
disposal, a different situation with regard to interests must be assumed. 
It is then a question of a fresh organization of the factors of production 
of group companies. The cause of action on the undertakings market is 
a business viewpoint. If the interests of the undertakings as market 
objects are not taken into account, at least an overlapping group interest 
will be intended to be furthered. Possible harm to the interests of the 
other shareholders of the "object undertaking" is covered by company law. 
By contrast, a bank cannot pursue its own group interests by appearing 
in the market for undertakings in the non-banking sector. It is not 
possible to add to the bank the resources of industrial or commercial 
undertakings. Furthermore, a bank is less obliged to seek profitability 
in the transaction. The capital which a bank is required to commit is 
sometimes relatively small if it can rely, in addition to its participatory 
holding, on the right to vote on deposited shares. A bank is in a 
position to pursue its interests in a different way. It may, in 
particular, promote mergers, in order to earn profits through commissions 
(71)  or in order to handle any share issues that may be necessary 
Another motive can be the desire to build up a larger customer with a 
corresponding share of business. The preservation of the interests of 
third parties must also be considered. 
The intervention by the banks, on the basis of their participatory 




w,-/. This course would presuppose the possibility, which 
does not exist, of arriving at a sufficiently accurate valuation of the 
(7
T0 
undertakings as the object of the transactions '^ . Even a cartel-law 
91 (74) 
authority to control business concentration, as exists in Germany and 
(75)  has been proposed for the European Community , would only impinge 
marginally on this state of affairs. The creation or strengthening of 
a position of dominance on the market is not inevitably the result, even 
when there is an amalgamation of the resources of competing undertakings. 
The consequences indicated could only be prevented by a limitation of the 
influence of banks in industry. 
3) Compétition between banks 
.Ve can assume for our purposes that banking competition within the limits 
(76)  imposed by the banking supervisory laws has.a positive function 
The influence on the decision-making capacity of the undertakings affected, 
procured through participatory investment in particular, can be used by 
the banks to consolidate their business relationships*·'''. This applies 
both to borrowing and to lending business and extends to cover the whole 
field of services. The influence thus becomes, as we have already seen, 
a tool of the sales and procurement policy. In this way the undertaking's 
links with the banking sector are reduced to one bank. The price and 
quality competition offered by competing banks can be excluded to the extent 
of the influence. With this striving for the servicing of an undertaking 
by a single bank, freedom of manoeuvre without regard to competition is 
created through the exclusion of competitors. The influenced undertaking 
can no longer react autonomously to a lower quality of services from his 
bank. A bank which thus secures itself in various ways in its customer 
relationships removeä itself from the pressure of competition. Competition 
in the banking system is impaired. 
This consequence of influence on the undertakings in which participatory 
(781  interests are held is acknowledged to be a possibility^' . How far su 
conduct is really to be met cannot be proved empirically. Cases are 
92 quoted in the literature on banking of unfavourable conditions in comparison 
with the general market being imposed on undertakings*·'^·'. In any case 
we may assume that there is a danger. The prerequisites for the creation 
of monopolies are present^ '. 
The banks' freedom of action based on participatory shareholdings and 
other influencing factors cannot, however, be extended at will. The 
competitive situation in the banking sector is able to set limits here. 
"The stronger the competitive pressure, the less the chance for the 
influence-exerting credit institution to obtain special advantages for 
itself in the long run and to block the access of other credit institutions 
to certain market participants" . The competitive process, which is 
strengthened in Germany by the activities of the public-sector credit 
institutions and in France and Britain by the partial abolition of 
specialization, reduces to a certain extent the danger of long-term fixing 
(°?1 
of business relationships . Every increase in the financial autonomy 
of the customer also acts as a limitation. This autonomy may consist in 
possibilities for self-financing and in the acquisition by the undertaking 
(83) 
of its own bank 
It must be recorded that the holding of participatory interests opens up 
commercial strategies for the banks which lead to stable customer 
relationships without these being attributable to market services provided 
by competitors. Strong competition in the banking sector and, in 
particular, the opportunity enjoyed by large undertakings of financial 
self-sufficiency can work against this. The two factors do not, however, 
remove the danger connected with participatory shareholding. 
93 VI) The undertakings affected by the participatory shareholding 
Insofar as the banks have a monopolistic freedom of action in their 
business relationships with the undertakings in which they have participatory 
holdings, they-may implement their own interests in opposition to those of 
the managements of the undertakings. Of course, it can be assumed that 
in principle it will not be in the interests of a bank to harm the 
influenced undertaking, because in the case of a participatory link this 
might adversely affect the value of the shareholding*· '. This does not, 
however, prevent prices for bank services being unfavourable for the 
undertaking. The value of the shareholding will not be prejudiced by this. 
In addition, conflicts between the objectives of banking policy and the 
interests of the company arise. Harm can then be done to the undertaking 
and its shareholders. If, in this case, a bank is pursuing its own 
interests, this is not as a rule known. The value of the participatory 
shareholding is not endangered. And even if this was the case, the bank 
might be prepared to accept such consequences. For it v-ould be able to 
recoup the losses through profits earned in the pursuit of its own interests. 
Conflicts of this kind can occur in two fields. Firstly, the bank nay 
impose its own will in banking relationships. Secondly, it is conceivable 
that it might use the powers conferred on it by company law through its 
participatory interest and its right to vote on deposited shares otherwise 
than in the best interests of the company or the other shareholders. 
1) Possibilities of undertakings being put at a disadvantage in banking 
relationships 
The bank may malte use of the exclusivity of the business relationship 
which it gains as a result of its influence by charging more than the 
normal market rates for its services. This, however, is a case of the 
usual opposition of interests between partners in a market and does not 
require further examination. Of course, the possibility cannot be 
excluded that a bank would use its potential for influence here too. 
(85)  An observation has already been made in this connexion . 
94 a) Conflicts of interest going beyond this occur in the field of credit 
security. "Its insight into the company's circumstances enables the 
bank to adapt the security given for the debts due to it to the prevailing 
risks and state of affairs and in this way to procure for itself an 
advantage over other creditors. Through excessive securing of debts, 
funds could be withdrawn from the company which were essential for its 
continued operation but which were in the bank's hands. It is well 
known hov/ many difficult and doubtful legal questions arise from the 
banks' credit-securing business. And it is doubtful whether these 
questions can be properly examined by a management body on which the 
bank's representatives have a seat and a vote" 
b) Reference is often made to the possible conflict of interests between a 
bank and an undertaking in connexion with the financing of the 
undertaking^ ''. It is said that the universal banking system gives 
the banks the opportunity to determine the financial plans of an industrial 
undertalting. If, owing to the financial position of a customer, a need 
for equity capital arises, but the undertaking's bank is tempted by a 
higher profit from the granting of loans, the capital-requiring undertaking, 
it is said, is often left with no choice but to cover its requirement, 
which is really of a long-term nature, with short-term credits^ 
If the external financing of an undertaking under the influence of a bank 
is determined in this fashion, there is a threat, from the point of view 
of the individual sector of the economy involved, to the sound financial 
structure of the undertaking. There will be a tendency to encourage 
under-capitalization. Added to this, there is, from the point of view 
of the economy as a whole, the argument that the securities market is 
neglected owing to the influence of the universal banks
 y . In con 
with this, the view that deposit-saving is favoured at the expense of 
saving through share investment plays a part . The conflict of 
interests described thus gains a special importance. 
95 The higher profitability of short-term lending, in particular, compared 
with share issue business is not questioned*·"''. Accordingly the 
conditions for a conflict of interests are present. The following 
arguments, however, have been advanced against the actual imposition 
(92)  by the banks of their own interests in this sphere . The negotiating 
power of an undertaking capable of issuing shares is as a rule large 
enough to enable it to obtain finance in a suitable form. The bank has 
an interest, in the long term at least, both in its own security and in 
the security of the undertalting whose affairs it is handling. It has 
further been pointed out that when there is noticeable competition the 
bank cannot act against the interests of a customer if it does not wish 
to endanger its business relationship. 
The argument of the bank's interest in the suitable equity financing of 
its customers has a direct effect on the significance to be accorded to 
this conflict. It does not alter the fact, however, that there is such 
a conflict. 
The further arguments, which are also advanced in other connexions, speak 
against an exploitation of the banks' influence. The competition 
argument is not valid, however, if the bank's influence has led to a 
hardening of the business relationship and thence to monopolistic freedom 
of action. The same consideration applies to the undertaking's negotiating 
power. The contrary arguments can only be upheld if neither participatory 
share ownership nor the right to vote on deposited shares give the bank a 
strong position. This state of affairs is not the object of our 
investigation, however. 
2) Possibilities of undertakings being put at a disadvantage directly through 
the exercise by banks of powers under company lav/ 
a) Banks' influence on companies through participatory shareholding and, in 
certain circumstances, the right to vote on deposited shares can lead to 
a lack of control on the part of the governing bodies. The repeatedly 
advanced statement that the banks almost without exception vote in surport 
(,°3) 
of the management's proposals
w-" is not the equivalent of a renunciation 
96 of control. It might reflect confidence in the undertalting's management, 
but it could equally well be the case that the bank's view or influence 
had already made itself felt by the time the management's proposals came 
to be made. For the rest, it does not need to be stressed that it is 
not in the banks' interests to use their powers of control otherwise than 
to assist the efficient running of the business, in other words in the 
interests of the company. 
The representation of the banks, gained through their influence in company 
lav/, on governing bodies (in the case of separation betv/een management 
bodies and supervisory bodies) leads to other conclusions, however*·°'. 
In the first place, criticism in the literature on banking is directed 
against the remuneration for the representatives' activities (supervisory 
board fees) which in this way can reach an unreasonably high level. 
Conflict situations betv/een bank and company interests can also arise 
on the annual discharge from liability of the directors. And it is 
doubtful whether substantiated claims for compensation could in fact be 
upheld against management. In these cases the banks' representation in 
the companies may lead to unreasonable caution in the exercise of 
supervision under company law. 
b) A further field of possible conflict can be indicated: this is the case 
where a bank uses its voting influence in order to implement its own 
interests against the ideas of the company and its shareholders. This 
does not involve the general set of problems relating to groups of 
companies which concerns the possibility of the controlling shareholders 
in the undertaking using the resources of the controlled company for their 
own ends. Instead, what is involved is the pursuit of banking objectives 
unaccompanies by the goal of business subordination through voting power. 
This is in line with the often quoted statement that the banks do not 
undertake business functions through their participatory holdings. 
97 Under this aspect the possibility of conflict in connexion with capital 
increases is conceivable. As already mentioned, the bank may oppose a 
resolution for a capital increase in order to compel the company to adopt 
a method of external financing that is more favourable to the bank's 
profit policies. 
In the case of the decision on the payment of a dividend, it might be in 
the interest of the bank to leave the highest possible amount of funds 
in the company for reasons of credit security*·-'-
7'. 
c) Further possibilities of conflict are discussed in the literature, such 
as the exclusion of the right to subscribe for new shares, in order to 
enable a participatory holding to be increased under the most favourable 
possible conditions, or the prevention of a capital increase in order to 
maintain the percentage share in the company's assets without the need 
to increase the participatory shareholding . Here, however, we are 
dealing with situations that do not only arise in connexion with 
participation by banks. They are therefore not significant for the 
purposes of our enquiry. 
3) Conclusion 
Bahks, by pursuing their own interests, act against the interests of 
undertakings partly owned by them if their influence is used as a lever 
to assist lending business. This applies to the problems of credit 
security (over-securing; impeding of dividends) and of external financing 
in a manner designed to benefit the bank. The possibilities of putting 
the undertakings in question at a disadvantage can be said to be inherent 
in the system in that they only occur in connexion with the participatory 
shareholdings of banks of the universal type. This does not apply, 
however, to the criticism that has been made that undertakings refrain 
98 from exercising supervision as prescribed by company law where banks are 
represented on the governing bodies. Where this occurs, it cannot be 
said that purely banking interests are being pursued. 
It remains to be asked whether ways are open, under company law, for 
limiting harmful exercise of influence by banks. The possibility of 
group-company-law obstacles to controlling influence must in particular 
be considered. Here a comparative legal survey of the relevant regulations 
employed by the Member States of the European Community would be necessary, 
but this would be outside the scope of this investigation. It may be 
mentioned that in Germany the law relating to the de facto group, in 
French and Belgian lav; the institut des abus de droit and in English law 
the concept of fiduciary duties which also applies to the major 
shareholders, limit the influence exercisable under company law. It 
hardly seems possible, however, that the conflicts of interest described 
can be combated by this means. It would be difficult to prove control 
on.the part of banks as their potential for exerting it depends on several 
factors. Moreover, influence can also be made effective below this 
threshold. And finally there is the problem of quantifying the extent 
of possible disadvantagement. 
VII) The power aspect 
There is hardly any other factor in the field of the social sciences 
which is as hard to define as the concept of power. We must content 
ourselves with sketching an outline from the point of view of the banks' 
participation policy. 
Economic power is described as the capability of altering objective 
economic parameters such as prices, forcing business partners to revise 
their prices, subjugating competitors, making full play with one's own 
information against other economic ''subjects" and influencing the 
framework of conditions established by the state for economic activity 
in order to create economic advantages for oneself at the expense of 
others without making any corresponding contribution to the national 
product*·"''. 
99 The effects which the banks have on undertakings and markets, as described, 
indicate at least an approach towards this state of affairs. The banks' 
own business relations can be determined unilaterally, competition betv/een 
banks is affected by the immobilization of customers, markets in 
undertaltings are influenced and undertakings' links are withdrawn from 
market decisions. 
These phenomena are stated on the basis of individual possibilities of 
conflict. In aggregate there is an influence which goes beyond this 
v/hich can be in opposition to other economic or company, interests. In 
this way competition as a condition of decentralized economic planning 
in the market economy is not only affected at certain points by some 
actions of the banks taken in their own interests. Rather, the banks' 
holding coirpany function v/hich arises from participatory ownership leads 
(98)  to a concentration of economic decision-making powers
 
7 '. 
For theoretical purposes this form of economic power is described, in 




v■'■''. This is because of the combination of various functions 
in a single entity. Express reference is made in this connexion to the 
position of the banks of the universal type as an example. The 
aggregation of functions is said to have led in Germany to a concentration 





This power may chiefly have implications for the economic sphere in the 
narrower sense. But the exercise of functions for the common good by 
the authorized bodies could possibly be endangered. This is the case 
v/hen the data set by the state, v/hich are important for the economic 
success of the bearer of the power, are influenced. Economic pressure 
is brought to bear, for example, to force the amendment of laws, to gain 
tax relief or to obtain subsidies 
100 The result is a disruption of economic and public functions through the 
exploitation of power that is not integrated into the system and is thus 
only controllable to a limited extent. This state of capital and 
executive accumulation can be attained in particular when the economic 
"subjects" are closely interlinked and the banks, themselves concentrated 
through mergers etc., exercise their influence in the controlling companies. 
In the USA the reports of recent investigations indicate that developments 
of this kind have been taking place there*· . It emerges from the 
report of two Senate sub-committees that a large and significant proportion 
of undertakings is under the control of a small number of financial 
institutions, especially banks. It is interesting to note that these 
findings have been made with respect to a system based on the separation 
of commercial and investment banking. It is said in this connexion that 
the banks have extended their influence through trust departments, holding 
companies and letter-box firms. The trend towards universalization in 
the USA, long since noted '^ , thus assists the concentration of economic 
power. 
To what extent similar circumstances have come about in the Member States 
must remain unanswered here. But the latest events involving the Suez 
Group, in France*· ' and a listing of the substantial particip-atory 
holdings of the major German banks '''make analogous developments seem 
probable here. Also interesting in this connexion is the news that in 
France 6 banking groups account for 80% of the aggregate balance sheet 
totale). 
It should be noted, therefore, that the fields of influence of the banks, 
as described above, carry in themselves the tendency for the development 
of a power potential extending beyond the determination of individual 
conflicts of interest in their favour. Participatory share ownership 
alone is not responsible for this. It is, however, a precondition which 
cannot be ignored. 
101 CHAPTER FIVE 
Conclusions from the analysis of the banking and non-banking effects 
of participation 
The starting point for the development of our conclusions is the evaluation 
and assessment of the interests affected by the banks' participation 
policies. In this connexion we will start with the universal banking-
system, since in this way it will be possible to irxlude the areas of 
conflict comprehensively. Only then will the patterns 'of interests in 
the separation system be appraised. 
'.) Fositive effects 
1) Banking policy 
An evaluation of the arguments advanced against bank participation must 
proceed from the assumption that such participation is advantageous from 
the banking point of view. This is valid in the first place for unplanned 
participation. Although this is not the result of deliberate investment 
policies, it is always compatible with the banks' ccir.rrercial interests and 
hence with the goal of profit maximization. Here, the avoidance of losses 
(e.g. price support operations to maintain the value of the banks' own 
holdings; recoupment of bad debts on lendings; the consolidation of 
credit advanced by way of preliminary finance) or the improvement of 
earning power (assumption of sales risks on share issues) may be the most 
important factors. 
Profitability considerations also determine planned participatory investment, 
The following factors are important here. In the first place the 
acquisition of a participatory interest may be directly geared to profit 
maximization, when attractive shares are purchased, whether with a view 
to good dividend payments or in the expectation of a rise in the share 
price. Secondly, participatory investment, like all share investment, 
103 serves the purpose of the banks' need to make full use of their capacity 
as service-rendering undertakings, when surplus liquid funds are used for 
the purpose. Further, there is the intention to balance income risks 
between the various departments and in the field of financial assets. 
Finally, the possibility, accompanying participation, of being able to 
influence the decision-making of the other parties to market transactions, 
the effect of v/hich can be a freezing of business relations, which in turn 
is in the interests of earnings. 
It remains to be asked, on the subject of the positive results accruing 
from the banking point of view, whether these are only obtainable through 
participation, that is to say according to our definition through the 
acquisition of shareholders' rights which it is not intended shall be 
held for the short term only and which by their extent may make it possible 
to exert influence. Or is it conceivable that other financial investments 
could also have similar effects? Surprisingly enough, no comments en 
•this point are to be found in the literature. 
In the field of planned investment one can only within limits describe 
the acquisition of shareholders' rights of a volume such as to amount to 
participation as being necessary for the pursuit of earnings interests. 
The spreading of income risks and the utilization of capacity can also be 
achieved through the investment of surplus liquidity in the purchase of 
securities which carry no shareholding rights or through the creation of 
holdings of shares v/hich do not reach the volume of a participatory 
investment in any one company. Moreover, the significance of participation 
(1)  for the earning of profits can hardly be assessed from outside 
Certainly there is a favourable correlation here, because the book values 
of participatory investments are often very small in relation to the 
companies' dividends. Nevertheless doubts remain as to whether there 
must be participation in order to pursue these earnings goals. 
104 The formation of large parcels of shares is clearly encouraged by the 
tax concessions, already mentioned, in Germany and in general by the 
premiums obtainable when large parcels of shares are dealt in. Investment 
to the extent of participation is also necessary in order to stabilize 
business relations or to carry out transactions on the market for 
undertakings (preparations for mergers, etc.). 
As far as unplanned participation is concerned, investment of this kind 
is an Important instrument of commercial policy which can hardly be 
dispensed with. Larger shareholdings, which have to be taken over in 
the course of issue business, whether as a consequence of placement 
difficulties or share price support operations, serve capital market 
interests which must also be included and which cannot be pursued elsewhere. 
Participation, as a special case, for the conversion of bad debts incurred 
on lending business is under certain circumstances the sole possibility 
of avoiding losses on advances. 
2) The capital market 
An assessment of the shareholdings owned by the banks must also take into 
account the importance of the ownership, for the capital market. Four 
functions should be mentioned here: 
1) Acting as an intermediary betv/een supply and demand through 
collaboration on the launching of share issues, which frequently 
leads to temporary share ownership. 
2) Enlargement of the market for participation capital through an 
increased capability for taking up shares. The banks enter the 
market as investors owing to the liquid funds at their disposal 
and assist the supply of equity capital tc business undertakings. 
3) The share market gains elasticity through participatory share 
ownership. To the extent that banks enter the markets as acceptors 
and sellers of larger parcels of shares, they are able tc react 
more rapidly to large-lot transactions. 
105 τ) liiithin the capital market the banks exercise a "mobilization" 
function. Long-term investment credit is replaced by share issues, 
v/hich the banks either take up themselves or place on the market. 
These functions can as a rule only be fulfilled when it is possible for 
the banks to enter the share market in connexion with larger lots which 
reach the extent of participatory holdings. It should be stressed that 
the importance of participation for the capital market in the four 
above-mentioned cases is not exclusively dependent on the banks. Promotion 
of the elasticity of the capital market through large-lot dealing and 
also its enlargement can be implemented in similar fashion by other 
institutional investors. The extent to which, from the above points 
of view, participatory share ownership by banks is necessary will therefore 
be governed by the conditions prevailing on the capital market at the time. 
II) Negative effects 
1) Solving the problems without controlling participatory share ownership 
Cur investigation of the non-banking areas affected has shown that some 
of the problems discussed in connexion with participation in the non-banking 
sector must be assessed ambivalently. Moreover, it has become clear that 
to a partial extent solutions involving control of participatory share 
ownership has to be ruled out and answers sought in other areas. This 
is usually the case when the effects in question do not emanate from the 
banks alone. 
In this connexion the question of large-lot dealing should first be 
mentioned. The associated circumvention of the stock exchange has 
positive effects, in that violent price fluctuations are avoided, but 
it militates against market "transparency". In addition, large parcels 
of shares are also exchanged by non-banking undertakings, with the same 
results. In this area, therefore, a genuine solution cannot be attained 
through control of participation. 
106 A similarly ambivalent effect is produced by the use of shareholdings to 
influence share prices. This practice may mislead investors and induce 
them to carry out loss-making transactions (share price manipulation) or 
it nay prevent short-term fluctuations in a narrow market (share price 
support). This capability, too, is enjoyed by other institutions besides 
banks. 
In these cases the problems arising must be dealt with in other ways, if 
a comprehensive solution is desired. Possibilities here may be found 
in an improvement of supervision of the securities market coupled with 
the introduction of disclosure requirements and powers to obtain information. 
Solutions on a different level must be selected to deal with the questions 
of the use of inside information and the secret building up of participatory 
holdings. In contrast to the circumstances mentioned above, these 
problems, although they involve transactions which must unequivocally be 
described as harmful, are nevertheless not inherent in the banking system 
as such. 
The secret building up of participatory interests is a problem of 
information for the shareholders of the company affected. It must be 
ensured that notification is made as early as the stage of the intention 
to participate. This falls under the subject natter governed by 
group-company law. In some Member States this question has already been 
tackled through standardization in matters relating to "take-over bids". 
The 'acquisition of information which can be exploited prematurely on the 
stock exchange is another matter that cannot be dealt with by limiting 
the banks' right tc participate. Ownership of shares in a company is 
only one of several ways of obtaining such information. And the circle 
of "insiders" clearly extends beyond the banks, showing that here, too, 
other means of protecting investors must be found. 
107 The significance of participation for the counselling of investors saving 
through buying shares must be judged somewhat differently. Here there 
is a conflict of interests which could endanger the objectivity of the 
banks' conduct. It may be questioned, however, whether control of 
participation is the right answer. For the danger is not inherent in 
the system, that is to say, it is also present in the case of investment 
banks in the "separation system" and can even occur '/¿here the shareholding 
is small. Therefore a prohibition or even a limitation on participation 
to deal with this conflict of interests does not really seeir; to be an 
appropriate reaction. It v;ould be more suitable to increase the publicity 
requirements so as to provide savers who invest in shares v;ith unbiassed 
information vvhicn prepares them for their buyiig or selling decision and 
removes from the banks their key position when giving advice. At :r.ost, 
this possibility of conflict can be said to provide additional grounds 
for controlling participation. 
In the area of market interests we established that a bank can exert 
influence en the competitive relations of an undertaking which it is able 
to influence. ¿ere the disruption of the "¡arket process is involved; 
the removal or prevention of this disruption is basically to be regarded 
as a natter for the law on the restriction of competition. 
An analysis of the problems occurring in connexion with participation by 
the banks thus shows, in the situations quoted, that it is not really 
possible to achieve a suitable solution by interfering with the banks' 
freedom to invest. This does not apply, however, tc the remaining areas 
affected by participation. 
2) Participatory share ownership as a criterion for control 
a) Ownership of shares by banks can, particularly if it has reached the level 
of participation, lead to considerable risks for depositors. This applies 
first of all under the aspect of liquidity. It has been pointed out above, 
in the context of the discussion on depositor protection, that investment 
of customers' money in shares clearly impairs the banks' payment 
capabilities. To meet the maturity of liabilities there is no corresponding 
108 possibility of converting participatory shareholdings into liquid funds. 
A situation of unwillingness to buy prevailing on the capital market and 
the risk of selling at a loss due to changed share prices are factors 
responsible for the immobilization of the participatory shareholding. 
Equally clear, secondly, is the security risk for customers' deposits. 
Price fluctuations inherent in the stock market often lead to losses in 
value, which in times of economic crisis can reach substantial proportions. 
This risk is heightened when the share investment is concentrated in a 
few industries and is increased still further when there are large 
participatory holdings in individual undertakings. An additional factor 
threatening security is the possibility of speculative transactions with 
participatory investments. 
Here there is a serious problem of deposit protection which can only arise 
when deposit and investment business are linked. A solution to this 
central question of banking supervision is only conceivable through control 
of participatory share ownership, unless there is to be an abolition of 
this link in favour of a "separation system". 
b) The opportunities to exert influence on business undertakings conferred 
through company lav/ by participation can have an adverse effect both for 
the undertakings themselves and for market interests. The banks' potential 
for influence threatens the interests of the undertaltings. To the extent 
that an exclusive business relationship is established, be it only 
partially, the business undertaking ceases to be able to take advantage 
of more favourable offers from competing banks. It is also possible that 
charges in excess of current market rates could be demanded. 
This conflict of interests is further strengthened if the bank pursues its 
own special commercial objectives against the undertal-ting's interests 
(promotion of credit business) or neglects company-lav/ supervision when 
it is itself represented on the governing bodies. 
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influence also affects competition between banks. Competition by other 
banks is excluded in proportion to the influence. 
On the market for undertakings the banks' participation policy gives them 
the opportunity of freeing supply and demand from economic considerations 
and pursuing their own or third parties' interests. 
The concentration of various functions in the banks' hands produces a 
power potential extending beyond the possibility of deciding conflicts 
of interests arising directly within the business area in their own favour. 
There is a danger that these centres of decision-making will disrupt the 
market economy and harm the functions which the public institutions 
discharge for the general good. 
c) The causality of banks' participation for the above-mentioned opportunities 
for exerting influence and the adverse consequences of this participation 
are not as clear as in the realm of depositor protection. With regard 
to the question whether participatory share ownership can be considered 
a suitable criterion for control the following points are significant. " 
The banks' potential for influence cannot exclusively be attributed to 
the possession of shareholders' rights, although this may be regarded as 
an essential precondition. In some countries the right to vote on 
deposited shares, where large undertakings are involved, is an additional 
factor. Credit relations may give rise to dependence, particularly in 
the case of smaller companies. Personal involvement institutionalizes 
an influence. 
For the subject matter of our investigation this possibility of accumulation 
has no direct importance. For whenever participation exists at all there 
is, according to the concept of participation we have used here, a 
possibility of influence. The other elements mentioned are then only 
contributory factors. They gain qualitative importance only v/hen they 
are the factors establishing an influence. It follows from this that 
110 participatory holdings, although causal as regards an influence on business 
undertakings, are not causal as regards the whole range of dependencies. 
This finding is not an argument against using participation as a starting 
point for a solution but is an argument for control of the other potential 
causes of interference also. 
Dependencies cannot, it is true, be established and developed by the banks 
without limit. Lively competition in the credit sector may stand in the 
way of this. Monopolistic freedom of action made possible by a close 
business relationship is determined in this way. In addition, an 
undertaking with growing financial autonomy is able to withdraw itself 
from situations of dependence. The two factors do not, however, exclude 
participatory influence. Strong pressure of competition on the markets 
for banking services cannot entirely prevent a bank exerting influence on 
the decision-making of the other party on the basis of participatory 
influence and undertakings cannot instantly change a banking relationship. 
Finance obtained independently of banks can only serve to combat leverage, 
in the form of the exerting of influence in favour of credit business. 
Effects going beyond this are not included. 
It is repeatedly stressed that it is possible for there to be influence on 
industry and conflicts of interest between undertaking and bank. However, 
this situation, it is said, need not necessarily have adverse effects for 
market interests or undertakings' interests, since a bank must first 
actualize its influence by using the opportunities for influence open to 
it. This, it is said, cannot immediately be accepted as happening and 
(2)  indeed has not been proved
v '. 
This argument relies basically on the effectiveness of moral and social 
constraints. These should not be ignored in an economic and governmental 
system capable of self-criticism. It may be asked, however, whether the 
endangered interests are sufficiently protected in this way. The answer 
must be "no". 
Ill The effectiveness of moral constraints cannot be guaranteed. And the 
danger of injury to interests is too great so long as the banks promote 
their own commercial objectives in the context of profit maximization. 
Cases of unilateral exploitation of their position by banks have only 
comparatively rarely come to light. The reason for this is probably 
that even those affected are not always aware of the situation. In 
addition, litigation, as always in business life, is avoided as far as 
possible in order not to endanger business interests. Public opinion 
remains uninformed. Meetings are the actual venue for the settlement 
of disputes. 
The relevance of participation for the banks' influence and associated 
problems is thus proven. The control of share ownership becomes an 
appropriate starting point for a solution. Other standardization 
mechanisms are excluded. Control of voting power and additional influence 
through the medium of group-company law could, it is true, be considered. 
But there are limits inherent in this area of the law. This applies, 
for example, to the threshold of application of protection provisions and 
to the qualification and quantification of acts prejudicial to dependent 
companies. Ho relevant investigation of the position of the banks in 
group-company law lias been made. A decisive factor, beyond this, is the 
fact that in the Member States of the European Co:.':;r.unity grou^-cornpany law 
is still in the development stage, with the result that company-law 
solutions at Community level are not yet available. 
Ill/ Assessment of the relative importance of the interests involved 
Cur analysis of the arguments put forward in connexion with the participatior 
question under the aspect of "participation as a criterion for control" 
has greatly limited the scope of relevant considerations. The positive 
effects of banks' participation policy find expression in the sphere of 
112 of banking operations and on the capital market. In contrast to these 
effects, there are disadvantages from the point of view of the principle 
of deposit protection and as a consequence of influence on undertakings 
and on certain markets. Participation thus basically affects the 
following objectives: bank profitability; viability of the capital 
market; protection of depositors; protection of competition betv/een 
banks and protection of the market mechanism on the market for undertakings; 
and the independence of the undertakings in which the participatory interests 
are held. An assessment of the relative importance of the interests 
involved must proceed from an evaluation of these objectives and their 
relationship to participation policy. 
1) Assessment of the relative importance of the interests involved in the 
sphere of banking policy 
A permanent safeguarding of earning power is a precondition for the 
viability of the individual bank and is therefore important for the banking 
system as a whole. The acquisition and creation of participatory interests 
should be regarded as a beneficial, but not essential, activity in the 
attaining of this goal. Investment in securities is a lower priority, 
from the profitability point of view, than other lending business and in 
particular is ranked behind the granting of credit; this is not to say, 
however, that investment in securities makes no contribution to profit 
maximization. As we have shown, income risks can be balanced out through 
participation and also with the help of other portfolio investment. The 
same is true of the full utilization of capacity. The trend towards the 
creation of holdings of sufficient size to amount to participation for tax 
reasons or for the realization of a gain in the form of a premium en 
large-let dealing do not suffice to make participation qualify for 
description as an essential part of earnings policy. 
This loose but definite relationship betv/een the safeguarding of earnings 
and the policy of participation stands in direct opposition to the goal 
of depositor protection. The latter, in the form of security and liquidity 
requirements, is one of the fundamental tasks of banking policy. The 
holding of participatory investments, v/hich always implies that the 
shareholding is fairly substantial, represents a clear risk of lack of 
marketability and loss of value for the depositors. This risk is united 
tc participatory share ownership and is not separable. xt must be 
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without further action on the part of the bank. The danger is latent and 
can become reality through influences beyond the banks' control. 
The adverse effects of participation for the protection of depositors are 
thus more important than its significance for the safeguarding of banks' 
earnings. This interim conclusion is a point in favour of intervention 
in the banks' freedom of action with respect to their investment decisions. 
But unplanned participation which arises in connexion with share issue or 
credit business must also be considered. It can have beneficial effects 
as an instrument of commercial policy, at least temporarily. However, 
the necessity for control óf participation, which we have affirmed, cannot 
in general be called in question on account of this. The assessment was 
the result of an appraisal of the effects inherent in participation. 
Unplanned participation only involves particular, clearly definable, 
situations. A general set of rules could make specific provision for 
such situations. 
2) Assessment cf the relative importance of the interests involved in the 
sphere of influence on business undertakings 
Connected with the goal of earnings safeguarding is the influence on 
business undertakings as a determining cause of participatory investment. 
The desired freezing and extending of business relations must be judged 
by reference to the non-bank-related consequences of influence. For this 
purpose one must proceed from the maintenance of undertakings' private and 
autonomous freedom to take decisions in their business relations and from 
their possibility of protecting their own interests. Further, competition 
between banks and the maintenance of independent decisions on the market 
for undertakings must be included. These market-economy objectives are 
114 threatened by influence on decision-making in the undertakings in which 
participatory interests are held. Admittedly, this consequence is 
dependent on the manner in v/hich use is actually made of the opportunities 
for influence. But this does not stand in the way of the necessity for 
neutralizing conflicts of interest through intervention in the banks' 
participation policy. ' The goal of profit maximization through 
stabilization of relations v/ith customers cannot justify the threat to 
the interests thereby affected. The necessity for standardization, which 
has thus been demonstrated, is supported by a consideration of the power 
aspect. Limitation of participatory shareholding v/ould reduce the 
concentration of decision-making powers. The coming into being of 
economic power positions would be made more difficult and their dismantling 
v/ould be assisted. 
3) Taking capital market functions into account 
Finally, the capital -narket functions of participation must be included 
in the assessment of the relative importance of the interests involved. 
Basically, these functions have been described as beneficial. But here 
the banks only partially play an indispensable role. The enlargement 
and elasticity of the capital market through the increase in supply and 
the fact of large-lot dealing can also be undertaken by other investors, 
although as a necessary precondition they would have to have sufficient 
liquid funds at their disposal. However, the acquisition of participatory 
holdings in the process of placing nev; issues can only be carried out by 
institutions carrying on share issue business. Reference has already 
been made to this participatory function in connexion with unplanned 
participatory investment. The mobilization function on the capital 
market through the combining of credit and investment business has been 
similarly characterized. 
For the significance of these effects of participation in the context of 
the assessment of the relative importance of the interests involved, the 
conclusions already stated in connexion v/ith unplanned investment apply. 
A general modification of the judgment is not necessary, as limited 
situations, v/hich must be separately covered as individual cases in the 
regulations, are involved. 
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By a "separation system" we mean a banking system v/hich differentiates 
between business departments and prohibits deposit and credit banks from 
carrying on share issue business and dealing in securities and vice versa. 
In a system of this kind the area relevant for the assessment of interests 
is appreciably reduced. 
The security and liquidity risk associated with participation does not 
arise. An interest in profitability, associated v/ith the acquisition 
of shares, remains. However, the need to make full use of capacity has 
less importance because the investment in shareholders' rights does not 
take place as a complement to credit business. The same is true of the 
spreading of risk, v/hich in the main only takes place in the context of 
share investment. The positive effects for the capital market that are 
connected with participation business are also, and particularly, relevant 
in the case of investment banks. Unplanned participatory holdings can 
only arise in connexion with share issue business. 
Against this positive evaluation stands the possibility of an influence 
on the undertakings in v/hich the participatory interests are held. Thus 
even in the "separation system" there can be a threat to the independence 
of corporate decision-making. This chiefly means that business relations 
can be stabilized. In this connexion it should be borne in mind, however, 
that the scope of the commercial interests pursued is considerably smaller 
and can basically only cover, in addition to consultancy, dealings in 
securities and share issue business. The danger arising frem the 
opportunity to exert influence thus loses its force. The autonomous 
pursuit by undertakings of their own interests can only be prejudiced to 
a slight extent. The same is also true of possible adverse consequences 
for competition. Only a narrov.ly limited sector of banking services can 
be affected. 
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of conflict v/hich are otherwise rooted in the link with credit business, 
the inducement of firms to act against their own interests is only 
conceivable in infrequent cases. The danger of neglect to exercise 
proper supervision under company lav/ when there is representation on 
governing bodies still exists. Conditions that are unfavourable in 
comparison with those offered by competitors can also be imposed. 
The possibility, conferred by participation, of influencing decisions 
on the market for undertaltings is not affected by the organization of 
the banking system. The market mechanism can be made inoperative 
insofar as decision-malting by the other party in the market can be 
influenced. 
The interests affected by participation are thus less pronounced in the 
"separation system" than they are in the universal banking system. In 
particular, the sharp conflict between profitability interests and depositor 
protection disappears. The potential for influence over undertakings, 
conferred by shareholding rights, has less scope for effect and its use 
is less determined by conflicts of interest. Only a distortion of 
decisions on the market for undertakings is conceivable, as in the 
universal banking system. 
On the basis of these considerations it cannot be recommended that the 
freedom of action of securities banks or investment banks with regard to 
their investment policies should be limited. This only applies, of 
course, to the extent that these special banks are prevented from exercising 
any influence over deposit banks. A development such as has been seen in 
the USA, with increasing links between banks in spite of the separation 
of departments, must be ruled out. 
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The effects of differences in Member States' regulations on the European 
Community's integration objectives 
(The need for Community legislation) 
I) The present state of integration 
Particular value attaches to the development of the banking sector within 
the framework of European integration since its importance to many other 
fields of the Community's economy is obvious. Integration of the markets 
for banking services can play a leading role particularly in the attempt 
that is still being made to set up economic and monetary union. The 
usual distinction which has existed up to now in Europe between home and 
foreign business cannot be retained until true monetary union is effected. 
The processes involved in developing the banking system and in moving 
towards monetary union are gradual and depend on market conditions and 
political factors. The creation of a common banking market, however, 
must come first in time so as to prepare the way for further integration 
(il  objectives^ ". 
Within the existing institutional framework of the Treaty of Rome, the 
instruments for integrating the banking sector are contained in the 
provisions for the freedom of establishment and for thé free provision 
of services and movement of capital (Articles 52-73 of the Treaty). 
Action within this framework to date may be outlined as follows. On 
28.6.1973 the Council issued a directive to remove restrictions on the 
freedom of establishment and on the free provision of services regarding 
the independent activities of banks and other financial establishments*" . 
This directive is aimed at guaranteeing equal treatment for banks in the 
Member States. These are in each case to be able to pursue their business 
activities in the same way as domestic organizations, through their own 
119 branches or through international trading. Other restrictions are not 
removed. Restrictions on business activities based on national law are 
not covered. Individual States' regulations as to the acquisition of 
participatory holdings are accordingly not affected by the directive^-
7 . 
Direct investments as a component part of the movement of capital were 
liberalized by the directive of 11.5.1960^ as extended by a directive 
of 18.12.1962^3·'. Here, too, one restriction applies. Under Article 
5 (3) of the i960 directive, restrictions on capital movement resulting 
from the regulations of a Member State remain intact. The creation of 
participatory holdings therefore continues to remain subject to national 
law. In line with the progressive liberalization of capital movement, 
however, it is also intended that banking services linked to capital 
movement should be liberalized (Art. 61 (2) Treaty of Rome). 
The requirement for Community legislation on banking activities therefore 
continues to exist. In December 1974 a proposal for a directive was 
prepared for this purpose^"'. Harmonization of national laws with regard 
to the admissibility of the acquisition of participatory holdings in the 
non-banking sector presupposes a reply to the question to what extent 
differing laws affect the realization of a common banking and capital 
market. 
II) Legal differences and a common banking market 
1) Competitive advantages for banking? 
The survey of regulations in Member States has shown that substantial 
differences exist. The spectrum ranges from unrestricted opportunity 
for participation within the universal banking system to prohibition in 
the case of specific types of banks. The resultant effects for any 
common banking market that might be set up can only be determined by 
proceeding from an equal basis. Only in the matter of participation 
should differences exist between the national banking systems under 
competitive conditions that are otherwise equal. 
120 The importance of the opportunity for participation as a parameter of 
activity on the market for banking services depends on the question of 
what advantages arise with regard to the competitive position. On this 
point, reference may be made to the comments on the status of participation 
within the banking field. 
From profitability aspects, major shareholdings may be regarded as 
advantageous for banks. Reference may be made to the doctrine of 
utilization of capacity, stabilization of the income risk, and direct 
profit-making interests (dividends and share price rises). The 
opportunities for diversification, in particular, offered thereby may 
lead to more favourable profit levels and consequently to competitive 
advantage. Increased profitability can be utilized by the banks to 
expand business through more favourable offers. 
Such competitive advantages exist as long as other institutions cannot 
diversify in this way. We have seen, however, that other portfolio 
investments, too, made with a view to utilizing capacity and stabilizing 
(7) 
risk can yield comparable results . And opportunity for profit through 
dividends and increases in share values are hardly assessable. Banks' 
competitive advantages on the basis of participation opportunities must 
therefore, to this extent, be judged cautiously. They exist, but are 
not specific in nature. 
In the field of participation as unplanned investment, too, a preferential 
position may be gained in international competition. The chief elements 
here are the reduction of risk in issue business and the security of credit. 
The account of the legal approach to participation in Member States has 
in fact shown that no relevant differences exist here. Even in the case 
of prohibitions on participation, exceptions apply to temporary 
stockholdings which as a rule cover such cases. 
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selective investment policy and plays no really important role within 
the scope of the business as a whole. 
If the opportunity for participation cannot accordingly be considered as 
of decisive importance to a common banking market, it should nevertheless 
be noted that associated services may affect the assessment. The very 
fact of being able to keep large holdings of shares enlarges the banks' 
spectrum of services. This applies irrespective of whether issuing 
business and dealing in securities are also undertaken. Greater recourse 
will be had to a bank with this capability as business consultants; this 
applies especially in the case of company rehabilitation and the 
reorganization of corporate structures by grouping and mergers. In this 
connexion, transitory items are commonly accepted. 
2) Competitive advantages as a result of influence based on company law 
The relevance of participation opportunities to international competitive 
status is further increased if influence based on the exercise of voting 
rights is included. This leads to trading from a monopolistic position 
and to a restriction of independent action by market rivals. The 
consequence is stabilization of business relations. Competing banks 
are thereby eliminated and competition is reduced. 
This capability is particularly noticeable in international competition. 
Where participation allows influence, foreign banks can be prevented from 
penetrating the home market. Existing business relations are hard to 
sever. International banking services are not encouraged. Conversely, 
banks with participation business are in a better position to operate in 
other foreign markets. Market relations not secured through company law 
are easier to alter. Where new sales opportunities are created, in 
certain circumstances a participatory investment can in turn be made in 
order to consolidate them. 
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on banks' opportunities for participation are appreciable. Influence 
through voting rights linked by definition to participation, in particular, 
leads to market positions that, especially in a common banking market 
within the EEC, could produce serious competitive disadvantages in the 
absence of uniform regulations. 
Ill) Legal differences and integration of the capital market 
It may be accepted that the importance to integration policy of the 
(81  inter-relationship of capital markets is substantial^ '. This aim is 
pursued in the first place by the removal of selective controls on capital 
movements which are discriminatory in effect. Article 67 of the Treaty 
of Rome provides a suitable legal basis for this. In addition, every 
Member State has statutory and administrative rules governing the movement 
of money, credit and capital which, without being discriminatory, differ 
as to aims and methods and consequently militate against an integration 
(9) 
of the capital market . These provisions also include the differing 
regulations regarding the admissibility of participation by banks in the 
non-banking sector. 
The importance of such investment to the market for participation capital 
has already been outlined^ '. It lies in the first instance in an 
expansion of the market, when the bank invests liquid funds in this way. 
The EEC investigation into the setting up of a European capital market 
(Segré Report) lays great stress on this function, especially where other 
(111  institutional investors are less in evidence^ '. To this should be 
added an increased elasticity in setting off supply against demand through 
dealing in large parcels of shares. The acquisition of shares, moreover, 
assists the placement of issues with a reduction of the associated risk, 
(1^1 
when gradual selling is made possible in this way*·'-'. 
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the first instance only secure similar capital market conditions in the 
Member States. An improvement in the functional capacity of the 
individual markets is, however, an important precondition for their 
integration. At the same time, the inter-linking of markets would be 
encouraged. It is in this area that the banks could make a special 
contribution. Compared with other investors, they are better able to 
obtain information on undertakings and stock exchange organization in 
other Member States. Balanced, undistorted development of a common 
market for participation capital therefore requires coordination of the 
regulations to enable banks to take up shareholding rights in other 
undertakings. 
IV) The harmonization of legal differences from the supervisory law aspect 
In authoritative literature on banking, it is advanced as an argument 
against harmonization of the rules on the acquisition of participatory 
holdings that an important question of control policy in the banking 
system would thereby be opened up. Standardization associated with the 
harmonization of commercial activities in the EEC v/ould not therefore, 
(13)  it is claimed, be appropriate . Behind this lies the view that only 
a common approach to the organizational principles on which banking is 
based could cover the question of participation. 
Coordination of the various national attitudes to matters regarding the 
structure of banking is unlikely in the foreseeable future. This would 
require unanimity as to the system on v/hich European banking business 
should be based. A decision of this kind is not, however, necessary 
for regulation of the acquisition of participatory holdings under Community 
law. 
The need for legislation arises in two sectors. Clearly in the foreground 
is the question of protecting depositors, as participation by banks in 
the non-banking sector gives rise to problems of banking solvency owing 
124 to the difficulty of liquidating the investments without loss. Moreover, 
the risk of a drop in value also affects the security requirement. 
Liquidity and security are two of the traditional subjects of banking 
supervisory legislation. Coordination of the relevant provisions in 
the Member States cannot affect the structure of the banking system. 
For the rest, as stated in the summary of the legal position in the various 
countries, clear concordance in banking legislation is already evident and 
based on supervisory law. This may be seen in the standardization of the 
relationship between participation and banks' own resources and the capital 
of the companies concerned. 
Further, the possible influence through participation on the companies 
concerned would support an intervention in the matter of the banks' 
freedom of action in the investment field. The considerations in this 
case are in fact of a regulative nature and relate to banking competition 
and the possibility of concentration of power. The question of the 
structure of the banking sector is not, however, affected thereby. 
The substantive, content of legislative control of participation consequently 
shows that harmonization does not in fact affect or intrinsically prejudice 
the structural basis. The position might well be otherwise if the 
opportunity for participation were to be entirely excluded. There are 
no grounds, however, for recommending this, as is shown by the proposal 
for legislation put forward in the next chapter. 
125 CHAPTER SEVEN 
Development of a proposal for legislation 
I) Possible methods of control and their relevance to present problems 
1) Prohibition of participation 
A prohibition on participation could be effected through the removal of 
participatory investments from the banking assets and their transfer to 
(1)  a special company . This would constitute an approach to a system 
whereby deposit banks were separated from investment banks. Such a 
solution, as indeed the introduction of a separation system, can, however, 
be left out of consideration immediately. It would, in particular, leave 
out of account the important contribution of banks' participatory holdings 
towards the viability of share markets. The report of the EEC 
investigation into the setting up of a European capital market (Segre 
Report) rightly advocates in several passages, a liberalization of the 
strict rules of a number of Member States·^-' which, in any event, also 
(3) 
contain exceptions with regard to the expansion of the share market
1·^'. 
Further, such radical solutions would be regarded as a political 
encroachment on a number of banking systems within the EEC. The measures 
could not be covered by a consensus regarding supervisory controls on 
banking activities. 
2) Limitation in proportion to own resources 
The comparative account of the legal position in Member States revealed 
a number of possible methods of control. Mention might be made here in 
the first instance of restriction on participation so as to maintain a 
specific ratio to the bank's own funds. This can be done in two ways. 
The restriction may apply to the ratio between shares in one company and 
the bank's own funds or all shareholdings as a whole may be related to 
the bank's own funds. 
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liquidity risk. This risk arises especially where short-term deposits 
are used for share investment v/hich is frequently not immediately realizable. 
The transformation of maturity dates implicit in this action jeopardizes 
the bank's ability to repay the deposits. This problem does not arise 
only in the case of individual participation, but through shareholding in 
general as there are no maturity dates for this kind of investment. It 
would consequently be more appropriate if shareholdings as a whole were 
to be restricted in proportion to own funds. In this way, the security 
requirement would be met at the same time. If the utilization of 
customers' money for participatory investment is excluded, there will be 
no risk of loss of value of deposits. 
3) Limitation of the level of participation in individual undertakings 
A further possible control lies in an obligation on the bank to limit 
its shareholdings in companies within the non-banking sector to a specific 
level. An encroachment of this kind on freedom of action would have a 
two-fold effect. Firstly, the restriction on the level of participation 
v/ould serve to protect depositors. As capital interests in an undertaking 
are strengthened, so the security risk in lending business rises. The 
economic losses of the undertaking affect the bank in proportion to the 
capital involvement. Secondly, a restriction on the level of participation 
affects the banks' opportunities for influencing the undertaking. Influence 
through voting rights is directly reduced. This means a less adverse 
effect on market interests that might be influenced through the undertaking. 
At the same time, the concentration of powers of economic decision is 
countered. If a limit is set to the level of participation, this may, 
however, affect the functional viability of the share market. 
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An interesting provision is made in connexion with banks' participatory 
holdings in the German Restriction of Competition Act (GWB), as amended 
in 1973· Section 23 of the Act requires notice to be given of mergers 
of undertaltings. The circumstances in which mergers must be notified 
include share acquisitions at a certain level. An exception applies, 
however, under Section 23 (5) of the GWB where a credit institution 
acquires shares in another undertaking in connexion v/ith the incorporation 
or capital increase of an undertaking or otherwise in the normal course 
of business for the purpose of re-sale on the market, provided that it 
does not exercise the voting rights on these shares and that re-sale is 
effected within twelve months. 
This provision should be judged v/ith reference to the purpose of mandatory 
notice. What is concerned is control of the concentration of undertakings 
from the cartel law aspect; the acquisition of shares by a bank within 
the stated conditions is not regarded as an element of amalgamation. 
The restriction on the exercise of voting rights where a shareholding is 
only temporary means in other words that the opportunity for economic 
influence is reduced. 
II) Proposal for legislation 
1) Limits to participation 
Due weighing of interests has meant that the pursuit of profitability 
underlying banks' participation policy must give way before the hazards 
in securing depositors associated therewith. The liquidity risk is 
most effectively restricted by a ratio between the bank's total shareholding 
and its own funds. As regards the question of how this ratio is to be 
129 fixed, there are no absolute yardsticks. A criterion may be found in 
the consideration that own funds serve not only to satisfy creditors but 
also as working capital. To meet this criterion, total participatory 
shareholdings would always have to be lower than a bank's own funds. 
Such a limitation would, however, have detrimental effects, particularly 
with regard to the expansion of the share market and to the often only 
temporary holding of shares, since the banks' own funds form only a small 
proportion of their balance sheet total. A limitation on shareholdings 
to the full amount of own funds therefore seems appropriate. This 
provision is in line with French banking supervision law. It is more 
liberal than the Dutch and Danish Acts, which impose a limit of 50%. 
The security risk for lending business associated with the possible 
depreciation of participatory holdings can be controlled especially by 
restricting the level of individual participation. In this way a better 
spreading of risks is achieved. When the level of participation is being 
fixed, account must at the same time be taken of the hazards arising from 
participation as a result of the opportunity to influence the undertaking 
concerned. 
Both aspects would support as low a shareholding as possible in individual 
companies. It should be noted in this connexion that where a company's 
shares are sufficiently widely distributed, even a very small holding can 
procure influence. 
A lower limit is in fact inherent in the concept of participation which 
excludes the possibility of influence. As long as 5% is not reached, 
these conditions do not arise. A draft Dutch law on banking supervision, 
however, provides for the introduction of an approval proviso in respect 
of this percentage and upwards. 
130 This limitation would certainly adequately restrict the problem of the 
protection of depositors and the influence over commercial undertakings. 
The question may still be asked, however, whether the importance of 
participation for a large capital market should not lead to a different 
conclusion. As explained, this importance depends on the existence of 
other institutional investors who combine to provide the supply of capital 
and are able to place it on the market for participation capital. In the 
investigation into the setting up of a European capital market (Segre 
Report) the proportion of institutional investors in Member States is 
considered too small for this purpose, except in Holland and Great 
(4)  Britain
v '. On the basis of this assessment, a higher proportion would 
seem desirable. In this way the opportunity for large-lot dealing 
would also be increased. A limit on participation of 10% of nominal 
capital is therefore proposed. This lies below the corresponding 
provisions in France and Ireland which specify a limit of 20%. Such 
a level of participation cannot, however, be supported if it is intended 
that the influence of banking on the economy should be restricted. It 
should further be noted that in Italy and Belgium there is a general 
prohibition on participation. The sole criterion of Danish legislation 
is the opportunity to exert influence, although no concrete limits are 
set. 
2) Exceptional provisions 
The analysis of the effects of participation on banks and the non-banking 
sector has indicated, with a due weighing of interests, that in certain 
situations the holding of shares fulfils important functions, for which 
special provision should be made. Mention should be made here of the 
creation of participatory holdings in the course of executing share 
issues (price support operations, temporary placement difficulties, etc). 
This promotes mediation between supply and demand on the share market. 
Shares are further taken up by way of debt conversion to save endangered 
credit, while temporary shareholdings promote elasticity in the capital 
market, especially in the creation of new corporate structures. 
131 Depending on circumstances, such factors could be regarded as exceptional 
provisions, as is the case in Belgium. In other countries, such as 
Italy and Ireland, an approval proviso has been introduced that can be 
exercised accordingly. 
The objections to an approval facility in respect of participation 
exceeding the 10% limit, when such a facility is not concretely defined, 
are appreciable. This facility would allow the competent authorities 
to exercise the discretion granted them in accordance with the most 
varying criteria. The need for control that would arise might then be 
left out of account in certain circumstances. If, for example, a liberal 
outlook on approval was motivated by the needs of the capital market, the 
requirements of depositor protection and, particularly, the significance 
of a free banking market for integration policy would recede into the 
background. 
As long as Community powers of approval cannot be realized, a system of 
limited exceptions must be proposed. However, a compromise is conceivable 
in this case which v/ould allow more flexible reactions and could assist 
the ability to arrive at a political consensus on this point. The special 
conditions of participation referred to are already essentially fulfilling 
their function in the case of temporary shareholdings. Approval for the 
acquisition of participation for a set period could consequently be 
provided for in order to cover exceptional situations and to take account 
of other situations where necessary (e.g. the employment of capacity), 
A one-year period such as exists in Belgium for such cases might be 
appropriate. However, an opportunity for extension should be introduced 
where holdings can demonstrably not be reduced to 10% without substantial 
loss. 
132 A relatively open-ended clause of this kind must be restricted in two 
ways if the general problems of participation are also to be taken into 
account. If a participation in certain circumstances exists for several 
years or even for only one year, influence on the undertaking concerned 
is likely. This may, to a certain extent at least, be countered by 
prohibiting the exercise of voting rights. Banking interests will not 
be adversely affected by this. The functions of middleman on the capital 
market remain viable. At the same time, sale of the holdings is 
encouraged. 
A restriction on the level of participation must also be demanded in this 
case in the interests of protecting depositors. Even in the case of a 
temporary shareholding, a high commitment means a high risk of depreciation. 
It is therefore suggested that an upper limit of 50% of the share capital 
be imposed. 
Exceptional provisions in respect of the fixing of the ratio between the 
shareholding and the bank's own funds are not necessary since sufficient 
freedom of action for participatory investment remains within this framework. 
There are no special regulations of this kind within Member States. 
3) Combating circumvention of the provisions 
The limits here placed on participatory holdings could be evaded by the 
banks interposing other companies. Shares in another undertaking would 
go beyond the proposed limit of 10% if a subsidiary were also to hold 
shares. Influence could in this way be increased to an inadmissible extent. 
No risk would arise, however, with regard to the protection of depositors 
and the problem of evasion thus loses its significance. 
133 Evasion of this kind would require group-type links between at least 
two companies under simultaneous controlling influence of the bank whose 
participatory holdings were restricted. This condition would apply to 
a bank only if it interposed other banks or financial institutions. For 
control can, as a rule, only be exercised over an appreciable participation, 
which in turn would be permissible only in the case of companies within 
the banking sector. 
The possibilities of this kind of circumvention become particularly 
important if a bank whose participatory holdings are restricted joins 
with another institution to which no such limit applies. This would 
apply, for example, to controls on investment banks or credit institutions 
with registered offices outside the EEC. A conceivable solution would 
be to consolidate holdings in the non-banking sector by dependent companies 
with the overall holdings of the controlling bank. Consolidation of this 
kind could be extended to cover a group in its entirety. Indirect 
influence on other undertakings by means of participation would thus be 
prevented. The overstepping of permissible shareholding limits would 
have to be remedied through the relinquishing of the controlling 
participation in the interposed company. This relinquishment could be 
implemented in conjunction with a duty of disclosure or an approval 
requirement in respect of connexions betv/een undertaltings in the financial 
sector. 
Another conceivable means of circumvention would be the interposition of 
a holding company intended to hold participatory interests in the 
non-banking field. If the holding company's shares were taken up by 
the bank itself, the problem would be no different from the problem of 
evasion already discussed. The position would be different, however, 
if the shares in the holding company viere taken up by the bank's 
shareholders on an exchange basis. The bank's shares would then form 
part of the holding company's assets. 
A solution could not be related to the bank's activities nor to the 
formation of the holding company by the bank, since a "man of straw" 
could be interpolated. 
134 It would be difficult to prohibit the transfer of banking shares to 
holding companies within the banking supervisory purview. In order 
to secure compliance with the suggested provision, therefore, it would 
be necessary to include the participatory interests held by banking 
holding companies. 
Göttingen, February 1975 Prof. Dr. Ulrich Immenga 
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Addendum 
After the completion of this study (February 1975),the Belgian 
Law Bank was amended (Amending Law of 30 June 1975, Moniteur 
Belge, 2 August 1975, page 947l). Article 14 of the previous 
Bank Law is affected by the amendment. In principle, the sepa-
ration system is retained, but the following additions must be 
made to Chapter 2, Section I (Belgium)(2)(Exceptions) of the 
study : 
- (a) : Banks are now permitted to invest not only in other banks 
but also in savings banks and in credit institutions set up 
under special laws. The interpretation given in the second 
paragraph of (a) (footnote 6) is expressly incorporated into 
the law in the form of the power to authorise exceptions 
(Article 14(7), new version). 
- (b), (c) and (d) : Unchanged 
- Addition : (e) : Article 14 (4) of the Belgian Bank Law was 
redrafted in June 1975 and now in addition permits shares to 
be held where these shares do not exceed certain limits with 
regard to their value or to the voting rights which they confer; 
these limits are to be determined by royal decree, issued on the 
basis of an opinion by the Banking Commission. This very far-
reaching general exception will still prevent banks from exerting 
a controlling influence over non—banks (no majority holdings, etc.) 
but represents a distinct step in the direction of the 
"despecialisation" of Belgian deposit banks. A revised form of 
Article 14 (6) of the Belgian Bank Law confers upon the Banking 
Commission a specific right to require the communication of informa-
tion and a right to set limits to the risks that may be assumed 
by way of trade investments. 
157 ANNEX I 
STATUTORY BASES Belgium: Royal Decree No. 185 of 1935 
Article 14 
No bank established in any of the forms specified under Article 8 may possess 
partnership shares or shareholdings of any kind whatever in any one or more 
commercial companies or companies having a commercial form other than banks or 
in any one or more undisclosed partnerships. 
Such banks may, however, subscribe for or purchase such securities, other than 
through a stock exchange, for the purpose of offering them for sale and may 
retain ownership therein for a period not exceeding one year as from the time 
subscription or purchase is first undertaken to this end. Subject to the same 
limitations, they may similarly hold shares in one or more undisclosed 
partnerships formed for the purpose of offering shares or bonds for sale. 
Such banks may, furthermore, acquire ownership of the securities referred to 
in paragraph 1 of this article in order to protect themselves against their 
doubtful or overdue debts. Such securities shall be disposed of within a 
period of two years. 
The prohibition imposed under paragraph 1 shall net apply to the securities 
referred to therein where these are guaranteed by the otate, by the Colony, 
by the provinces or by the civil parishes, nor tc shares in the capital of 
credit institutions set up by special statute. 
The Banking Commission may, in respect of periods not exceeding one year in 
either case, grant two extensions to the periods specified under paragraphs 
¿ and 3· 
The Banking Commission may, by regulation approved by the Minister of Finance 
and by the Minister for Economic Affairs, lay down instructions applicable to 
all registered banks intended on the one hand to ensure that it receives 
information on the transactions set out in paragraph 2 and, on the other hand, 
to limit the relative extent of portfolios of securities to be offered for sale. 
The Banking Commission may grant dispensation from the limits laid dov>n by it 
by virtue of the preceding paragraph where these are justified by exceptional 
circumstances. 
161 PENAL SANCTIONS. Article 42 (4) - Directors, managing partners, managers and 
chief clerks who contravene the provisions of Article 14 shall be punished by 
the penalties provided for under Article 179 (now 204) of the consolidated 
legislation on commercial companies (imprisonment for one month to one year 
and a fine of 50 tö 10,000 francs, or either of these two penalties alone). 
Article 44 - Bankers, directors, managing partners, managers and chief clerks 
failing to observe the provisions of the regulations laid down by Article 14 (6) 
shall be punished by imprisonment for eight days to three months and a fine of 
50 to 10,000 francs, or one of these penalties alone. 
162 Federal Republic of Germany: Banking Act of 10 July 1961 
(Federal Lav/ Gazette, I, p. 881) 
(5) The equity capital shall be valued on the basis of the most recent balance 
sheet drawn up as at the end of a financial year. Capital changes subsequently 
entered in public registers shall be taken into account. 
Section 11 Liquidity. Credit institutions shall invest their funds in such a 
way that adequate liquidity shall be guaranteed at all times. The Federal 
Supervisory Office shall lay down principles in consultation with the German 
Federal Bank by means of which it shall normally be judged whether a credit 
institution's liquidity is adequate; the credit institution's professional 
associations shall be consulted beforehand. The principles shall be published 
in the Federal Gazette. 
Section 12 Investment in land, ships and participation. Permanent investment 
by a credit institution in land, buildings, ships and participation may not in 
aggregate, when calculated by book values, exceed the equity capital. The 
Federal Supervisory Office may on application permit a credit institution to 
depart from this provision temporarily. 
2. Credit business 
Section 13 Major credit (1) Credit granted to a borrower exceeding in the 
aggregate 15% of the credit institution's equity capital ("major credit") shall 
be notified forthwith to the German Federal Bank; this shall not apply to major 
credit where the sum granted or drawn is not more than 20,000 Deutsche marks, 
unless such major credit exceeds the credit institution's equity capital. Major 
credit already notified shall be notified again if it is increased by more than 
20% of the sum last notified. The German Federal Bank shall pass such 
notification on to the Federal Supervisory Office together with its opinion 
thereon; the latter may waive the passing on of specific notification. The 
Federal Supervisory Office may require credit institutions to submit a summary 
once yearly of major credit qualifying for notification. 
(2) Credit institutions having the legal form of a corporate entity or a trading 
partnership may without prejudice to the effectiveness of the transaction grant 
major credit only by virtue of a unanimous decision by all management. The 
decision shall be taken before credit is granted. Where this is impossible in 
163 particular cases owing to the urgency of the transaction, the decision:shall 
be taken subsequently_Jwithout delay.. The decision shall be officially recorded. 
If a decision has not been obtained within one month the Federal Supervisory 
Off ice IsHall be■informed accordingly¿ 
(3) Major credit shall not in the aggregate comprise more than one-half of the 
sum of all credit granted by the credit institution. The relevant amounts for 
this purpose shall be the sums drawn. 
164 Denmark 
Chapter 6 
Investment and liquidity of assets 
Section 25. A bank or savings bank may not grant a customer credit or take 
up guarantees for the person concerned to such an amount that the bank's or 
savings bank's total outstanding account with, or obligations on behalf of, 
the person concerned exceed 35 per cent of the bank's or savings bank's 
equity capital at the beginning of the year, in addition to equity capital 
originating from share or guarantee capital subscribed during the year. 
Upon the unanimous recommendation of the Board of Managers and with the 
consent of at least two-third of the Board of Directors in each case, this 
limit to the extent of individual commitments may be increased to 50 per cent. 
Such a decision must be reported to the Inspectorate of Banks and Savings 
Banks. This also applies to a bank's or savings bank's total outstanding 
account with, and obligations on behalf of, undertakings between which 
there is such a connexion that the commitments with these constitute a 
joint individual risk for the bank or savings bank. 
Para. 2. The Minister of Trade may establish regulations providing for 
particularly safe claims to be disregarded in the calculation of the 
amounts set out in Para. 1. 
Section 24· A bank or savings bank may not own or raise a loan on shares, 
co-operative shares or guarantee certificates in an individual company at 
a book value higher than I5 per cent of the bank's or savings bank's 
equity capital. However, the bank's or savings bank's interest in the 
undertaking concerned may not thereby exceed the limit set out in 
Section 23, Para. 1. The book value of the shares, co-operative shares 
and guarantee certificates acquired by a bank or savings bank may not 
exceed 50 per cent of the bank's or savings bank's equity capital. 
Para. 2. A bank or savings bank may not acquire or, with a right to 
exercise voting rights, pledge more than 30 per cent of the share capital 
in a bank or of the guarantee capital in a savings bank. With its annual 
accounts, the bank or the savings bank shall submit to the Inspectorate 
of Banks and Savings Banks a return of the shares in banks and guarantee 
certificates in savings banks that it possesses or has pledged. 
165 Para. 3. A bank may not acquire or accept as security its own shares to a 
total face value greater than 10 per cent of the share capital. Pledges may 
not exceed 75 per cent of the pledged document's market value and of its face 
value or, if the document is the subject of a market quotation, 75 per cent 
of the buying price quoted at any time. A report on such pledging and 
acquisition shall be submitted to the Inspectorate of Banks and Savings 
Banks together with the monthly balances. 
Para. 4« If a bank or savings bank grants a loan for the taking up of its 
share of guarantee capital beyond 5 percent of the bank's or savings bank's 
total share or guarantee capital, incontestable surety must have been 
provided for the excess amount. 
Para. 5» A savings bank may not acquire or accept as security its own 
guarantee certificates. 
Section 25» A bank or savings bank may not own real property or have shares 
(holdings) in property companies at a higher book value than 20 per cent of 
its equity capital. Real property that a bank or savings bank has acquired 
in order to operate bank or savings bank activities therein is however not 
covered by the regulation. 
Section 26. The Inspectorate of Banks and Savings Banks may grant exemption 
from the provisions of Section 23, Para. 1, Section 24, Paras. 1 and 2 and 
Section 25· 
Section 27. A bank or savings bank may not, without the permission of the 
Inspectorate of Banks and Savings Banks, grant credit to or issue guarantees 
for undertakings or persons which, through shareholdings or otherwise, 
directly or indirectly, have a controlling influence upon the bank's or 
savings bank's transactions, or which are controlled by undertakings or 
persons having such an influence. 
Para. .2. If the Inspectorate has good reason to assume that permission 
pursuant to Para. 1 is necessary, and this is contested by the bank or 
savings bank concerned, it is for the latter to prove that this is not 
the case. 
166 Section 28. According to the circumstances of the bank or savings bank, 
it must have a sound cash balance, in which may be included fully secure 
and liquid demand deposits with Danish and foreign banks and savings banks 
as well as credit balances on postal giro accounts. The cash balance, 
together with the value of the holdings of secure, easily realizable, 
unpledged securities and credit instruments shall amount to at least 15 
per cent of the liabilities that - irrespective of any payment conditions -
the bank or savings bank is required to pay on demand or at notice shorter 
than one month. The liquid holdings referred to must also amount to at 
least 10 per cent of the bank's or savings bank's total liabilities and 
guarantee obligations, as computed pursuant to Section 21. 
Para. 2. If the requirements of Para. 1 are not met and the position not 
rectified within eight days, the bank or savings bank shall report this 
immediately to the Inspectorate of Banks and Savings Banks. The Inspectorate 
sets a time limit for the requirements to be met. 
167 France 
Artide 5 (Decree No. 66-81 of 25 January 1966). Deposit banks (banques de 
depots) are banks whose chief activity is to carry on credit operations and to 
receive sight and time deposits from the public. 
(Decree No. 66-1053 of 23 December 1966). They shall not keep participatory 
shareholdings to an amount exceeding 20% of the capital in undertakings other 
than banks, financial institutions or companies necewsary to their operation 
and undertaking the management either of real assets or research services or 
technical services connected with banking. 
(Decree No. 67-757 of 1 September 1967) Furthermore, the aggregate of the 
said participatory holdings, including firm subscriptions for share issues, 
shall not exceed the aggregate of their own resources. 
Deposit banks, in the absence of special and temporary dispensation granted by 
the Banking Control Commission, shall not exceed the limits set out in the two 
preceding paragraphs or use any sight deposits or deposits with a term of less 
than two years for participatory investment or investment in immovables. 
Deposit banks whose chief activity is to intervene on the money market or the 
foreign exchange market may receive deposits from the public only up to the 
level of such proportion of their own resources as may be fixed by the National 
Credit Council. 
Investment banks (banques d'affaires) are banks whose chief activity, other than 
the granting of Credit, is the acquisition and management of participatory 
holdings in existing businesses or businesses in the course of being set up. 
For this purpose they may not invest funds received at sight or for a term of 
less than two years. 
Long and medium-term credit banks (banques de credit à long et moyen terme) are 
banks whose chief activity is to grant credit for a term of at least two years. 
They may not receive deposits for a shorter term than this without the permission 
of the Banking Control Commission. 
They shall be subject to the same restrictions as deposit banks as regards 
participation by them, save in the case of special and temporary dispensation 
granted by the Banking Control Commission. 
168 The above provisions shall not apply to credit establishments placed under 
State control exercising their activities within the framework of a constitution 
defined by law. Such provisions, however, may be extended in whole or in part 
by decree of the Council of State
v~'. 
(1) Former Art. 4: there are three classes of bank: deposit banks, investment 
banks, and long and medium-term credit banks. 
Each bank must adopt one or other of these classes by declaration made to the 
Banking Control Commission within three months of the effective date of the 
present Act. They are allowed one year to conform with the rules applying to 
their class except in the case of dispensation or extension granted by the 
Banking Control Commission. 
All of them shall be subject to the controls provided for under Arts. 12-15 
below. 
(Added under Act No. 46-1071 of 17 May 1946): The Control Commission may v/ithin 
a period of two months indicate that it does not accept the classification 
requested by a bank and may place it in another class. Similarly, where a 
bank's activities no longer comply with the conditions on which its previous 
classification had been based, the Control Commission may amend such classification. 
In either case, an appeal may be lodged against the decision before the National 
Credit Council within a period of one month. 
(2) Former Art. 5 (wording of the Act of 2 December 1945): Deposit banks are 
banks receiving sight deposits or deposits with a maximum term of two years from 
the public. They may not hold participatory interests in undertakings other 
than banks, financial institutions or property companies necessary for their 
operation exceeding 10% of the capital of such undertakings. They may not in 
the form of participation or in investment in real property use the deposits 
that they receive from the public without permission from the Deposit Committee 
of the National Credit Council. 
Investment banks are banks whose chief activity is to acquire participatory 
holdings and to manage such participatory holdings in undertakings and which 
do not receive sight deposits or deposits with a term of one year or less except 
from their own staff, their active or sleeping partners or from undertakings in 
v/hich they effectively hold 15% of the nominal capital or which they have caused 
169 to be set up by accepting participation at a level of 15% of the initial capital. 
The class of long and medium-term credit banks covers the establishments having 
such objects, which have been placed under State control and which carry on 
their activities within the framework of a constitution laid down by law. Their 
chairman, director-general or governor shall be appointed by the State. Banks 
specialising in long and medium-term credit not falling within this definition 
shall be deemed to be investment banks. 
Former Art. 5 (wording of Act No. 46-1071 of 17 May 1946): Deposit banks are 
banks which receive sight deposits or deposits with a term not exceeding two 
years from the public. 
They may not hold participatory interests in undertakings other than banks, 
financial institutions or property companies necessary for their operation to 
an amount exceeding 1C% of the capital of such undertakings. 
In no case shall the total sum of such participation, including firm subscriptions 
for share issues, exceed 75% of their own funds. Any exceeding of this limit 
and any utilization of their deposits in the form of participation or property 
investment is prohibited unless authority is granted by the Deposit Committee 
of the National Credit Council. 
Investment banks are banks whose chief activity is to acquire and to manage 
participatory holdings in existing businesses or businesses in the course of 
being set up and to offer credit without limitation as to time to public or 
private undertakings which benefit, have benefited or will benefit from the 
said participation. 
For this purpose they shall invest only such funds as derive from their own 
resources or from deposits at not less than two years' call or notice. 
(Note continued on page 3) 
170 Ireland: Central Bank Quarterly, Bulletin, Autumn 1971 
In exercising the function of supervising the activities of holders of licences, 
the Bank will continue to apply, as appropriate, the requirements and standards 
set out above. In addition it will apply the following standards:- Λ 
1. Structure 
A holder of a licence 
(i) Should observe minimum liquidity standards appropriate to its class 
of bank. 
(ii) Should not pay a dividend until all of its preliminary expenses have 
been recovered out of profits. 
2. Activities 
A holder of a licence 
(i) Should not, except under penalty as to rate, repay on shorter notice 
than that which was agreed, money held on deposit in cases where the 
agreed notice period exceeds ten days. 
(ii) ohould not owe more than 10 per cent, of deposits to any one depositor. 
(iii) Should not extend more than 10 per cent, of total bills, loans and 
advances (including acceptances) to any one individual, firm or group 
of companies. 
(iv) Should not extend more than 2 per cent, of total bills, loans and 
advances (including acceptances) to any of its directors or a business 
in which it or any of its directors has what is considered by the 
Central Bank to be a major interest. 
(v) Should not, without the prior approval of the Central Bank, make an 
investment in voting shares of another company in excess of 20 per cent, 
of such shares except in the case of:-
(a) another bank or a company offering financially-related services, 
i.e. engaging in activities functionally related to banking; or 
(b) a business in v/hich the holder's investment by v/ay of shares, bills, 
loans and advances (including acceptances) is less than 2 per cent, 
of the total of its assets in these forms. 
171 (vi) Should not have an undue concentration of risk assets in any one sector 
of business or economic activity. 
(vii) Should not grant an advance, loan or credit facility against the 
security of its own shares or the shares of any subsidiary, 
• **-* fellow-subsidiary or parent company unless such shares are quoted 
on a Stock Exchange. 
(viii) Should ensure that its activities are consistent with the aims of 
economic and monetary policy, the safety of depositors' funds and 
fair trading in banking. 
172 Italian Banking Act 
Artide 35 
The Supervisory Office further disposes of the following powers with regard 
to undertakings under its supervision: 
a) to order meetings to be convened of shareholders and participating corporate 
entities and of the board of management and other governing bodies in order 
to submit to them for comment the instructions considered necessary in 
respect of the undertakings and to convene meetings itself if the competent 
bodies fail to heed this call; 
b) to order compulsory execution proceedings to be opened against debtors 
through whom the financial undertaking is considered by the supervisory 
office to be in arrears of payment; 
c) to lay down provisions for the elimination, reduction or settlement of 
interruptions in payments occurring in the case of the said undertakings. 
The Supervisory Office may, further: 
a) specify the relationship between the company's assets and investments in 
land and securities: 
b) lay down upper limits to the granting of credit and issue provisions and 
time-limits v/ith regard to reductions in the case of excessive credit; 
c) issue provisions regarding the declarations to be made by applicants 
concerning their financial and economic position in order to obtain credit; 
d) give its opinion on an application that the undertaking proposes to make 
to the ¡Sourt to summon the creditors for the purpose of making a composition. 
An application shall be deemed unacceptable by the court if it is not 
accompanied by such an opinion or a simple declaration by the Supervisory 
Office that there is no impediment to such an application being made. 
173 Italy: Credit Supervisory Regulations - G (17) 
17 - Participatory Holdings 
(Articles 33 and 35 of the Banking Act) 
For supervisory purposes "participation" shall as a general rule mean any 
investment intended to create economic and/or capital links in other than 
a transitory manner: 
- in the shares of part-holdings in the capital or capital funds of banking 
and non-banking companies and organizations for the purpose of exercising, 
either exclusively or in concert with other subsidiaries, the rights and 
powers attaching to the ownership of shares or part-holdings; 
in shares taken up in organizations set up or promoted by the State or by 
other public bodies entrusted with specific tasks or functions of a generd 
nature. 
Participatory holdings which credit institutions may wish to take up in exceptiond 
circumstances for good reason shall be notified beforehand to the Supervisory 
Office accompanied by a full explanation of the matter and by copies of the 
balance sheets for the last three years of the establishment in v/hich a 
participatory holding is to be taken up. 
The requirement as to prior notification relates both to the assumption of shares 
in the initial capitd or capital funds of a company or organization and to an 
increase, even by a scrip issue, in such holdings dready in being. 
Notification shall further be made of any variation made in participatory holdings 
even where no actual payments are concerned (refunds, transfers, depreciation). 
The Bank of Italy has instituted a generd scheme for a credit system with regard 
to "banking and other" participatory holdings and has prepared appropriate 
documents known as Forms 84 Vig. and 85 Vig. 
Form 84 Vig. was completed at the end of the 1969 financial year in respect of 
all participatory investments held by a finance house or special credit 
institution, however such holdings may be treated for accounting purposes, 
including those totally written off or depreciated which, moreover, shdl be 
shown separately in open account if only at the nominal vdue of 1 Lira. 
174 Form 84 Vig. must be used to notify the assumption of new participatory holdings 
and shall further be used as soon as any individual new investment is made 
whether wholly or in part. 
Credit houses and specid credit institutions shall on their own accord enter 
on form 84 Vig. ody the following details for the time being: 
- details of the credit house and the special credit institution making 
notification; 
- details of the participatory holdings: such details must include individud 
specification of the items in the account (forms 81, 82 and 140 Vig.) under 
which the holding has been entered; 
- detdls of commercial activities, to be indicated in conformity with those 
adopted by the Risk Centre. 
As regards the registered office, in addition to the details entered in full, 
credit houses and specid credit institutions shdl place only a cross "X" in 
box "R" as regards resident companies and in box "NR" as regards non-resident 
companies. A similar cross must further be placed in one of the boxes to the 
right of the capital entry for the purpose of indicating cases where the capitd 
of the company comprises listed shares ("AQ"), udisted shares ("ANQ") or 
part-shares ("Q"). 
Form 85 Vig. shall be used only to indicate any variation occurring in the 
participatory holding and also affecting any entry in the "registry" or "status" 
sections of form 84 Vig.; notwithstanding the above, the registry section shall 
in dl cases include an indication of the company's name and registered office 
to permit proper identification of the holding. 
175 The Netherlands 
From the Dutch Bill to reform the Supervisory Act 
Article 17 
1. Credit institutions shall not, save where a declaration of consent has been 
obtained from the Bank: 
a) reduce their own assets by a repayment of capital or payment out of the 
reserves; 
b) obtain participation in other undertakings or institutions directly or 
indirectly, participation being taken to mean an interest exceeding 5% 
of the net worth of the undertaking or institution concerned, nor increase 
such a participation; 
c) take over the assets and liabilities of other undertakings or institutions 
in whole or in a substantial part; 
d) enter into mergers v/ith other undertaltings or institutions; 
e) proceed to financial reorganization; 
f) cause a managing partner to join a credit institution. 
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177 Banks' participation in the non-banking sector 
(Notes on the tabulated summaries) 
Introduction 
Having regard to the relevance of a 25% participation under shareholding lav/ 
(Sections 179 (II) 1. and 182 (I) 1. AktG.), ody such participation has been 
included in the investigation where the shareholder owns at least one-quarter 
of the share capital of a public limited liability company or a limited 
partnership with share capital. 
For the sake of clarity, it should be pointed out that dl capital sums referred 
to below represent the nominal value. 
1. General 
In 1972/73 there were 2,169 public limited liability companies and limited 
partnerships with share capital having their shareholders' rights embodied in 
formal documents; the total share capital of these companies amounted to 
DM 64,455 million. 
Amongst these companies, a total of 2,8l6 participatory holdings of 25% and 
over was ascertained. This participation represents DM 40,477 million or 
62.8% of the total share capital. In other words, only 37.2% of the total 
share capital (i.e. DM 23,978 million) was held by small and medium-sized 
shareholders; of the latter sum, in turn, DM 9>532 million was attributable 
to 36 companies, mainly major undertakings, in the case of which substantial 
participation could not be determined. 
2. Banks' participation in particular (position at 30.11.1973) 
2.1 The scope of the investigation 
Included in the investigation were 400 companies, i.e. 18.44% of the total basic 
unit of 2,169 companies. 73, i-e. 18.25%, of the companies investigated held 
178 one or more participatory interests of 25% and over. Altogether, 83 
participatory holdings were found amongst the 73 companies. 
2.2 The extent of participation in detail 
The share capitd of the companies investigated amounted to DM 3,359«45 million, 
i.e. 5·21% of the total share capitd. 
The total amount of the banks' participation in the companies investigated was 
DM 1,279.01 million. Of this, DM 90.23 million related to majority holdings, 
and DM 1,188.78 million to participation from 25% up to, but not including, 50%. 
Participation by ody one bank was found in the case of 63 companies, by two 
banks in the case of 9 companies and by three banks in the case of ody one 
company. 
Participatory holdings were owned by 24 credit institutions - major banks and 
private banks - the greatest extent of participation by value (but not by 
volume) idling, as might be expected, to the three major banks. In relation 
to the totd amount of share capital, banks' participation amounted to about 2%. 
2.3 Participation and net worth of the banks 
The statistics on the banks' participation and net worth/own funds deserve 
special attention. 
If calculation is based exclusively on the share capital of the bank concerned, 
it appears that, for example, participation by the Deutsche Bank amounted to 
just under 60% of this capital sum, by the Dresdner Bank to about 49%, and by 
the Commerzbank to 42%. If the reserves are added to the share capital, 
participation by the three major banks changes within a range of 16-19% of 
this capital sum. It should be stressed once again in this connexion that 
the percentages quoted have been cdculated on the basis of the nominal value 
of the participation. If the bdance sheet vdues were used as a basis for 
participation, the latter wodd exceed the net worth of the credit institution 
concerned many times over. 
179 Participations by banks in the non-banking sector 
As of November 30. 1973 
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Westdt.Landesbank, Girozentrde 
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Totd participations  1.279,01  (83) 
+ the number of participations held by each bank is 
indicated in brackets 
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